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Foreword
In the late 1990s, PPIC began a systematic assessment of growth,
development, and infrastructure issues in California.  The first report
looked at metropolitan planning organizations and the implementation
of federal transportation policy.  The second focused on redevelopment
as a form of subsidy to local governments.  Subsequent reports covered
topics as diverse as local growth controls; infrastructure planning,
budgeting, and financing; housing supply; the regulation of electricity;
and the future of water markets in California.  It would be hazardous to
identify a single, simple theme in all of these studies, but they all do
conclude that building for the future of California will not be “business
as usual.”  In the past, California relied on increased spending to meet its
needs. The future will increasingly require improved efficiency—making
better use of existing facilities rather than the wholesale construction of
new ones.  Moreover, the state’s growth plans are, and will probably
continue to be, heavily constrained by a combination of local and state
policies that regulate everything from the environment to affordable
housing.
By 2003, PPIC had a much better understanding of infrastructure
supply, including the options for putting new capacity in place and the
process for implementing plans.  We were less certain about future
demands and what the future will bring in terms of population growth
and composition.  Is our current system of infrastructure planning and
investment up to the job?
We approached the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation with an
ambitious plan—mobilize resources from both institutions to take a look
out to the year 2025.  PPIC was in the unique position of having a
research team that had just completed ten years of research on the
changing population, economy, and governance issues facing the state.
We had also just completed five years of work on infrastructure.  Our
proposed project identified a wide range of relevant issues—population
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and economic forecasts, systems of governance, the financing and
requirements for infrastructure, the equity of alternative solutions,
and statewide public opinion about the need for new infrastructure
investments.  The Hewlett Foundation had a strong interest in bringing
the state’s future requirements to public attention and highlighting the
kinds of solutions necessary to bring demand in line with supply.  With
substantial support from the foundation, PPIC launched the project in
the fall of 2003.  California 2025: Taking on the Future is the result of
that effort.
This project draws some remarkable conclusions.  The contributors
see a future of slowing population growth and a shift in economic
growth trends that will put less pressure on infrastructure. They also
conclude that major strides have been made in the planning and
financing of infrastructure and that many of the demand-management
options once politically unattractive are entering into the process of
balancing supply and demand.  Rather than facing a crisis, California
seems to be at a critical point—looking at a future that could be
managed with a set of policy options that fall short of budget-breaking
solutions.
Ironically, the major concern raised in the report relates to the
supply of high-skill labor.  Providing sufficient human capital, rather
than more physical capital, could well be California’s biggest challenge in
the year 2025 and beyond.  California has always drawn on a national
and international labor market to help meet its needs for high-skill labor.
However, those born in California who do not get a four-year college
degree might well find themselves left out in future growth cycles.  The
relative supply of jobs for high school graduates will shrink while jobs for
higher-skill workers expand.  The authors conclude that this shift,
coupled with some demographic trends, could create a state with
increasing numbers of workers without the skills to make significant
gains in lifetime earnings.  Their conclusions point once again to the
importance of education to the state’s economic growth and especially to
the integration and well-being of individuals from second and third
generation immigrant families.
This report provides a unique profile of California’s future.  From
population and economic growth to the supply of infrastructure.  From
vphysical capital to human capital.  From “hard” solutions to “soft”
solutions to our infrastructure challenges. And from importing our
future labor supply to growing our own.  These are the challenges facing
the state today.  California 2025: Taking on the Future provides the facts
and clarifies the options.
David W. Lyon
President and CEO
Public Policy Institute of California
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11. Introduction and Summary
Ellen Hanak and Mark Baldassare
There has been a mounting sense of doom and gloom about the
future of the Golden State.  After decades of rapid population growth
and repeated cycles of budget shortfalls, California appears to be drifting
into a state of disrepair and voters seem to disregard the long-term
consequences of ignoring its schools, roads, and other infrastructure.  At
least that has been the drumbeat sounded by alarmists, made up of a
loose coalition that includes such unlikely allies as Republicans and
Democrats, business interests and labor activists, and builders and
environmentalists.  Whether the growth and infrastructure crisis is as bad
as some say and how to best go about planning for the future and paying
for necessary repairs and expansion of infrastructure are the topics that
we seek to address in this report, California 2025.
The project evolved out of an interest on the part of many
institutions that care deeply about the future of the state and generous
funding from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.  Staff and
resources of the Public Policy Institute of California were directed
toward providing policymakers, interest groups, and the public with a
nonpartisan, objective, independent analysis of the current state of affairs
and the available policy options as California prepares to take on its
uncertain future.   The endeavor draws on the talents and expertise of
researchers in all three of our institute’s program areas—economy,
governance, and population—to provide the most thorough and
comprehensive investigation into the state’s future to date.  In areas
where we lacked the depth of knowledge, or wanted second opinions on
our findings, we called on outside experts from other state think tanks
and research organizations.
Our choice of the year 2025 as a horizon for looking at California’s
future was carefully considered.  The state government is required to
make plans at five-year intervals, which seem too short-term for
addressing long-range issues.  Some population and economic
2projections extend 40 years or longer, but they are scarce and admittedly
look into events that are well beyond the foreseeable future.  The 20-year
time frame provides the researcher with many data points to compare
and contrast and a reasonable interval for planners and policymakers to
develop policies and programs that may take years or even decades to
implement.
Our focus on three elements of infrastructure—schools, water
systems, and roads and transportation systems—was also considered.
The large, high-impact public works projects undertaken by the state a
half-century ago were in these three arenas.  Prime examples include the
Master Plan for Higher Education and heavy investments in public
school systems, the State Water Plan’s extensive network of reservoirs
and aqueducts, and the massive freeway system that defines California’s
landscape today.  These sectors continue to dominate public investment
in California, receiving a significant proportion of all state and local
investment dollars.  There is general agreement that public education,
water systems, and transportation projects will play an important part in
the state’s future and thus demand our attention today.
Many of the findings and conclusions offered in this volume will
support the views of those who have raised serious concerns about the
state’s future.   Certainly, it is a formidable task and complex
undertaking to adequately plan for such a large and growing state as
California.  Moreover, this policymaker’s task is critically important to
the economic vitality and quality of life of state residents but, in recent
years, has not received the attention that it deserves.  The importance of
infrastructure and the relative neglect of its upkeep and development are
clearly evident themes throughout our investigation into the state’s
future.
Still, our research is likely to disappoint those looking for solid
evidence that the state is in a downward spiral because our infrastructure
needs will outstrip the available resources or those who believe that we
will solve all problems by investing more funds in infrastructure.  For
instance, we point to many areas in which progress has been made to
address shortcomings in planning and funding of state and local
infrastructure.  Moreover, projected demographic and economic trends
will ease some of the pressures on the infrastructure base.  At the same
3time, these trends point to some new challenges—in particular, the need
for bold and unprecedented investments of public resources to ensure a
brighter tomorrow for today’s youth.
Although the 20th century saw progress through construction and
engineering feats unprecedented for their time, the greater challenges in
the 21st century are in the adaptability and effectiveness of our political
institutions and system of governance.  We argue that too much
emphasis on how much infrastructure is needed and how much it will
cost can obscure other important questions that should be part of today’s
policy discussions.  For instance, what is the quality of the roads, school
facilities, water systems, and other infrastructure that residents want
for their state, and what are the most efficient ways to pay for the
infrastructure systems?  Moreover, how will the goals for infrastructure
planning and the financing tools affect the lives of Californians?  In
the chapters that follow, we provide evidence that will broaden our
understanding of the range of policy issues that Californians will need to
confront as they take on the future.
The remainder of this introduction summarizes the major findings
and conclusions of an investigation that took over one year to complete.
We begin with population and economic forecasts, patterns of
infrastructure financing, and the current state of knowledge regarding
our infrastructure needs.  We then turn to the governance and
institutional challenges facing state and local policymakers as they
attempt to plan for the future and the equity issues that merit careful
consideration as we seek to address infrastructure challenges.  Last but
certainly not least, given their growing role in policymaking at the ballot
box, we consider public perceptions of the state’s future; their policy
preferences in the realm of schools, water, and roads and transportation;
and their willingness to pay higher taxes or fees to support the
infrastructure they want.
California’s Population in 2025
Even as the state struggles to accommodate the demands generated
by the 10 million population increase of the past two decades, it is
expected to add millions more residents between now and 2025.  The
Department of Finance projects another 10 million residents by that
4year, bringing the total population to 46 million.  Allowing for slightly
higher or lower rates of fertility and migration, our study projects a likely
range of growth between 7 million and 11 million.   For those concerned
about meeting the infrastructure challenges of population growth, both
scenarios imply some good news relative to projections made several
years earlier.  A decline in fertility rates, particularly among the fast-
growing Latino population, has led demographers to revise their
population growth figures downward.  Still, most experts agree that the
absolute growth facing California will be formidable, placing significant
strains on public infrastructure, including educational facilities, water
systems, and roads and transportation networks.
There is also general agreement about the regional patterns of
growth, with much faster increases expected in the inland areas than in
the state’s population centers along the coast.  The fast pace of growth in
the Central Valley and the Inland Empire (Riverside and San Bernardino
Counties) may pose particular challenges because infrastructure systems
must be built from scratch or from a much smaller base.  However, the
Southern California coastal areas (Los Angeles, Orange, and San Diego
Counties) and the San Francisco Bay Area are also likely to experience
sizable population gains, putting pressure on existing systems in areas
where the built-up environment makes expansion more difficult,
potentially more costly, and politically controversial.
Another area of agreement is the state’s shifting racial and ethnic
makeup.  California’s transition from a majority white state to a
majority-minority state, ongoing for decades, is destined to continue.
Today, less than half of the state’s population is white—the majority is
made up mostly of Latinos but with sizable proportions of Asians,
African Americans, and multiracial Californians.  Almost half of all
births today are to Latina mothers.  Latinos are now the largest
racial/ethnic group of state residents under age 30.  They are expected to
become the largest group in the state within a decade and eventually will
account for half of the state’s population.
These demographic shifts raise special concerns about how prepared
we are for the future, especially when it comes to providing quality of life
and economic opportunities for nonwhite and immigrant populations.
For instance, young Latinos have lower rates of educational attainment
5than the white baby boom population that now makes up a large share of
the college-educated workforce.  Although Latino youths have registered
some progress in educational outcomes over the past decade, much more
needs to be done.  To ensure a better future for California, we will need
to significantly improve the educational outcomes of the Latino youth
who will be the state’s workers in the future.  Otherwise, many second-
generation Californians will face low-skill, low-pay jobs or chronic
unemployment.  Making improvements in educational attainment in the
coming decades would also benefit other racial, immigrant, and low-
income groups who might otherwise also face grim prospects in the
future job market.
A third area of demographic certainty is the increasing share of the
state’s senior population, resulting from the aging of the baby boom
generation and improvements in health care.  This increase will raise
demands for the infrastructure serving the special needs of seniors,
ranging from health care facilities to public transit.
Trends and Patterns in California’s Economic
Future
Population growth is likely to be the key driver of infrastructure
needs, raising school and college enrollments, increasing the demand for
urban water and wastewater systems, and putting pressure on
transportation networks.  However, the trajectory of the economy may
also play a significant role, because shifts in the industrial composition
and geographic location of economic activity influence the demand for
both infrastructure services and a skilled workforce.  To shed light on
these issues, we looked at anticipated trends in the California economy.
Specifically, we examined predictions about the level of future economic
activity, its geographic location, its industrial composition, and the
implications for the skill composition of the workforce.
California today has a large and dynamic economy rivaling that of
many nations.  Following the trends noted for population growth,
employment growth is expected to be in the range of 30 to 40 percent in
the next two decades.  One threat to these forecasts, noted by experts, is
that insufficient investment in the state’s infrastructure could lead to a
6slowdown in growth over the coming decades.  Although economic
evidence on these linkages is inconclusive, the concern is valid and has
prompted labor and business interests to call for greater attention to
infrastructure financing.
The forecasts do suggest that shifts in industrial composition will
alleviate growth pressures on some infrastructure services.  Specifically,
our analysis indicates a continuing decline in the share of manufacturing
employment and a steady rise in the share of services employment over
the next two decades.  The industries declining in economic significance
are more intensive users of water, roads, and energy than are growing
industries.  Agricultural water use is also likely to decline as a result of
market forces.  This is important because the agricultural sector now uses
roughly 80 percent of the state’s developed water resources.  Although
these shifts should reduce the relative pressures of growth, the absolute
expansion level of the state’s economy will put new burdens on our
transportation networks, water systems, and energy.
The changing industrial composition is expected to increase
demands on one infrastructure sector:  the state’s public educational
facilities—particularly public institutions of higher learning.  In the new
economy, the demand for workers with a high school education or less
will fall and the demand for workers with some college courses or a
college degree will rise.   This may seem like a surprising conclusion
because the service sector is often seen as generating a preponderance of
low-education and low-skill employment.  However, our analysis
indicates that the expected growth in service employment in
California—including business, professional, entertainment, recreation,
health, and educational services—will require a highly educated
workforce with associate, bachelor’s, and advanced college degrees.  The
part of the service sector expected to grow the least—personal services
including household work—consists of jobs requiring less education.
These economic changes underscore the key challenge facing the
state:  Residents entering the workforce over the next 20 years will
increasingly be Latinos—a group that now has lower levels of education.
Latino immigrants and second-generation Californians, as well as other
growing minority and low-income groups with low education, will have
to attend college in larger proportions than today to meet the
7employment demands of 2025.  Otherwise, the state will have to import
college-educated workers in larger numbers than it does now from other
states and abroad.  If these college-educated migrants do not come,
prospects for economic growth will suffer.  That is a real possibility
because we could face stiff competition with other states that offer
college-educated workers a lower cost of living and more affordable
housing than California can offer today and is likely to offer in the
future.
If California’s children and youth do not acquire a college education
before they enter the workforce in the coming decades, they face the
prospect of low or no employment, a lack of opportunities for high-
paying jobs, and a greater likelihood of depending on public health and
social services.  For the state, the stakes could not be higher.  California
faces either a bright tomorrow with many residents in high-skill, higher-
paying jobs that generate high tax revenues or a bleak future in which the
jobs requiring more skills go elsewhere and its low-income residents seek
public assistance.
Infrastructure Financing in California
How much have California’s state and local governments been
spending on infrastructure projects and where are they finding the funds?
Overall spending patterns get a mixed report card, with some areas of
recent success and worrisome trends in some other sectors.  California’s
real per capita spending on public infrastructure investments declined
precipitously in the 1970s and 1980s.  However, by the early 1990s, it
recovered to the levels of the early 1960s, California’s “golden era” of
public investment.  The most recent figures from the U.S.  Census of
Governments, for 2002, show a sharp increase over the preceding five
years, with real spending now considerably higher than it was in the
1960s.  These overall statewide trends largely mirror trends elsewhere in
the country, and California now spends about the same per person as the
nation.
Nevertheless, these overall spending trends mask some important
differences across the three infrastructure sectors.  Like its semiarid
western neighbors, California has always spent more than the national
average on water resources.  After decades of neglect, and thanks to the
8success of recent state and local school bond initiatives, the state has
again caught up to the national average for educational facilities.
However, California was once a national leader in road and highway
investments but now invests considerably less than the national average;
considerably more of its transportation budget goes for maintenance
costs.  In the meantime, spending on transit has increased substantially
and now accounts for a fifth or more of the transportation investment
budget.  The low investment in roads is a major concern as the state
prepares for its future population growth and increases in economic
activity.
There are also troubling trends in how the state pays the bills for
these investments.  Federal funds have been a declining source of the
state investment budget, and pay-as-you-go financing has also become
less common.  Correspondingly, the state government has become
heavily reliant on borrowing through long-term general obligation
bonds.  These are paid back through the existing general fund rather
than through any new revenue sources dedicated to infrastructure.  In
addition to the school bonds, voters have recently passed large bonds to
pay for water and park projects and stem cell research and to cover
outstanding state debt.  As a result, the debt-service ratio—the portion of
general fund revenues devoted to interest and principal payments on
debt—is approaching levels that have called into question the remaining
state debt capacity for taking on new infrastructure projects.  This level
of indebtedness also raises concerns about the state’s ability to generate
bond funding for unexpected developments such as response to a natural
disaster.
Local revenue sources have become more important in California,
and this trend may be expected to continue in an era of tight state and
federal funding.  As a result of Proposition 13 and related tax limitations,
local governments face greater constraints than the state government
does in mobilizing new resources.  Whereas state bonds require a simple
majority pass rate, local bonds have historically required a supermajority
of two-thirds.  Since the voters lowered the threshold for passing local
school bonds to a 55 percent vote in November 2000, the funding for
local educational facilities has become more certain.
9Meanwhile, the county sales tax has become the largest revenue
source for local transportation projects.  Getting voter approval for these
local tax increases has become more difficult since 1995, when the
system shifted from a simple majority to a two-thirds vote requirement as
a result of a court ruling on the state’s constitutional laws.  Nineteen
counties currently have a local sales tax for transportation; 15 others have
tried and failed to pass one.  In several counties that passed taxes under
the old simple majority rules, the tax is up for reauthorization under the
new supermajority rules, and this has raised concerns about the ability to
maintain current funding levels.
As the state looks for a stable source of funding for its roads and
transportation projects, many proposals have been considered.  Voters
passed an initiative that earmarked a portion of the state sales tax for
transportation; however, the legislature has routinely circumvented this
requirement to close the budget gap.  Voters defeated a measure to
earmark a portion of the general fund for infrastructure spending on the
same ballot that they chose to recall their governor in October 2003.
Some policymakers have suggested that the vote requirement for local
transportation sales taxes be lowered to 55 percent, as is now the case for
local school bonds.  Finally, the idea of user fees and of taxes tied more
directly to infrastructure use has gained support in policy circles,
particularly as planners have been rethinking the definition of “needs.”
Infrastructure Needs and Tradeoffs
This brings us to the core question that has been raised by critics of
state policy:  Are we spending too little on our public investments,
thereby compromising our economic vitality and quality of life?  The
conventional method for addressing this question, sometimes referred to
as “gap analysis,” is misleading.  It begins by assessing infrastructure
“needs,” pricing them, and then comparing the total price tag to actual
spending.  The discrepancy between the price tag and actual spending is
then dubbed the “funding gap.”
The major problem with gap analysis arises from the way it defines
and estimates infrastructure needs, that is, gauging needs by matching a
targeted per capita level of services to population projections.  As a result,
it tends to overstate the level of needs in sectors where market
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mechanisms (especially prices) might shape the demand for those
services.  Such overestimations can be compounded by the nature of
infrastructure finance, because agencies competing for public funds often
have incentives to inflate their requirements.
We thus call attention to some techniques for distinguishing
needs from desires—often grouped under the heading “demand
management”—that have grown in importance over the last 10 to 15
years.  This shifts the focus from not only asking whether we are
spending enough to secure a sound economic future and quality of life
but also asking whether we are making the most efficient use of our
available public resources.
As noted above, state bonds and fiscal reforms have increased
funding in recent years, resulting in overall investment rates much higher
than in the 1960s.  California is also investing at rates comparable to the
national average.  But is this “enough,” or do we need to find ways to
mobilize additional resources?  Our review of education, water, and
transportation provides ample evidence that there is no definitive answer
to this question, if only because there is no objective measure of “needs.”
However, we can shed light on the areas of concern within each sector
and the challenges to devising adequate public investment strategies.
These challenges include striking the right balance between efficiency
and equity goals and setting up appropriate funding mechanisms.
For education, the recent state and local bonds have gone a long way
toward funding facilities backlogs.  Bigger questions on the horizon
concern the operating budgets for this sector.  In particular, recent
budget cuts to higher education have called into question the basic tenets
of the Master Plan for Education, under which low-cost instruction is
available to all California residents who can benefit from it.  In light of
the challenges to workforce skill development noted above, questions of
both quality of and access to our public system of higher education
become paramount.   In facing these challenges, Californians will need to
address the question of user fees (tuition) for students who can afford to
pay and the relative roles of lower-cost community colleges and the four-
year and graduate institutions of learning.
For water, contrary to the popular image of impending water
shortages, we find that California is actually well positioned to meet the
11
water supply challenges of growth, with many options available for
making more efficient use of existing resources.  Water and wastewater
systems also rely on a well-developed system of user fees, enabling local
governments and utilities to undertake the necessary investments.
Unresolved public investment challenges in this sector include the
restoration of ecosystems damaged by past water supply projects and the
protection of the state’s water supply from seismic activity in the San
Francisco–San Joaquin River Delta.
The complexity of the transportation system makes it particularly
difficult to assess whether we are spending enough in this sector.  It is
certain that we are now investing less in roadways, on a real per capita
basis, than in the heyday of freeway building in the 1950s and 1960s.
Moreover, the higher costs for rights-of-way, environmental mitigation,
and modern design standards mean that these dollars do not go as far as
they once did.  Traffic congestion is thus a feature of life in California’s
metropolitan areas and, judging by public opinion polls, a source of daily
consternation.
Given the costs, building enough roadway capacity to eliminate
delays in peak-time travel would not be a good use of scarce public
resources.  Instead, it makes sense to manage congestion by investing
strategically to tackle bottlenecks and by managing demand.  “Demand
management” can include encouraging drivers to carpool, to spread out
their travel across the day, and to use transit alternatives during peak
periods.
Transportation is also the sector in which the finance system is most
broken.  Roadways have a tradition of user fees, notably through state
and federal taxes on gasoline introduced in the 1920s.  But rising fuel
efficiency and failures to adjust this tax for inflation have progressively
eroded this revenue source.  In real terms, gas taxes now raise about one-
third the amount raised in 1970 per vehicle mile traveled.  User fees have
been progressively replaced with local sales taxes.  Unlike the gas tax,
these sales taxes provide no incentives to drivers to moderate car use.
Moving to more user-fee-based systems will depend on public
willingness.  When surveyed, Californians routinely cite traffic as one
of their biggest problems.  Yet they have been loath to increase
transportation funding, except through local sales taxes.  Legislators have
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not dared increase the gas tax since the early 1990s.  And tolls, although
promising, continue to meet with public skepticism.  The alternative is a
future in which we manage demand by default through longer and
longer delays.
The message that emerges across all three sectors is that Californians
have choices to make about their future.  One part of the choice is
deciding what level of public services we want to provide.  Another part
is deciding how to pay for them, given the range of funding options
available.  To the degree that we can link payments to the use of
facilities, we can encourage people to use them more efficiently.  The
examples we provide in the realm of water show that user fees offer the
potential to be robust, stable funding sources.
To be sure, there are important equity implications of more reliance
on user fees—especially when it comes to education—but there are also
ways to provide safety nets for low-income residents.  There are also vital
roles for both state and local governments in developing successful
strategies to meet infrastructure demands.
Governing Institutions, Planning, and Public
Investment
We next consider the institutional setting and governance structure
in which policy decisions are being made about infrastructure issues.
Specifically, we are interested in the ways the processes of planning,
approving, and funding infrastructure projects are impeding progress in
making improvements in the educational, transportation, and water
systems of the state.  In doing so, we consider the origins of governance
challenges for public investment and the changes in the decisionmaking
process for these sectors.  We also examine recent examples of
governance reform that may hold the key to a process in line with
the political realities and infrastructure issues facing the state.
First, it is important to note that some of California’s largest public
projects—including the State Water Project, the Master Plan for Higher
Education, and the state highway system—were passed during Governor
Pat Brown’s tenure about four decades ago.  Democratic Governor Pat
Brown had support from the state’s first Democratic-controlled
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legislature in the 20th century.  A rise in federal government aid for
domestic infrastructure, notably a massive program for highway
construction, helped propel Brown’s efforts to expand the state’s
infrastructure.  Brown also galvanized support for the new projects by
passing the first significant tax increase since the early 1940s.
The political context of that earlier era provides a useful comparison
to the current circumstances of a deep partisan divide among the state’s
lawmakers, a lack of federal funding for large infrastructure projects, and
voters’ reluctance to accept higher taxes.  Today, many voters believe that
their state government is inefficient, ineffective, and unresponsive; and
this lack of trust adds to the political gridlock over state efforts to
increase revenues or spending for roads and other infrastructure.
However, our research also concludes that Governor Brown’s
effectiveness ultimately rested in his ability to translate the prevailing
sense of urgency for reform into pressure to force political compromises.
As is true today, the state’s lawmakers then were concerned about the
need to expand infrastructure facilities following decades of high
population growth and lagging investment.  Brown’s legacy suggests that
a major priority for leaders at such historic turning points is to forge
consensus and to prod key interest groups to negotiate so that public
investments can move forward.  In this respect, there are some
similarities with current events:  The first replacement governor through
the state’s recall process, Arnold Schwarzenegger, has thus far proven to
be a political figure who is highly persuasive with the voters, legislators,
and interest groups.  He has also signaled that infrastructure planning
should be a high priority for the state.  However, to date he has been
unable to solve the budget deficit and set a future agenda.
Although the highways, water systems, and college campuses built
during the 1950s and 1960s are still with us, the confidence and
consensus that launched them has waned ever since the 1970s.  The
investments of the postwar era helped transform the state in ways that
provoked a political backlash and increasing public concerns about the
environmental and quality-of-life consequences of new growth, which
have ultimately led to higher costs for development.  Communities
protested against invasive projects such as highways, and government
costs increased for mitigating the negative local impacts of these projects.
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When the Proposition 13 tax limitations were passed in 1978, the “era of
spending limits” had officially begun; and infrastructure investment
headed into the steady decline that was not reversed until the 1990s.  In
recent years, the combination of record state budget deficits and political
paralysis in Sacramento has once again threatened to limit investment in
infrastructure and planning for the future.  The monies that would
otherwise flow to infrastructure have been diverted to pay for existing
programs and mounting state debts.  Meanwhile, the Democrats and
Republicans in the legislature and the executive and legislative branches
have quarreled over current fiscal priorities and have been unable to agree
on a forward-thinking plan.
Further, the infrastructure policymaking process has become more
and more complex.  Governance today involves state, local, and regional
infrastructure agencies.  With a plethora of local special districts in
California, often organized on a single-function basis (e.g.,
transportation, water, air quality), the lines of political authority and
ultimate decisionmaking are often blurred.  Today, when the state makes
infrastructure decisions, many more private and nonprofit interest
groups also seek a seat at the table—groups that range from
environmentalists to neighborhood organizations to labor and business
representatives.  Policymaking is more contested, as community activists
and interest groups have made increasing use of such tools as local and
state voter initiatives and litigation to press for various causes.  As a
result, the approval process for both small and large infrastructure
projects can be a time-consuming and difficult exercise of competing
political wills.
In the current political and fiscal climate, policymakers are
considering a variety of new governance strategies and different
institutional goals.  Planners are shifting their priority from building new
physical capacity for meeting future infrastructure needs, seeking instead
to encourage more efficient use of existing systems and resources.  In this
context, both funding and planning authority are also pushed downward
from state to regional agencies and local governments—an approach that
promotes greater flexibility, strategic management, and policy
integration.  A regional emphasis on infrastructure planning also seems
appropriate in a large state with a multitude of distinct regions (e.g., Los
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Angeles, Sacramento Metro, San Joaquin Valley, Inland Empire, Orange
County, San Diego), each with its own large populations and geographic
areas.
The institutional obstacles to a new regional approach are also
formidable.  The complexity of new decisionmaking structures can
hamper decisionmaking.  However, we have also learned that effective
collaborative arrangements are possible and that the agreements reached
through this type of process may actually balance state, regional, and
local concerns more effectively than either imposed or top-down
solutions.  The state has an important role to play in creating a new
governance system by providing more of a policy focus, funding
mechanisms, and institutional support for local and regional
decisionmaking.  The state government in California still lags behind
other states’ efforts in this regard.
In 2004, the release of Governor Schwarzenegger’s California
Performance Review, with its over 1,000 specific recommendations for
improving the efficiency of state government, underscores our central
message that broad governance and fiscal reform are essential ingredients
in today’s arena of infrastructure planning.  Among the proposals is the
establishment of a new state Infrastructure Department with a broad
mission to oversee the planning for a broad array of sectors—pointing to
the importance of integrating future planning, complementary programs,
and financing mechanisms.
The transition from massive statewide engineering projects to a
broader consideration of the costs and effects of potential investments
across metropolitan areas ultimately seems a healthy and appropriate one
in such a mature and highly developed state as California.  The
protections now offered to environmental values, community
participation, mitigation of the harms of projects, and fiscal restraint are
important values to most residents.  State leaders today must sometimes
secure political agreements not just on how to allocate more services and
facilities but also on how beneficiaries of state services can make do with
less.  Moreover, the priorities that are now being placed on equity issues
for low-income communities in infrastructure decisions—which were
not always part of institutional thinking in earlier eras—require a
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governance process that offers opportunities for inclusiveness and time
for full debate.
Equitable Infrastructure Investment
Indeed, state law in 2002 defined the intent of infrastructure
planning priorities to “promote equity, strengthen the economy, protect
the environment, and promote public health and safety.” However,
many observers have noted that educational facilities, water supply and
quality, and roads and transportation infrastructure have not been
distributed equally across communities.  Moreover, the negative impacts
(e.g., noise, air pollution, toxic waste) that are sometimes associated with
the siting of public facilities in communities also raises questions about
the “environmental justice” issues that go along with new infrastructure
development.  The idea of promoting equity in infrastructure planning
has thus taken on increasing importance over time.  The concept of
equity can apply to groups defined by income, gender, race, ethnicity, or
age, in the context of infrastructure planning and related investment
policies, but equity issues typically refer to the expected consequences for
low-income and minority communities.  
Our study points to three reasons for considering equitable
infrastructure investment.  The first reason is that it may create
opportunities for communities that have been left behind by California’s
economic growth, since infrastructure investments may play a role in
shaping economic growth.  This idea takes on more relevance when we
consider the patterns of income inequality in California:  In 2002,
incomes of low-income families were lower in real terms than incomes of
similar families in 1969 whereas the incomes of middle-income families
showed a 22 percent gain; and families at the high end of the
distribution showed a 60 percent increase.  A second reason is that such
investments may help to promote broader economic growth in a cost-
effective manner.  A third reason for considering equity in infrastructure
investments is that it may help build the political consensus required for
large public projects.  The latter point is consistent with a new approach
to decisionmaking that involves public participation and an assessment
of the benefits and costs for a large, diverse number of interest groups.
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With these three rationales in mind, we examine the equity issues in
the state’s largest infrastructure sectors:  transportation, K–12 school and
higher education facilities, and water.  We also discuss environmental
justice issues, given their relevance as an infrastructure equity concern.
We describe equity-related policies within each infrastructure sector and
document major equity concerns, relying on existing studies that have
recently turned attention to issues of equity and environmental justice
issues.
We also argue that larger social, economic, and political forces are
shaping the future of infrastructure equity and the broad policy
directions that would promote more equitable investment.  In particular,
we point to five components of equitable infrastructure investment that
we find critical in our analysis of the existing studies:  an equity-based
assessment of the existing infrastructure; strategies for the equitable
funding of infrastructure; efforts to facilitate community participation to
provide feedback for equitable decisionmaking; the need for integrated
land-use, housing, and infrastructure policies; and the role of public will
and leadership.
Public will is an important component of any successful major
infrastructure effort.  For instance, will the state’s older, whiter, wealthier
voters share a sense of common destiny with younger, minority, and
poorer future residents as they think through future investments?
According to our recent surveys, the public today is aware of
inequities in transportation and educational facilities.  However, the
same survey data also suggest that voters’ willingness to invest more in
low-income and minority communities lags behind awareness of this
issue.  Moreover, although a majority of California adult residents
express support for redressing inequities in school facilities, just under
half express support for similar attention to other infrastructure.
Significantly, support for investments to overcome inequities is higher
among the youngest adults and declines with age.  In recent years,
however, the passage of over $21 billion in new statewide bonds for
K–12 school facilities seems to demonstrate that voters are willing to
make large capital investments in children.
In sum, our research points to the fact that promoting equity in
infrastructure investment is a growing issue.  One question is whether
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today’s state leaders will take on the task of elevating equity as a concern
for future-oriented policies.  Is California on a path that will lead to
equitable infrastructure investments?  Certainly, equity issues have
emerged as major themes in infrastructure policy, but it remains to be
seen how the new policies will be implemented and whether there will be
cumulative effects.  There remain a variety of social, political, and
economic impediments to addressing equity issues.  A concerted effort in
this area will require public will, once again pointing to the major role of
the voters and public opinion in shaping policies toward the future.
The Public’s Views on Growth, Governance, and
Policy Options
Does the California public realize that population growth is on the
horizon?  What do they see as the expected consequences of population
increase?  Is there any public consensus on how to address the increased
demands for infrastructure that are likely to occur with growth?  To
answer these questions, we examine the results of a large-scale PPIC
Statewide Survey, conducted in 2004, that focused on four related issues:
public perceptions of present state and regional conditions; perceptions
of the state’s future; public attitudes toward governance; and policy
preferences to address the prospects of future growth and related
infrastructure demands.  The extent of public consensus on conditions,
predictions, governance, and policy preferences is of great importance.
Voters play a key role in passing state and local funding measures at the
ballot box, and they would likely be asked to approve any governance
reforms proposed to deal with planning issues.
We find that Californians are evenly split about whether their state is
currently headed in the right or wrong direction and deeply divided
along partisan lines in their overall assessment of the state of the state.
Although state residents are more upbeat about California than they were
a year earlier, they were much more optimistic about their state in the
late 1990s when the economy was growing at a brisk pace and the state
government was accustomed to generating budget surpluses.  Indeed,
economic uncertainties and political distrust continue to weigh heavily
on the minds of Californians even well after the latest recession has
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ended and the governor’s recall is history.  Residents say that the
economy is the most serious state problem, with broad consensus across
regions, racial/ethnic groups, and political groups.  A lack of confidence
in state government is a pervasive theme despite a popular new governor
with sky-high approval ratings and support across the political spectrum.
When asked to rate the seriousness of certain conditions in their own
regions of the state, problems that are related to population growth and
infrastructure are the stand-out issues.  Most Californians say that traffic
congestion on roads and freeways and affordable housing are big
problems where they live today.  Many residents also cite the quality of
their K–12 local public schools, the lack of well-paying jobs, and air
pollution as big problems.  But Californians are divided when asked if
they would rather pay higher taxes and have the state government spend
more money for roads and other infrastructure projects.  Once again,
they are deeply split along partisan lines.  Only when new revenues are
tied to specific projects does support emerge for new taxes, indicating
again the pervasive role of government distrust.
We find that few Californians are aware of the state’s current
population size or its predicted size in the year 2025—this lack of
awareness in itself limits a public discussion about the future.   When
given the current estimates, however, most Californians say that the
amount of expected population growth would, overall, be a bad thing for
themselves and their families.  Most Californians also perceive that the
state overall and their specific region will be a worse place to live in 2025
than it is now.  On issues that are currently viewed as major regional
problems—such as traffic congestion, affordable housing, and air
pollution—most residents expect conditions to go from bad to worse in
the future.  Many also express pessimism about their regional economy
and public educational system in the future.  When asked what should
be done to plan for a better future, residents focus on jobs and the
economy and improvements in roads, school facilities, and water
systems.
Who should be making the most important decisions today about
the future of the state?  Most residents say that voters should do so at the
ballot box.  This is because residents lack confidence in their state and
local governments’ abilities to plan for future growth.  Few approve of
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the state legislature’s handling of plans for the future, but most are
optimistic about Governor Schwarzenegger’s abilities to tackle those
challenges.
The public today is largely disengaged but hardly disinterested when
it comes to the state’s future.  Although most Californians we surveyed
are not engaged in local planning discussions, many say that they want to
be involved in discussions about growth and the future.  When given a
variety of options and tradeoffs to consider, most also have opinions
about what the state must do to plan for the future.
As their top priorities for the future, most Californians name the
three types of infrastructure projects that we focus on in this volume—
school facilities, surface transportation, and water systems.  There is also
public consensus that the state government should focus on finding
efficient and cost-effective solutions in all three arenas.  For instance,
when they are asked to consider the policy tradeoffs, they favor more
efficient use of existing freeways and highways instead of building more
major roads.  They support efforts to use existing public educational
facilities more efficiently rather than building more public schools, and
they favor relying on conservation of the current water supply rather
than building new dams and water storage systems.  Indeed, this
perspective is consistent with our other survey findings about public
finance and the budget, which indicate a public belief that state
government is so wasteful that the same level of services could be
provided even if there are fewer resources available.  The public’s
preferences for “demand management” rather than “bricks and mortar”
also parallel many of the themes that are discussed elsewhere in this
volume.
Public attitudes toward new tax increases and user fee proposals—
along with an appetite for governance reform and insistence on equitable
planning—will be a major force in shaping infrastructure planning for
the state’s future.  A majority of Californians believe that their
governments lack adequate funding for roads, school facilities, and other
infrastructure projects, but would they support tax increases to prepare
for future growth?  Many voters reject the idea of increasing their taxes
unless they know exactly how these tax dollars will be spent.
Surprisingly, given their anti-tax reputation, many Californians say they
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would be willing to increase their local sales tax for roads and public
transit projects and would support a 20-year bond measure to pay for
local school construction projects.  With certain assurances that their
money will be put to appropriate uses, and especially if there are
governance systems in place to make public officials accountable for their
spending decisions, many voters appear willing to set aside their distrust
and invest in the future.  They are willing to act against their political
instincts because they believe that their economic future and quality of
life are at stake.
Californians also seem highly conscious of the fact that growing
economic inequalities threaten the future of the state for everyone.
Many are even agreeable to the idea that policies should provide for
uneven investments in public schools and infrastructure that favor the
least advantaged minority and low-income communities over more
affluent communities.  Keeping the equity perspective in the mix will be
a necessary ingredient in future policymaking, given that overcoming
inequities is a part of the challenge faced in achieving good educational
outcomes and increasing economic opportunities in the state.
A major task ahead is finding a way to restore the public’s trust and
confidence in their state and local governments.  To do so will require an
unprecedented effort by the state’s leadership.  It will be a challenge to
overcome the apathy, disinterest, cynicism, and pessimism that has been
pervasive for decades.  The public’s lack of confidence cuts short any
serious discussions of forward planning, which then makes it difficult to
reach any consensus on goals.  The solution may ultimately lie in a set of
political, governance, institutional, and fiscal reforms that will make state
and local government actions more transparent, accountable, efficient,
and responsive to the people that they serve.  Some say that the best
opportunities for an overhaul of state and local governments are present
in the postrecall era in California.  To date, however, the focus has been
reaching consensus on balancing the state budget.
In closing, despite the clear signs of success in some infrastructure
sectors, and population and economic trends that will ease the growth in
demand for public facilities, California faces the future without a clear
mandate on how much or how to raise funds for infrastructure projects
to accommodate an expected 10 million new residents.  We also
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uncovered a “human infrastructure” issue with major implications for the
future—a growing need for college-educated workers for our changing
economy and a likely shortfall in highly educated adults in the fastest-
growing population groups.
In the California system of public finance and governance, much
will depend on the voters’ willingness to raise taxes or pay higher user
fees for new future-oriented proposals.  The public acceptance of policies
that promote socioeconomic progress in low-income and minority
communities and shift from a local to a regional focus in infrastructure
planning will also be critical in determining the state’s future.  Major
political and policy shifts will no doubt require courageous leadership,
but this quality has always surfaced whenever California has taken a giant
step into the future.
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2. California’s Population in
2025
by Hans P. Johnson
Any serious discussion of California in 2025 must include some
analysis of the state’s changing population.  Almost every area of state
concern—from social services caseloads to transportation infrastructure
to environmental protection—is directly affected by population growth
and change.  Some of California’s demographic challenges are shared by
other states—the aging of the baby boomers, for example, is a national
phenomenon—but others are unique to California.  The state’s
population level—36 million people in 2003 (Figure 2.1)—now exceeds
that of all but 32 countries and will likely surpass Spain’s in the next two
decades.   Moreover, California’s growth rate outstrips that of any
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developed region of the world; indeed, it looks more like Mexico’s than
the rest of the nation’s.
The state’s diversity is also noteworthy.  California is home to
immigrant groups from over 60 countries, making its population
arguably the most diverse in the world.   Most of the state’s recent
population increase occurred among Asian and Latino populations, and
much of it was due to immigration.  In 1970, four of every five
Californians were non-Hispanic whites; by 2000, one of every four
residents was foreign-born, and no racial or ethnic group constituted a
majority of the state’s population (Figure 2.2).
If the 20th century brought staggering population growth and
change to California, the 1990s represented a sharp departure from the
usual pattern.  During that time, the state’s population grew only a little
faster than the rest of the nation’s (13.8% versus 13.1%), and for the
first time since the 1850s, New York City had a faster growth rate than
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Los Angeles.  The major cause of this slowdown was an exodus of
Californians to other states.  During the 1990s, about two million more
people moved from California to other states than came from other states
to California.  Much of the outflow occurred in the early 1990s and
originated from Los Angeles.  California’s population continued to grow,
however, because these losses from domestic migration were more than
offset by international migration and natural increase (the excess of births
over deaths), both of which remained at high levels.
The domestic migration outflows of the 1990s were clearly related to
the economy.  The recession of the early 1990s was longer and deeper in
California, especially Los Angeles, than in the rest of the nation.
California’s unemployment rate peaked in 1993 at 9.4 percent,
compared to 6.9 percent for the nation.  Domestic migration flows out
of California exceeded 400,000 people in 1993 and again in 1994, when
the unemployment rate differential remained large (Figure 2.3).  As the
state’s economy improved in the late 1990s, the outflow abated.  Today,
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domestic flows out of the state are roughly offset by domestic flows into
the state.
The other components of population change—births and
deaths—have also contributed to a slowing in the rate of growth of
California’s population since the 1980s.  The number of births in
California has fallen substantially since its peak in 1992 (Figure 2.4).1
This decline has occurred as the baby boomers—those born between
1945 and 1964—aged out of their prime childbearing years.  In
addition, the average number of children has fallen from 2.5 children per
woman in 1990 to 2.2 children per woman in 2001.2  Fertility dropped
across all of California’s major ethnic groups, but declines have been
especially large among Hispanic and African American women (Johnson,
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_____________
1This peak in births in the early 1990s occurred as large numbers of baby boomers
reached childbearing ages and as the number and fertility rates of women in California
rose with large flows of immigrants.  See Hill and Johnson (2002) for a more complete
discussion of fertility rates by ethnicity and nativity in California.
2The total fertility rate can be thought of as the average number of children a
woman has in her lifetime.  Specifically, we report period total fertility rates.
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Hill, and Heim, 2001).  By 1998, total fertility rates of Hispanics had
fallen to 2.8, from a peak of 3.5, and African American fertility rates fell
to 2.0, from 2.6.  As birth rates were falling, the number of deaths in
California was increasing as a result of the aging of the state’s population
(Figure 2.4).   Although age-specific mortality rates have been decreasing
in California, the number of older Californians has been increasing at a
faster rate.  The consequence of these recent trends in births and deaths
has been a substantial decline in natural increase.  In the early 2000s,
natural increase was adding about 300,000 people to the state’s
population each year, compared to almost 400,000 in the early 1990s.
Alternative Population Projections
These recent trends make population projections for California
especially difficult.  The best forecasters rely heavily on historical
patterns, and their track records are not encouraging.3  Projections made
in times of robust population growth generally overstate future growth,
and those made in times of relatively slow growth generally understate it.
In addition to overweighting contemporary trends, forecasters are
notoriously bad at predicting fundamental demographic shifts.  For
example, demographers did not anticipate the large increases in fertility
rates that occurred at the outset of and even during the baby boom.
Similarly, most did not predict declines in fertility rates during the baby
bust.
For these reasons, planners should consider alternative population
scenarios.  The California Department of Finance (DOF) develops only
one set of projections for the state and cautions users that  “these
population projections depict only one possible course of future
population change, i.e., the one reflecting recent trends in fertility,
mortality, and migration” (California Department of Finance, 1998).
The U.S.  Census Bureau develops high, medium, and low projections
for the nation, but the bureau’s most recent state projections are
outdated and provide only one alternative series.  A set of California
_____________
3For more discussion of population projections for California, see PPIC working
paper “A Review of Population Projections for California” (Johnson, 2005), available
from the author.
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projections developed by researchers at the University California (UC)
Berkeley includes probability intervals, but the intervals are too wide for
practical planning purposes.4
Working with the DOF, PPIC has developed two alternative
projections for California for 2025.  These alternative projections include
a high growth scenario with elevated fertility and migration rates, and a
low growth scenario with lowered fertility and migration rates.
Specifically, the low growth scenario assumes that age-specific fertility
rates will be 10 percent lower by 2025 than currently forecast by DOF
and that migration will be 20 percent lower each year.  The high growth
scenario assumes that fertility rates will be 10 percent higher by 2025 and
migration flows will be 20 percent higher throughout the projection
period.  These alternative assumptions represent relatively modest
changes to the baseline DOF projections.  Thus, we view the low and
high projection series as plausible and useful alternatives for planners.
Overall Population Growth:  Lower Than
Previously Expected, But Still Large
The most recent projections indicate that California’s population
growth will not be as large as previously forecast.  The latest DOF
figures, for example, indicate that the state will be home to 46 million
people in 2025—about three million lower than its previous projections.
Projections from the University of Southern California (USC) and UC
Berkeley’s median projections are even lower than DOF’s current series
(Table 2.1).  PPIC’s alternatives frame all of these projections (DOF,
USC, UC Berkeley median) and place the state’s 2025 population at
43.9 million in the low growth scenario and 48.2 million in the high
growth scenario.
_____________
4The 5th percentile projection suggests that over the next 20 years, the state’s
population will grow by fewer than 2 million people, whereas the 95th percentile places
the growth at over 14 million.  Planners could choose less extreme percentiles to develop
narrower bounds.
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Table 2.1
California’s Projected Population (millions)
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
California Department of
Finance (2004a) 34.065 36.855 39.247 41.571 43.852 46.041
PPIC low growth scenario 34.065 36.454 38.469 40.374 42.197 43.891
PPIC high growth scenario 34.065 37.256 40.030 42.776 45.521 48.210
USC (Pitkin and Myers, 2004
preliminary) 33.872 35.744 37.794 39.950 42.151 44.344
UC Berkeley (Lee, Miller, and
Edwards, 2003)
Median 33.872 36.376 38.579 40.632 42.600 44.600
5th percentile 33.872 35.427 36.267 36.728 36.981 37.119
95th percentile 33.872 37.349 40.874 44.425 48.043 51.879
CCSCE (2003) 33.872 39.710
UCLA Anderson Forecasting
Project (2003) 34.036 39.670
UCLA Anderson Forecasting
Project (2002) 34.117 39.957 45.850
California Department of
Finance (1998) 34.653 37.372 39.958 42.371 45.449 48.626
Census Bureau preferred
(Campbell, 1996) 32.521 34.441 37.644 41.373 45.278 49.285
Census Bureau alternative
(Campbell, 1996) 32.423 33.511 34.968 36.838 39.034 41.480
NOTES:  DOF, UC Los Angeles (UCLA), and Census Bureau projections are for
July 1st of each year.  The UC Berkeley projections are as of April 1st.  The USC
projections are for January 1st of each year, with April 1st 2000 as the base year.  CCSCE
is the Center for the Continuing Study of the California Economy.
Our alternative projections bracket the DOF projections, with the
low series showing a total population in 2025 that is about 2.1 million
people fewer than the DOF projections and the high series showing a
total that is about 2.2 million people more (Figure 2.5).
Despite these relatively slow growth rates, absolute increases to the
state’s population are projected to remain strong.  The DOF projections
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place the state’s growth at 4.7 million between 2005 and 2015 and at 4.5
million between 2015 and 2025.  This absolute growth is substantially
smaller than that of the 1980s, when the state added more than six
million new residents, but larger than the absolute gains of the 1990s,
which came to about four million.  Indeed, projected growth will be
greater in absolute terms than in any other decade except the 1980s and
the 1950s.   The PPIC low series suggests that between 2005 and 2025,
the state will gain about seven million people, whereas the high series
places the gain at just under 11 million.
The major forecasters agree that future growth rates will be lower
than past ones.  Indeed, the DOF projections suggest that in the 20-year
period from 2005 to 2025, California will experience the slowest rate of
change for any two decades in the state’s recorded history (Figure 2.6).
Even the PPIC high alternative series suggests that future growth rates
will be lower than in the 1990s.
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Population by Race and Ethnicity
Two other aspects of the state’s demographic future also seem
certain.  The first is that Latino and Asian population growth will
continue to be strong; the second is that the population of non-Hispanic
whites will either increase very slowly or actually decline.  DOF
projections suggest that Latinos will become the largest racial or ethnic
group in California by 2011 and will constitute a majority by 2040.
Already, Latinos are the largest racial or ethnic group among Californians
under age 30 (Figure 2.7).  Furthermore, almost half of all births in
California are to Latina mothers.
Changes in racial and ethnic categories and identification could alter
these projections.  No more than two consecutive censuses have used the
same racial and ethnic categories.  For example, the 2000 census was the
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Figure 2.7—Racial and Ethnic Composition in California by Age, 2000
first to allow respondents to choose more than one race.  In that year, less
than 2 percent of Californians identified as non-Hispanic of two or more
races, and less than half of the children of parents of different races were
identified as multiracial (Tafoya, Johnson, and Hill, 2004).  Yet
multiracial populations could increase substantially over time with
increases in intermarriage and changing perceptions.
Nativity
After decades of strong increases, the growth of the foreign-born
population is likely to be much less dramatic.  By 2025, 30 percent of
the state’s residents will be foreign-born (Pitkin and Myers, 2004).
Although this figure represents an increase in the proportion of foreign-
born Californians compared to today, it also indicates a substantial
slowdown in that group’s rate of growth (Figure 2.8).  Although
California remains the leading destination for immigrants to the United
States, its dominance is not as great as in the past (Hill and Hayes, 2003;
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Myers, Pitkin, and Park, 2004).  This decline could be due to several
factors.  The severity of the early 1990s recession in California made
finding a job more difficult in California than in other states.  The high
cost of living, especially housing, may also have deterred some
immigrants from choosing California as a destination.  Finally, as
immigrant social networks expand geographically, information about
jobs and housing in other parts of the country become more readily
available to new immigrants.
A primary feature of the state’s population will be a large increase in
the number of second-generation Californians or those with at least one
foreign-born parent.  In 2003, the vast majority of California’s second
generation was made up of children (Figure 2.9).  With a median age of
15 (compared to age 33 for all Californians), this cohort is poised to
finish its schooling and enter the workforce in large numbers.  This
second generation and its educational and economic success will help
determine California’s future.
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Age Structure
The continued aging of California’s population is also a safe bet.
Older adults have relatively low migration rates and fairly predictable
mortality rates; because they are also well counted in the census,
projections of their population tend to be accurate.  Life expectancies will
continue to increase, and baby boomers will begin to reach retirement
age in 2011.  By 2030, the number of seniors in California will double
(Table 2.2), and one in every six Californians will be over age 65.  USC’s
Table 2.2
California’s Projected Population Ages 65 and Over
Year DOF USC UC Berkeley
2000 3,627,000 3,595,000 3,596,000
2010 4,467,000 4,185,000 4,319,000
2020 6,212,000 5,791,000 6,134,000
2025 7,299,000 6,824,000 7,302,000
2030 8,302,000 7,844,000 8,448,000
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projections are almost a half million lower than DOF’s by 2030, but
some of this difference is due to the date of the projection (January 1,
2030, for USC versus July 1, for DOF).
At the other age extreme, the child population of California is
expected to change very little over the next 10 years (Table 2.3).  As the
relatively small baby bust generation has reached childbearing ages, the
number of births in California has declined.  Declines in fertility rates
have also played a role, especially for Latinas; second-generation Latinas
have much smaller family sizes than their first-generation parents (Hill
and Johnson, 2002).  As a result, the number of children ages 5 to 17 is
projected to increase only 2 percent from 2000 to 2010, a dramatic
slowdown from the 21 percent increase in the number of public school
children over the previous 10 years (California Department of Finance,
2003b).  The DOF forecast shows a 10 percent increase in the number
of school children between 2010 and 2020, whereas the UC Berkeley
projections show only 5 percent growth.  These differences increase in
forecasts of later years and arise primarily because UC Berkeley
projections assume lower fertility rates than their DOF counterparts.
Both projections assume an increase in the number of women of
childbearing age, especially those ages 20 to 34.  This increase is largely
attributable to the children of the baby boom echo entering the prime
childbearing ages, replacing the much smaller baby bust cohort.
Nonetheless, even the higher DOF projections assume that population
growth rates will be lower for children ages 5 to 17 than for the overall
population between 2010 and 2020.
Table 2.3
California’s Projected Population Ages 5 to 17
Year DOF USC UC Berkeley
2000 6,781,000 6,763,000 6,767,000
2010 6,932,000 6,879,000 6,869,000
2020 7,608,000 7,338,000 7,210,000
2025 7,979,000 7,681,000
2030 8,295,000 7,948,000 7,492,000
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Changes in the school-age population will not be felt evenly across
the state.  DOF projections for 2005 and 2025 show declines in the
number of 5 to 17 year olds in 15 counties, including Los Angeles,
Ventura, Santa Barbara, San Luis Obispo, San Mateo, and Marin
Counties.  At the same time, many inland counties will experience large
gains in that age group.  Sacramento, Placer, San Joaquin, Merced,
Madera, and Tulare Counties will all experience increases in the school-
age population of 40 percent or more between 2005 and 2025.
Note that there is substantial uncertainty regarding the number of
school-age children in the future, largely because future fertility rates are
less predictable.  The PPIC low and high variations of the DOF
projections show that relatively small changes in future fertility rates
could lead to substantial changes in the number of children ages 5 to 17.
If fertility rates in 2025 are only 10 percent higher than those assumed in
the DOF projections, the number of school-age children would be
500,000 greater than those shown in Table 2.3; similarly, if fertility rates
are only 10 percent lower, the number of school-age children in 2025
would be 500,000 less.  The USC projections are slightly higher than the
DOF projections, whereas the UC Berkeley median projections are
substantially lower.
An easy way to summarize the age structure of a population is to
examine the dependency ratio—the number of people of nonworking
age (younger than age 18 and over age 65) for every 100 people of
working age.  It provides a rough indicator of a population’s ability to
support nonworking members.  As shown in Figure 2.10, California’s
dependency ratio is projected to increase substantially after 2010, as large
cohorts of baby boomers begin to enter retirement ages.  Because of the
certain aging of the baby boomers, there is little variation in projections
of overall old-age dependency ratios.  However, increasing labor force
participation at older ages (beyond age 65) could occur in the future,
especially if retirement ages increase.  (This has already occurred with
Social Security benefits.)  In this case, old-age dependency ratios would
be lower if they included only older seniors—for example, those over age
70.
To the state government, however, the most important component
of the dependency ratio pertains to children, largely because the state is
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the primary provider of school services to children.  After a substantial
rise in the child dependency ratio during the 1990s, the DOF series
projects a decline to 2010, with very little change thereafter (see Figure
2.10).  This may be a welcome short-term trend for a state trying to
catch up with large increases in public school attendance.
Another group of great importance to the state is young adults
between ages 18 and 24.  The number of young adults largely determines
the demand for higher education.  The state is currently experiencing a
large increase in this population.  The increase is attributable to the aging
into young adulthood of children of the baby boomers and the children
of the large number of immigrants that came to California in the 1980s.
DOF and USC projections suggest that this segment of the state’s
population will continue to grow rapidly to 2010 and then slow or even
decline from 2010 to 2020 before resuming strong growth from 2020 to
2025 (Table 2.4).  The decline occurs as the relatively small cohort of
children of the baby bust enters young adult ages.
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Table 2.4
California’s Projected Population Ages 18 to 24
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
DOF 3,403,000 3,774,000 4,198,000 4,148,000 3,994,000 4,261,000
USC 3,366,000 3,672,000 4,023,000 4,026,000 4,026,000 4,174,000
Regional Projections
Regional patterns of growth seem fairly set.  Inland areas of the state
have experienced faster growth rates than coastal areas for over 30 years,
and thus their share of the state’s population has grown (Figure 2.11).
DOF forecasts that between 2005 and 2025, populations will increase 45
percent in inland counties and 17 percent in coastal ones.   Absolute
increases will also be greater in inland counties (4.8 million) than in their
coastal counterparts (4.4 million).  In particular, the Inland Empire, the
San Joaquin Valley, and the Sacramento Metropolitan Area are projected
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to continue to experience the fastest growth rates in the state (Figure
2.12).  Each of these areas is projected to grow by half their current
population from 2005 to 2025.  Especially striking historically has been
the Inland Empire.  One of the fastest-growing metropolitan areas in the
United States for decades, it now has a larger population than
metropolitan Cleveland, San Diego, St.  Louis, or Denver, and
projections suggest that its population could increase from 3.8 million in
2005 to 5.5 million by 2020.  (As recently as 1980, the Inland Empire
was home to just 1.6 million people.)  Riverside County is projected to
grow more rapidly than San Bernardino County, as Riverside
increasingly becomes home to commuters to San Diego, Orange, and
Los Angeles Counties.  DOF projects that by 2010, Riverside County
will surpass San Bernardino County to become California’s fourth most
populous county.
35% or more
20% to 35%
Less than 20%
Figure 2.12—Projected Percentage Change in Population
Growth in California, 2005–2025
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Northern California has the makings of its own Inland Empire as
population growth spills out of the Bay Area into the northern San
Joaquin Valley.  Over the past few years, growth rates in the northern
San Joaquin Valley have rivaled those of the Inland Empire.  DOF
projections suggest that the northern San Joaquin Valley will be the
fastest-growing region in the state between 2005 and 2025, with San
Joaquin County projected to be the fastest-growing county in the state
and Merced County projected to be the third fastest-growing county in
the state (Table 2.5).
The DOF projects that by 2040, despite impressive growth rates in
inland areas, about 60 percent of the state’s residents will still live in
coastal rather than inland counties.  San Diego and the Bay Area are
projected to have growth rates almost as high as in the rest of the state,
whereas Los Angeles County will have very low growth rates.
There is some variation in current projections for regions in the
state.  Compared to their precursors, the new DOF projections show
much less growth in the far northern part of the state and the Central
Coast and moderately less growth in Southern California.  Only the
Sacramento Metro region is forecast to experience much higher levels of
growth in the latest projections, compared to the previous DOF
projections.  These shifts reflect recent regional patterns of change as well
as input from local officials.
Projections become less certain for smaller areas and populations.
Many of the state’s councils of governments (COGs) develop population
projections for counties in their regions.  These COGs are more likely to
use local general plans in their forecasts.  Because the DOF projections
include every county in the state, we can compare the COG projections
with those produced by DOF.  In most regions, there is fairly close
agreement.  In San Diego, the DOF and San Diego Association of
Governments (SANDAG) projections are very close (San Diego
Association of Governments, 2003).  DOF projects that the region’s
population will reach 3.6 million in 2020, compared to SANDAG’s
forecast of 3.5 million (up from 2.8 million in the 2000 census).  In both
cases, these projections represent substantial downward revisions from
earlier projections.  DOF’s forecasts for the Bay Area are slightly higher
than those produced by the Association of Bay Area
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Table 2.5
Population Projections for California Regions and Counties
County
DOF New
Projections
for 2005
DOF New
Projections
for 2025
%
Change
DOF Old
Projections
for 2025
% Difference
(New vs.
Old)
North Coast and Mountains
Alpine 1,300 1,400 8 1,800 –22
Amador 37,800 43,400 15 41,000 6
Calaveras 45,300 65,300 44 67,000 –3
Del Norte 28,600 31,700 11 44,100 –28
Humboldt 130,900 141,400 8 143,400 –1
Inyo 18,500 18,400 –1 21,500 –14
Lake 64,400 84,700 32 101,700 –17
Lassen 36,300 38,500 6 52,400 –27
Mariposa 18,200 21,600 18 24,700 –13
Mendocino 90,800 103,500 14 126,000 –18
Modoc 9,700 9,100 –6 12,900 –29
Mono 13,900 16,900 21 15,000 13
Nevada 99,600 132,800 33 143,900 –8
Plumas 21,200 20,700 –2 23,400 –12
Sierra 3,600 3,800 7 3,600 6
Siskiyou 45,300 45,800 1 55,600 –18
Trinity 13,500 13,300 –2 15,900 –16
Tuolumne 58,000 67,200 16 81,700 –18
Total 737,000 859,600 17 975,300 –12
Upper Sacramento Valley
Butte 217,100 270,500 25 335,100 –19
Colusa 21,000 27,900 33 47,400 –41
Glenn 28,300 33,200 17 54,800 –39
Shasta 181,400 244,200 35 254,400 –4
Sutter 88,300 119,000 35 125,000 –5
Tehama 59,800 71,300 19 91,000 –22
Yuba 66,500 91,700 38 90,500 1
Total 662,300 857,800 30 998,200 –14
Sacramento Metro
El Dorado 174,100 236,500 36 275,900 –14
Placer 303,600 501,300 65 424,000 18
Sacramento 1,394,600 2,120,400 52 1,767,600 20
Yolo 194,400 295,900 52 242,500 22
Total 2,066,600 3,154,000 53 2,710,000 16
San Joaquin Valley
Fresno 882,700 1,205,400 37 1,210,100 0
Kern 746,600 1,032,300 38 1,196,000 –14
Kings 143,700 204,200 42 204,800 0
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Table 2.5 (continued)
County
DOF New
Projections
for 2005
DOF New
Projections
for 2025
%
Change
DOF Old
Projections
for 2025
% Difference
(New vs.
Old)
Madera 138,800 201,500 45 252,000 –20
Merced 244,700 399,100 63 351,500 14
San Joaquin 659,600 1,108,600 68 971,100 14
Stanislaus 508,600 699,600 38 776,600 –10
Tulare 408,300 596,300 46 629,300 –5
Total 3,733,000 5,446,900 46 5,591,400 –3
Bay Area
Alameda 1,538,100 1,955,800 27 1,867,800 5
Contra Costa 1,034,800 1,436,000 39 1,149,000 25
Marin 251,300 250,600 0 275,800 –9
Napa 134,400 178,300 33 166,000 7
San Francisco 795,300 810,600 2 739,500 10
San Mateo 723,400 802,000 11 882,000 –9
Santa Clara 1,757,300 2,083,600 19 2,299,500 –9
Solano 427,500 616,500 44 589,300 5
Sonoma 486,100 662,600 36 649,700 2
Total 7,148,300 8,796,000 23 8,618,500 2
Central Coast
Monterey 428,900 531,000 24 634,600 –16
San Benito 58,500 79,200 36 89,900 –12
San Luis Obispo 262,600 319,200 22 426,800 –25
Santa Barbara 419,600 466,500 11 604,000 –23
Santa Cruz 262,300 291,400 11 398,500 –27
Total 1,431,900 1,687,400 18 2,153,800 –22
South Coast
Los Angeles 10,145,600 11,081,300 9 12,164,600 –9
Orange 3,074,700 3,607,500 17 3,593,000 0
Ventura 817,300 956,200 17 1,054,600 –9
Total 14,037,600 15,645,000 11 16,812,200 –7
Inland Empire
Riverside 1,871,600 2,923,800 56 3,151,200 –7
San Bernardino 1,942,100 2,613,100 35 3,076,300 –15
Total 3,813,700 5,536,900 45 6,227,500 –11
San Diego
Imperial 160,500 234,500 46 344,600 –32
San Diego 3,063,300 3,822,800 25 4,194,500 –9
Total 3,223,800 4,057,300 26 4,539,100 –11
State total 36,854,200 46,040,800 25 48,626,100 –5
SOURCE:  Author’s tabulations of Department of Finance projections.
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Governments (ABAG) (2003).  DOF projections suggest that the
region’s population will increase 29 percent between 2000 and 2025,
compared to growth of 25 percent forecast by ABAG.  ABAG’s 2003
series projects 8.5 million people in the Bay Area by 2025, compared to
8.8 million in the DOF series.
Projections for the Southern California Association of Governments
(SCAG) region are slightly lower in the DOF forecasts (34 percent
increase) than in the SCAG projections (39 percent increase) (Southern
California Association of Governments, 2003b).  The lower growth rates
forecast by DOF are due to differences in Los Angeles County, with
SCAG showing substantially more growth (Table 2.6).  Regional
projections for Southern California produced by USC are between the
SCAG and DOF projections (22,599,000 for 2030).  Although these
absolute differences are notable, they are in the context of a region
forecast to be home to over 22 million people.
The greatest relative differences are in the Sacramento region.
Projections to 2025 are substantially higher in the DOF projections than
in the Sacramento Area Council of Governments (SACOG) projections
(Table 2.7).  Almost all of this difference arises in projections for
Sacramento County, with the DOF forecasting growth rates that are
almost twice as great as those forecast by SACOG.  DOF forecasts
suggest that Sacramento County will add almost 900,000 new residents
Table 2.6
Population Projections for Southern California (thousands)
County 2000 Census 2030 SCAG 2030 DOF
Imperial 142 270 255
Los Angeles 9,518 12,316 11,237
Orange 2,846 3,553 3,665
Riverside 1,545 3,045 3,180
San Bernardino 1,709 2,713 2,762
Ventura 753 993 1,026
Regional total 16,513 22,890 22,125
SOURCE:  Southern California Association of Governments (2003a)
projections.
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Table 2.7
Population Projections for the Sacramento Area (thousands)
County 2000 Census SACOG 2025 DOF 2025
El Dorado 156 194 236
Placer 248 415 501
Sacramento 1,223 1,695 2,120
Sutter 79 135 119
Yolo 169 266 296
Yuba 60 108 92
SACOG regional total 1,935 2,814 3,365
SOURCE:  Sacramento Area Council of Governments (2001)
projections.
between 2000 and 2025, whereas SACOG’s projections suggest growth
of fewer than 400,000 new residents.  Differences for El Dorado and
Placer Counties could be due solely to geographical considerations.
SACOG does not include the eastern portion of those counties (the Lake
Tahoe basin), whereas DOF projections are for entire counties.
Educational Attainment
Future economic outcomes—and therefore infrastructure and social
service demands—depend heavily on the labor force skills of California’s
adults.  Accordingly, we use the population projections to forecast
educational attainment levels in the state.  Educational attainment
distributions are projected by age, race and ethnicity, nativity, and
gender and then applied to the DOF population projections to arrive at
overall educational attainment projections.5
We develop two sets of educational projections for California’s
population.  The first set assumes no change in educational attainment
distributions from 2000 levels; thus, 45 to 49 year old white females in
2020 are projected to have the same percentage of college graduates as 25
to 29 year old white females in 2000.  For younger cohorts, we take the
educational attainment levels observed in 2000 for similarly aged people.
_____________
5Details of our approach can be found in Johnson (2005).
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For example, 20 to 24 year old white females in 2020 are projected to
have the same percentage of college graduates as 20 to 24 year old white
females in 2000.  We call these the static cohort projections.
In the second set, termed the dynamic cohort projections, we assume
that past increases in educational attainment for a cohort—again defined
by age, race and ethnicity, and gender—will continue into the future.
Specifically, increases between 1990 and 2000 are assumed to continue
to 2010 and then again to 2020.  Thus, 45 to 49 year old white females
in 2010 are projected to have the same percentage of college graduates as
35 to 39 year old white females in 2000 plus any increase in the
percentage of college graduates between 45 to 49 year old white females
in 2000 and 35 to 39 year old white females in 1990.
In both sets of projections, for Latinos we develop projections of
educational attainment and population by nativity (U.S.-born versus
foreign-born).  Because educational attainment is much higher among
U.S.-born Latinos than foreign-born Latinos, we adjust educational
attainment distributions of Latinos for increasing shares of U.S.-born
among each adult age cohort.
One of the most striking results of these projections is that older
Californians in 2020 will be among the best-educated Californians.  This
projection derives from the current age profile of educational attainment.
As shown in Figure 2.13, Californians with the highest rate of college
graduation in 2000 were those ages 50 to 54.  This is partly due to
differences in the demographic composition of the state’s population by
age.  In particular, Latinos are concentrated at younger ages and tend to
have low levels of educational attainment.  However, it is also due to
historical events that led that cohort to complete college at higher rates
than subsequent cohorts.  Men ages 50 to 54 in 2000 were of prime draft
age for the Vietnam War several decades earlier.  For some of those men,
attending college allowed them to avoid military service in Vietnam.
The phenomenon is not restricted to California.  Among U.S.-born
white males nationwide, for example, those ages 50 to 54 are the most
likely to have graduated from college.
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Because younger cohorts in 2000 (25 to 44 year olds) tend to be less
educated than older cohorts (45 to 59 year olds), the static cohort
projections suggest that California could face the prospect of a working-
age population that is less educated in the future than today.  In this
scenario, the percentage of college graduates among adults ages 25 to 64
would be lower in 2020, and the percentage of adults not completing
high school would be higher in 2020 than in 2000 under the static
cohort assumptions (Figure 2.14).
However, if educational attainment continues to improve for each
racial/ethnic and nativity cohort in the future as it has in the past, then
California’s population in 2020 will be better educated than today’s
population.  The dynamic cohort projections show substantial increases
in the percentage of adults ages 25 to 64 who are college graduates,
although the projected increase is smaller than the historic increase.  The
percentage of adults not completing high school is also projected to
decline, although one in five Californians would still fall into this
category.  One reason educational attainment levels improved in the past
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is that California attracted relatively well-educated adults from other
states and sent to those states less-educated former Californians.  Thus,
the dynamic cohort projections implicitly assume that California’s future
levels of educational attainment will rise because it exports less-educated
adults and imports better-educated adults from other states.
Overall, California’s public and private universities do not produce
all of the college graduates demanded by the state’s economy.
Historically, the state has experienced net domestic migration of college
graduates and, more recently, it has attracted large numbers of foreign-
born college graduates.  (Although most immigrants have low levels of
education, a sizable share are college graduates.)   As a consequence, most
college graduates in California are not native Californians (Table 2.8).
Thus, the state’s ability to meet the demands of its economy for high-
skill labor depends not only on the state’s own production of college
graduates but also the continued desirability of California to college
graduates from other states and from the rest of the world.
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Table 2.8
Place of Birth of College Graduates in California, 1960–2000
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
California 26% 27% 31% 32% 33%
Rest of United States 65% 64% 54% 47% 39%
Foreign-born 9% 9% 15% 21% 28%
SOURCE:  Author’s tabulations of decennial census data.
Population Projections and Public Policy
California may be on the verge of a new demographic era.  Strong
population growth rates, almost a defining characteristic of California,
can no longer be assumed.  The key question for prognosticators is
whether California will become the next demographic New York—a
place of slow population growth in which thousands of international
migrants arrive each year and thousands of domestic migrants leave—or
whether California will return to the population growth patterns that
have characterized so much of the state’s history, attracting migrants
both internationally and domestically.  The answer to that question will
determine both the pace and magnitude of future population increases in
California.  If California follows the path of New York, population
growth in the state will continue to slow and fall far below national
levels.  If California returns to its pre-1990s past, the state will experience
rapid and formidable levels of population growth.  The most likely
scenario is that California’s future, at least over the next two decades, lies
somewhere between the California of the past and the New York of
today.  The state will continue to experience substantial population
growth through international migration and natural increase but will no
longer experience large gains from flows of domestic migrants.
In the meantime, California faces many policy challenges as a result
of its population growth and change.  Absolute increases will be
significant if not unprecedented, and they will challenge the state’s ability
to provide infrastructure, social services, and environmental protection.
Perhaps the most important challenge is ensuring that intergenerational
educational progress is strong.  Almost half of California’s current
population consists of immigrants and their children, and although
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many immigrants arrive with high levels of education, many more do
not.  California’s future depends on a well-educated, highly skilled
workforce.  Although California may continue to attract domestic and
international migrants that fit this description, much of the state’s
workforce will be made up of second-generation Californians.  Preparing
them for life in California’s evolving economy is therefore an urgent
priority.
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3. California’s Economic Future
and Infrastructure Challenges
David Neumark1
This chapter considers California’s economy over the next two
decades, emphasizing those features that are likely to influence
infrastructure and workforce needs.  It draws on existing economic
forecasts, combines them with other data sources and predictions, and
reviews their implications for some of the challenges the state is likely to
face.  Specifically, it considers the following:
• The level of economic activity, especially employment;
• The geographic location of that activity;
• Its industrial composition; and
• The skill composition of the workforce.
The first two features influence the magnitude of the infrastructure
challenge and where it is likely to be felt.  Because industries make
different demands on energy, water, and transportation, the industrial
composition of economic activity will also affect infrastructure needs.
Finally, the skills required to support this economic activity will drive the
demand for education—like infrastructure, an investment with a
significant public component that has important implications for
California’s economic growth.
The effects of economic changes on projected infrastructure needs
considered in this chapter are less significant than California’s sheer
population growth.  Nevertheless, these economic changes have
significant implications for the nature of infrastructure challenges and
where they are likely to surface.  Moreover, the state’s workforce
challenges are more closely tied to economic changes than to population
_____________
1For a more detailed technical presentation of this analysis, see the occasional paper
California’s Economic Future and Infrastructure Challenges (Neumark, 2005), available at
www.ca2025.org.
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growth as such.  As a consequence, and because of the strong relationship
between workers’ skills and their economic well-being, these workforce
challenges receive a disproportionate share of attention in this chapter.
It is important to clarify at the outset what this chapter does not do.
First, it is not an exercise in economic forecasting as such.  Rather, it
summarizes and synthesizes existing forecasts to sketch California’s
economic future.   Second, this chapter does not explore specific
infrastructure needs associated with different industries and different
regions.  Instead, it identifies general economic trends and how they
might influence infrastructure needs, broadly defined, over the next two
decades.  Other chapters in this volume address specific infrastructure
needs in more detail.
Economic Forecasting
The most venerable method of economic forecasting comes from
econometric models, which combine economic theory and statistical
methods to model industrial sectors, the government, the labor market, and
so on.  In addition to the model of the economy, forecasting based on
econometric models also requires predictions of the future course of many
exogenous variables—for example, population—and typically reflects a
good deal of judgment as well.  Many institutions—including the Federal
Reserve Board and its banks, private banks, and forecasting companies—
use these models to produce both national and state-level forecasts.
Forecasts based on econometric models have two strengths.  To a
trained eye, they are transparent:  That is, they have a strong
“mechanical” component and are easy to both understand and critique.
Also, good econometric models impose the consistency required by
economic theory.  In particular, they require identities that hold (e.g., all
income is either saved or spent) and markets that are in equilibrium
(demand equals supply).  However, most econometric models are not
well suited to our purpose because they focus on the short or medium
term—the usual time horizon for financial investors or the Federal
Reserve Board.  Moreover, over a long time horizon their parameters—
which reflect underlying behavior, the state of technology, government
policy, and so on—may change in ways that the model will not capture.
Also, many exogeneous variables must be forecast in an ad hoc fashion.
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For these reasons, professional forecasters are skeptical of long-term
projections based on econometric models.
Many government agencies and researchers engage more explicitly in
longer-term projections, often for purposes of transportation or
manpower planning.   Although these projections match the time
horizons with which this chapter is concerned, they generally share two
weaknesses.  First, they tend to assume that present growth rates will
continue mechanically into the future.  Second, such projections are
often done in isolation from what is or what might be happening in
other sectors of the economy.  Another factor to keep in mind when
considering long-term forecasts is the interaction between infrastructure
and economic growth and development.  Because infrastructure shapes
the conditions for such growth and development, there is potentially
important feedback from infrastructure to the economy.  For example,
an economy that depends on a well-functioning transportation network
could be threatened by failure to develop the necessary transportation
resources.  Likewise, if California’s economy depends heavily on highly
skilled workers, a severe shortage of such workers would threaten the
state’s economic future.2
In short, economic forecasting—even in the short run but especially
in the long run—is far from an exact science.  Whether based on
econometric models or long-term extrapolation, such forecasts do not
allow for sweeping changes—in technology, politics, foreign economic
development, and so on—that may have profound economic effects.  For
example, declines in military spending and the dot-com boom
demonstrate how government spending and technological innovation
_____________
2In fact, the relationship between economic growth and infrastructure investment is
less clear than one might think.  Aschauer (1989a) finds that some publicly provided
infrastructure investments increase the productivity of private capital, rather than mainly
crowding out private investments.   His related study (Aschauer, 1989b) finds that
investments in “core” infrastructure—streets and highways, airports, electrical and gas
facilities, mass transit, water systems, and sewers—have the greatest effect on economic
productivity, in contrast to public investments in hospitals, other buildings, conservation
and development structures, or the military.  However, Kelejian and Robinson (1997)
summarize subsequent work that raises serious questions about the marginal productivity
of public capital, showing that such estimates are highly sensitive to the econometric
specification and that estimates indicating no productive effect are common.
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can dramatically influence the composition and location of economic
activity within California.   Moreover, no single method or approach is
uniquely suited to generating long-term economic forecasts for
California.  In what follows, we therefore consider a variety of existing
forecasts and supplement them with expert judgments about possible
changes, shocks, or threats to the California economy.
Economic Forecasts for California
There are three main sources of statewide economic forecasts—
UCLA Anderson, California’s Employment Development Department
(EDD), and CCSCE.3  Each of California’s COGs also provides
forecasts for its own region (the Bay Area, Sacramento, San Diego, and
Los Angeles/Southern California).  In addition, the California
Department of Transportation (DOT) generates county forecasts that
can be aggregated to form a statewide forecast.
The population forecasts that underlie the economic forecasts to the
year 2010 project population growth of between 16 and 17 percent
(Figure 3.1).  Not surprisingly, the range of the forecasts to 2020 is
wider—30 to 34 percent.  Note that the population forecasts embedded
in each economic forecast lie toward the high end of the range of
population forecasts.  This pattern reflects the economic forecasts using
earlier DOF forecasts, which called for higher population growth
(California Department of Finance, 2004b).  The range of the forecasts
for employment growth is considerably wider than that for population
growth—13 to 23 percent for the period from 2000 to 2010.4  There are
fewer forecasts available for 2020.  The DOT and CCSCE forecasts
predict 32 to 34 percent employment growth, whereas the UCLA
Anderson forecast predicts 41 percent employment growth from 2000 to
_____________
3For a description of each source’s scope and methods, see Neumark (2005).
4The levels are not strictly comparable across all forecasts because they are derived
from either payrolls (that is, wage and salary workers) or all employment.  The growth
rates, however, are more comparable.  The forecasts done at a later date project lower
employment growth (the exception is the EDD forecast), presumably reflecting the
economic slowdown at the beginning of the decade.
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Figure 3.1—California’s Population and Employment Forecasts, 2000–2020
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2020.  Note, however, that the later forecasts from UCLA Anderson and
CCSCE revise their projected employment growth downward.5
At the regional level, there is considerable variation between COG and
DOT employment growth predictions (Figure 3.2).  DOT projects the
lowest figures for the Bay Area and the highest for the San Diego region,
but COG forecasts project the highest employment growth in the
Sacramento region and much lower employment growth in San Diego.
Employment growth is projected to be near the overall state rate for the
North Coast and Mountains, the Upper Sacramento region, and the San
Joaquin Valley but lower for the Central Coast.  When comparing these
forecasts, it is important to note that the COG projections also serve as the
basis of regional plans and sometimes project the desired effects of current
policies.  For example, the 2003 ABAG projections are based on “smart
growth” principles that ABAG adopted in 2001.  ABAG assumes that
policies based on these principles—which would lead to increased housing
density in cities and inner suburbs as well as greater reliance on public
transportation—will be implemented, at least partially, by 2030
(Association of Bay Area Governments, 2003).  In this sense, the
projections are somewhat prescriptive as well as predictive.  Also noteworthy
is the fact that forecasting methods varied significantly across the COGs.
Employment forecasts by industry share two major features (Figure
3.3).  First is the projected decline in manufacturing employment, whose
share of jobs is predicted to drop 15 to 24 percent by 2010 and 29 to 36
percent by 2020.  (Note, however, that projected levels of employment in
manufacturing are virtually flat over the next two decades.)  Second, the
forecasts point to sharp increases in services employment—by 7 to 11
percent by 2010 and 15 to 17 percent by 2020.  The forecasts also
indicate declining shares in mining and construction as well as in
transportation, communications, and public utilities.  The projected
changes for trade, for finance, insurance, real estate, and for government
are relatively small.  It is important to note, however, that these forecasts
_____________
5Again, the employment forecasts are based on older DOF population forecasts that
called for slightly faster population growth; were they based on the current population
forecasts, they would presumably be a shade lower.
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are at the one-digit industry level (using Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) codes) and thereby mask substantial variation within
sectors.
Threats to the Forecasts
Finally, we consider expert assessments of developments that could
affect the economic future of the state and therefore its infrastructure and
workforce needs.6  Because these assessments are not quantified, we have
not incorporated them into our subsequent discussion regarding
infrastructure trends and needs.  We include them here, however, to
serve as a useful backdrop to that discussion.  These assessments—on
international economic relations, technological change, political
decisions, and infrastructure investment and utilization—are
summarized in Table 3.1.
Two of the four threats related to international economic relations
stem from sharp changes in trade patterns.  In general, more trade
implies changing demands for output of different industries in
California, as well as changes in infrastructure demands, in addition to
overall macroeconomic effects.  The development of a cheap, alternative
fuel would reshape economic and political relations between countries
but would most likely benefit a state like California, which is a large
consumer of energy and has strong economic ties with Asian countries
that would gain from decreased reliance on petroleum.  A dramatic
change in economic growth in Mexico would also be particularly
important to California, which has a large Mexican population prone to
cyclical migration, and is an important trading partner.
Sharp technological changes, including the growth and
commercialization of the biotechnology and nanotechnology industries,
could also alter the course of the state’s economy as the rise of the
computer industry in Silicon Valley did a generation ago.  These changes
would affect two key industries—health care and agriculture—most
_____________
6The brief discussion in this section is based on longer reflections on threats to
long-term economic forecasts for California provided by four experts:  Stephen Levy,
Howard Shatz, Christopher Thornberg, and Junfu Zhang.  See Neumark (2005) for the
full text of their reflections.
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Table 3.1
Four Experts’ Views on Threats to the Forecasts for California
Unanticipated
Development Likely Major Effects for California
International Economic Relations
End of globalization Reductions in demand facing high-tech industries.
Slowing of port traffic.
Development of cheap,
alternative fuel
Potential economic and political difficulties in oil-exporting
countries, including Mexico and Venezuela, which could
increase migration to United States.
Economic gains for Asian producers, leading to more trade
with Asia but also more competition from lower-priced
manufactured goods.
Dramatic Mexican
economic success
Slowdown or halt to illegal immigration.  Possibility even of
reverse migration of immigrants from United States back
to Mexico.
Increasing trade between Mexico and United States.
Elimination of industrial
and agricultural tariffs
Opening up of new markets for California exporters,
especially in agriculture, but also increased competition
from imports.
Possible large transitional costs for industries harmed by
increased trade.
Likely increase in wages and employment prospects for
more-educated workers, and declines in opportunities for
less-educated workers.
Technological Change
Deepening of Internet
technology
Increases in work online from home or other locations,
reducing burden on transportation.
Increased efficiency of use of educational infrastructure.
Incorporation of “information highway system” into
definition of physical infrastructure.
Advancement of
biotechnology
Health increases and reductions in mortality.
Increased agricultural production.
Commercialization of
nanotechnology
Shifts in industrial composition of economy and skill
composition of workforce.
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Table 3.1 (continued)
Unanticipated
Development Likely Major Effects for California
Political Decisions
Infrastructure investment
directed to manufacturing
industries
Disadvantage emerging nonmanufacturing sectors.
Changes in immigration
policy
Alteration of population growth scenarios and projected
skill composition of the workforce.
Excessive focus on
infrastructure-population
relationship
Insufficient attention to repair and maintenance of existing
infrastructure and improving infrastructure technology.
Infrastructure Investment and Utilization
Economic growth
depends in part on
infrastructure investment
Possibly lower economic growth, although evidence linking
growth to infrastructure is subject to debate, and
infrastructure may be more important as a determinant
of quality of life than of economic growth.
NOTE:  See Neumark (2005) for detailed discussions of threats to the forecasts.
profoundly.  Advances in biotechnology could also lead to declines in
mortality, thereby altering the state’s demographic profile.
Political decisionmaking, particularly in the area of infrastructure, will
almost certainly affect the state’s economic future.  Some chief concerns
include insufficient attention to repair and maintenance, replicating the
existing infrastructure stock as opposed to seeking out technological
improvements, and paying excessive attention to the infrastructure needs
of the manufacturing industry as opposed to those of other industries that
may be more important to the state’s economic future.  In addition, sharp
changes in federal immigration policy could affect the state’s population
trends and the educational levels of the workforce.
Although the precise interactions between infrastructure investment
and economic growth are unclear, insufficient investment could very well
drop economic growth below what is projected.  On the other hand, the
ability of government and the private sector to adapt to infrastructure
constraints should not be underestimated.  This ability, combined with
the weak evidence linking infrastructure to economic growth, suggests
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that at least moderate deviations of infrastructure investment from the
trends that might be projected based on economic growth will not
seriously threaten that growth.  In the end, infrastructure investment
may have more to do with maintaining the quality of life as economic
growth occurs than with economic growth per se; this does not minimize
the importance of infrastructure investment, but it may influence how
we think about the “need” for more investment.
Employment Versus Population Growth
Our forecasts also permit us to address imbalances between regional
employment growth and regional population projections, which are
summarized in Figures 3.4 to 3.6.  These imbalances have important
implications for transportation and housing infrastructure.  For example,
if a region is projected to have considerably higher employment growth
than population growth, commutes into and out of the region will likely
increase, thereby taxing that area’s transportation infrastructure.7  Note,
however, that the population projections do not take into account sharp
changes in housing availability.  A region facing employment growth that
outstrips its population growth may be able to partially alleviate this
problem by increasing housing availability.
The forecasts exhibit a fair amount of discrepancy on these
employment-population imbalances.  For example, looking to 2020, the
SANDAG forecast implies that employment growth will fall short of
population growth by 4 percentage points, whereas the DOT forecast
indicates that employment growth will outstrip population growth by 14
percentage points (Figure 3.5).  It is difficult to characterize what drives
these and other discrepancies.  In some cases, the DOT forecast calls for
considerably more employment growth than the COG forecast; in
others, the opposite is true.  These discrepancies notwithstanding, the
other DOT figures indicate that employment growth in the SACOG
region and the San Joaquin Valley is expected to lag population growth,
_____________
7This assumes that telecommuting or working at home does not increase
substantially.  In May 2001, 19.8 million persons, or 15 percent of the workforce,
worked at home at least once a week (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2002).  See also
U.S. Department of Transportation (2004).
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whereas in the North Coast and Mountains and the Upper Sacramento
Valley, employment is expected to grow considerably faster than
population.  For the ABAG and SCAG regions as well as the Central
Coast, the numbers seem to indicate relatively more balance between
employment and population growth.  All else the same, regions for
which employment growth is projected to outstrip population growth are
likely to face stronger infrastructure challenges involved with the
transportation of distant commuters to work—challenges that can be
addressed directly via transportation and perhaps indirectly via increased
housing availability.  Regions expecting relatively more population
growth will face similar (but not necessarily identical) challenges
associated with accommodating commuters.  Given the discrepancies in
the forecasts, however, we are not inclined to draw stronger conclusions
about employment-population imbalances by region.
Industrial Composition and Infrastructure Use
The industrial composition of the state’s economy has direct
implications for infrastructure because specific industries make different
demands on transportation, water, energy, and other infrastructure
systems.  To see how California’s changing industrial structure will affect
infrastructure needs, we developed an input-output table that highlights
infrastructure demands by industry (Table 3.2).   We focus on input
requirements of each one-digit (SIC) industry—for which we have
employment forecasts—for the output of industries in the one-digit
industry “transportation, communications, and utilities,” and the output
of government enterprises.8  We also focus on inputs from government
_____________
8The two-digit industries that make up transportation, communications, and
utilities include railroads and related services and passenger ground transportation; motor
freight transportation and warehousing; water transportation; air transportation;
pipelines, freight forwarders, and related services; communications; electric services; gas
production and distribution; and water and sanitary services.  Inputs from these
industries do not necessarily constitute infrastructure per se, but they are often strongly
associated with infrastructure demands.  As an example, the purchase of inputs from the
two-digit industry “motor freight transportation and warehousing” will not capture all of
the costs associated with highway use (wear and tear, congestion, and so on).
Nonetheless, output from this industry will contribute to demands on the transportation
infrastructure.
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enterprises, which may also help to pick up infrastructure demands.  The
input-output accounts include both federal enterprises (e.g., the postal
service and military exchanges) and state enterprises, such as local transit,
utilities, water and sanitation services, and parking  (U.S. Department of
Commerce, 1998).9
This analysis requires several important qualifications.  First, the
industry-level forecasts described above pertain to employment rather
than output.  If productivity growth differs significantly across
industries, a particular industry’s employment share may fall even when
its relative demands on infrastructure are rising.  Second, some industries
(for example, tourism) pose infrastructure demands that will not be
reflected in the input-output table.  Third, the table is likely to
underestimate the infrastructure needs that derive from California’s role
as a gateway for trade originating in or destined for other states.10
Finally, the fixed input requirements of input-output analysis may not
hold over the longer run.  Businesses and other agents may adapt to
infrastructure shortages or price changes, in which case industry input
requirements could change.
The table shows that the declining industries (again, in relative
terms) are the most intensive users of infrastructure, whereas the rapidly
growing services industry is one of the least intensive users.  These input-
output calculations suggest that California’s emergent industries may
make lighter demands on the state’s infrastructure than was true in the
past.  We reemphasize, however, that infrastructure challenges will rise
considerably as the population expands; the reductions to which we refer
should be interpreted as reductions relative to what would be implied by
population growth and the economic structure of the past.  Moreover,
given many of the limitations discussed above, many factors not captured
by this calculation may drive demand for transportation, water, and
energy systems.  Even so, the input-output analysis helps clarify some of
the changes that will accompany the state’s shifting industrial
composition.
_____________
9For more details on the methods for producing the input-output table, see
Neumark (2005).
10See Haveman and Hummels (2004).
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Industrial Composition and Skill Needs
California’s changing economy will make new demands on human
capital as well as infrastructure.  One dimension of human capital that is
strongly influenced by public policy is education.  Will California
workers be able to provide the skills demanded by industry over the next
two decades?  This is a complicated question, and we address it in a series
of steps.  First, we discuss the implications of the state’s changing
industrial composition, particularly as it implies changes in educational
levels for the workforce.  Second, we examine educational levels of
workers in different industries and changes in those educational levels
over time.  Third, we look at the implications of changes in the industrial
mix of employment at the regional level.  Finally, we discuss how the
educational attainment of workers in California is likely to adjust to
changing requirements on the part of industry.  In particular, we
consider the extent to which we might expect in-migration of workers
with the educational qualifications that are likely to be needed over the
next couple of decades.
To predict skill needs by industry, we consider two alternatives.
First, we take the educational levels of workers in each industry from the
2002 Current Population Survey (CPS) and assume that the distribution
within each industry will remain constant; we refer to this as the static
scenario.  In this case, the educational requirements of the workforce
change only because the industrial mix of employment changes.
However, we know that educational levels for the workforce as a whole
have been rising, perhaps reflecting the greater skill needs posed by
technological changes within industries.  Consequently, we also consider
a dynamic scenario in which educational trends within industries are
projected to continue to follow the same path that they followed from
1992 to 2002.11  In this case, the educational requirements of the
workforce are projected to change as the result of continuing trends in
education as well as the shifting composition of employment.
_____________
11Note that we use 1992–2002 rather than 1990–2000 because the classification of
education in the Current Population Survey changed in 1992.  See, for example, Jaeger
(1997).
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Using the UCLA Anderson industry employment forecasts for the
static exercise, we see that the share of workers with a high school
diploma or less is predicted to decline, whereas the share with a
bachelor’s degree or higher is expected to increase (Figure 3.7).  The
EDD forecasts show quite similar results.  In the dynamic exercise
(Figure 3.8), these changes are more pronounced, with sharp projected
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Figure 3.7—Percentage Change in Shares of Nonfarm Employment
and of Population by Educational Levels in California,
Static Exercise, 2000–2020
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increases in the shares of workers with associate degrees or higher and
sharp projected declines in the shares of workers with a high school
diploma or less.   Assuming that past trends in education within
industries persist, the projections in Figure 3.8 are probably closer to
how demands are likely to change.
These results may be viewed as surprising, given the popular
perception that our economy is moving in the direction of low-wage,
low-skill service jobs.  Table 3.3 provides some information on education
levels by industry, which should help to dispel this perception.  The top
panel shows the distribution of workers in each industry across
educational categories.  This panel demonstrates that mining,
construction, manufacturing, and trade use relatively less-educated
workers, whereas services tend to use more-educated workers.  For
example, 27.2 percent of construction workers and 21 percent of
72
Table 3.3
Educational Levels Across Industries and Trends Within Industries
in California
Less Than
High
School
Diploma
High
School
Diploma
Some
College
Associate
Degree
Bachelor’s
Degree
Ph.D.,
Master’s, or
Professional
Degree
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2002 share
Mining 17.7 24.1 13.8 20.8 18.8 4.9
Construction 27.2 36.3 20.2 7.2 7.3 1.8
Manufacturing 21.0 24.8 18.2 8.4 19.8 7.7
Transportation
and utilities 9.9 29.0 26.6 11.4 17.8 5.8
Trade 21.1 29.0 25.9 7.3 14.3 2.5
Finance, insurance,
and real estate 5.1 19.6 28.3 10.4 28.1 8.5
Services 11.2 17.5 20.6 9.7 25.0 15.9
Public
administration 4.0 13.3 28.8 16.3 24.1 13.6
1992–2002 %
change in share
Mining 3.0 –46.0 –41.3 556.5 304.9 –29.3
Construction 11.3 –3.3 –10.6 15.5 0.4 –6.8
Manufacturing –17.9 –10.8 –1.4 34.2 23.5 33.6
Transportation
and utilities –16.4 –3.3 –6.2 1.7 15.2 53.6
Trade –1.9 –10.0 0.5 12.7 23.8 –1.9
Finance, insurance,
and real estate –2.7 –21.5 4.0 14.5 6.5 19.1
Services –16.0 –18.4 –0.2 10.9 19.4 7.6
Public
administration 32.7 –38.8 6.3 2.8 9.2 31.5
SOURCE:  Figures are from monthly CPS files for 1992 and 2002.
manufacturing workers have less than a high school diploma, compared
with 11.2 percent of service workers.  Likewise, the services industry has
the second highest share (25 percent) with a bachelor’s degree; the
highest share is in finance, insurance, and real estate.  Moreover, service
jobs are not becoming less skilled.  The bottom panel shows the trends in
education within industry.  Here we see that in most industries
73
educational levels are rising, but the services industry exhibits relatively
robust growth in the share with college degrees.12
To shed more light on services, Table 3.4 gives information on
education levels for the four subcategories of services that were
introduced with the North America Industry Classification System
(NAICS)—business and repair services, personal services, entertainment
and recreation services, and professional and related services.  The top
panel of the table reveals that only the personal services industry is
characterized by low educational levels, and the bottom panel reveals that
the share with a four-year college degree has declined (slightly) in this
industry.  However, as the first column of the bottom panel shows, this
is the only services industry that is in decline; the other services
industries—all of which use much more-educated workers—are growing.
Thus, the services industry, which is the fastest growing, makes use of
relatively more-educated workers, and the trend is toward increased
education in this industry.  This pattern explains why the projected
changes in the industrial composition of employment imply rising
educational levels.13
In general, changes in skill needs are similar across regions, with
declines in manufacturing, mining, and construction, and increases in
services (Figures 3.9 and 3.10).  There are some exceptions, but we
should be cautious in reading too much into any single projection at the
industry-by-region level.14  Similarly, the implied changes in educational
levels across regions echo the statewide analysis, with projected declines
in workers with a high school diploma or less, and projected increases in
workers with an associate degree or higher (Table 3.5).
_____________
12Some of the percentage changes for mining are very large, reflecting changes
relative to a very small base.
13However, wages in the services industry—for otherwise comparable workers—
are lower than in manufacturing and construction (see, for example, Blackburn and
Neumark, 1992).  The issue of whether the state can or should try to encourage
employment in higher-wage industries or take other steps to increase wage levels within
industries is beyond the scope of this study.
14In particular, the results for the North Coast and Mountains sometimes differ
dramatically, but these are based on very small numbers, and this region has a very
different industrial structure.  For more detail on these projections, see Neumark (2005).
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Figure 3.9—Percentage Change in Nonfarm Employment Share
by Industry, COG Regions and Statewide, 2000–2020
Educational Attainment and Changing Educational
Requirements
The evidence considered so far strongly suggests that California’s
economy will require large increases in educational levels of its
workforce.  In that sense, perhaps the most serious challenge posed by
California’s economic future—aside from the scaling up of all
infrastructure required by a growing population—is the need for a more-
educated workforce.
A more-educated workforce may, in fact, be forthcoming.  Between
1990 and 2000, the following percentage changes in the share of the
workforce at each educational level occurred:
• Less than high school diploma, –9.6 percent;
• High school diploma, –16.4 percent;
• Some college, 0.2 percent;
• Associate degree, 12.4 percent;
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Figure 3.10—Percentage Change in Nonfarm Employment Share by
Industry, DOT Aggregated Counties and Statewide, 2000–2020
• Bachelor’s degree, 18.6 percent; and
• Ph.D., master’s, or professional degree, 22.5 percent.
These trends should continue, but the changing demographic mix of
the state’s population will work in the other direction.  That is, the
state’s population growth is concentrated among groups that now have
low levels of education (Figure 3.7).  For this reason, the demand for
educated workers will likely outstrip the supply generated by California’s
population.  Addressing this shortfall with proactive policies will be an
important but difficult challenge.  Decisions to obtain postsecondary
education are voluntary and respond to the costs, quality, and perceived
returns to education.  Over time, however, the rising demand for more-
educated workers will likely lead to rising educational levels in the
workforce.  Certainly in California (and elsewhere) educational
attainment levels rose for most groups as the economic returns to
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completing high school and obtaining college education increased in the
latter part of the 20th century.15
Finally, highly educated workers are likely to continue migrating to
California.16  This migration can fulfill the needs of industry without
requiring that the state “produce” as many educated workers as its
businesses require.  However, current residents will probably prefer that
their offspring move into these higher-paying jobs.  Moreover, the extent
to which in-migration is likely to occur depends in part on how the
demand for workers of different educational levels evolves in the rest of
the country.  The final three tables address this question.
In the dynamic exercise, the educational composition of the
workforce at the national level will parallel that of California, with
decreases in the representation of less-educated workers and increases in
the representation of highly educated workers (Table 3.6, bottom panel).
The static exercise points to considerably less dramatic changes
nationwide, largely because the 2002 UCLA Anderson forecast predicts
considerably slower growth of employment in services nationwide than
for California (Table 3.7).  However, this particular component of that
forecast seems anomalous.  The last column of the table reports
nationwide Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) industry employment
projections through 2010 (they do not go out to 2020), which suggest
much faster growth of services employment.  And finally, the more
recent 2003 UCLA Anderson forecast—which goes only through 2010
and uses the NAICS—also predicts faster growth of services
employment, as does a slightly later BLS projection based on the NAICS
(Table 3.8).  Thus, it seems safest to say that changes in the industrial
composition of employment will be qualitatively similar in California
and the nation as a whole.
These results do not imply that more-educated workers will stop
migrating to California.  They do suggest, however, that similar demand
pressures will exist elsewhere and therefore that the state’s economy may
_____________
15For evidence on increases in schooling attainment in California, see Reyes (2001).
16See Betts (2000).
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Table 3.6
Percentage Change in Share in Each Educational Category Resulting from
Changes in the Industrial Composition of Employment, Nonfarm
Workers in California and the United States
California United States
2000–2010 2000–2020 2000–2010 2000–2020
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Static:  fixed education
within industry
Less than high school
diploma
–1.9 –3.6 –0.1 –0.4
High school diploma –1.2 –2.2 –0.2 –0.9
Some college 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
Associate degree 0.3 0.4 –0.1 0.1
Bachelor’s degree 1.0 2.0 –0.1 0.4
Ph.D., master’s, or
professional degree
2.8 5.1 0.0 1.6
Dynamic:  trend education
within industry
Less than high school
diploma
–10.0 –19.9 –14.3 –28.6
High school diploma –19.6 –37.8 –14.3 –29.1
Some college 0.6 0.8 –0.1 –0.5
Associate degree 10.3 19.5 21.1 42.1
Bachelor’s degree 16.0 31.9 17.1 34.9
Ph.D., master’s, or
professional degree
16.4 31.6 11.9 25.7
NOTE:  The first two columns repeat the numbers from the UCLA Anderson
forecast (2002).  The last two columns present the same calculation, but for the UCLA
Anderson national forecast, and national data on educational levels and trends.
have to rely, in large part, on boosting educational levels among the
state’s current residents.  The results also suggest that if current residents
do not increase their educational attainment, they may increasingly find
themselves facing employment difficulties and a lack of higher-paying
jobs in the economy of the future.  This outcome will affect their quality
of life and most likely increase burdens on the state’s social and income
transfer programs.
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Table 3.7
Forecasted Percentage Change in Share in California Employment
by Industry, SIC
UCLA Anderson,
California (2002)
UCLA Anderson,
United States (2002)
BLS,
United States
1990–
2000
2000–
2010
2000–
2020
1990–
2000
2000–
2010
2000–
2020
2000–
2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mining –47.8 –9.8 –25.9 –36.4 –15.0 –23.1 –33.3
Construction 11.6 –4.9 –15.1 7.9 8.2 2.9 –2.2
Manufacturing –18.7 –18.1 –28.6 –19.6 –9.1 –14.5 –11.4
Transportation
and utilities 4.9 –8.6 –8.9 1.1 5.0 –3.8 2.0
Trade –5.0 0.3 –1.2 –2.4 0.9 2.0 –3.5
Finance,
insurance, and
real estate
–12.5 0.5 3.9 –6.2 3.5 3.6 –6.1
Services 19.1 9.7 17.3 20.3 0.6 4.7 13.2
Federal –34.9 –12.5 –17.3 –25.2 –13.6 –15.8 –18.8
State and local
government 3.0 1.4 –0.3 –2.2 2.0 2.5 –4.2
SOURCE:  BLS projections are from Berman (2001).
Conclusion
Aside from the overall scale of the economy, which is tied largely to
population, the critical factors regarding the state’s infrastructure and
human capital needs can be traced to shifts in the industrial composition
of the economy.  The various forecasts considered in this chapter point
to strong relative declines in manufacturing, transportation, and possibly
construction employment.  In contrast, service industries are projected to
grow strongly.  The regional effects of these changes will pose a host of
infrastructure challenges, but the regional forecasts are too varied to
permit more precise analysis of this question.  It also appears that the
shift away from goods-producing industries and toward service-
producing industries will diminish the relative demand on
transportation, utilities, and energy systems.  We hasten to add, however,
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Table 3.8
Forecasted Percentage Change in Share in California Employment by
Industry, Later Forecasts, NAICS
UCLA Anderson
(2003),
California
2000–2010
UCLA Anderson
(2003), United
States
2000–2010
BLS,
United States
2002–2012
(1) (2) (3)
Natural resources and mining
–46.7 –23.6 –24.4
Construction 1.9 10.5 –1.2
Manufacturing –26.8 –23.7 –15.0
Transportation, warehousing,
and utilities –4.4 6.3 1.6
Trade –1.2 –7.9 –2.9
Financial activities –11.3 –0.0 –3.6
Information 0.7 –5.8 1.7
Professional and business
services 8.4 18.6 11.9
Educational and health
services 18.6 12.3 13.1
Leisure and hospitality services 5.4 4.0 1.1
Other services 6.3 –0.9 –0.7
All services 13.7 8.9 8.2
Federal –8.5 –11.5 –13.8
State and local government 3.7 0.9 –2.6
SOURCE:  BLS projections are from Horrigan (2004).
that our analysis does not capture all of the demands placed on the state’s
physical infrastructure.  Furthermore, the reduction in the demand for
infrastructure is relative to the state’s projected growth in population and
economic activity.  The absolute demand on the state’s infrastructure
systems will continue to grow.
Although there is some controversy about the contribution of
physical capital to economic growth, there is less controversy about the
productive effects of human capital, of which education is a large
component.17  A long line of work documents the role of education in
_____________
17Motivated by the “Solow residual” (Solow, 1957), the early work on this topic
included Schultz’s seminal work (1960, 1961) based on the human capital approach and
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economic growth.  Projections of California’s economic future indicate
that the workforce will have to be considerably more educated than it
currently is.  There are important but unresolved questions concerning
what policymakers can do to increase educational attainment among the
workforce, but encouraging California’s youths to increase educational
attainment is particularly important if they are to enjoy high living
standards in the evolving economy.   A failure to do so is likely to
increase their difficulties and potentially increase the burden on public
services if they cannot support themselves or their families.  The
implication of this research is that investment in human capital can go
beyond meeting current labor market needs; it can also build the
foundation for stronger economic growth.  But Barro (2002) emphasizes
that efforts to increase educational attainment must not lose sight of
continuing efforts to improve the quality of education.  Thus, it seems
likely that the principal challenge posed by economic change in
California over the next two decades is for increased investment in
human capital, on which a modern, technologically advanced, and
service-oriented economy increasingly depends.
______________________________________________________________
Denison’s (1962) and Griliches’s (1960) research on the changing composition of the
labor force, and extending to consideration of the complementarity of capital and skill by
Griliches (1970).
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4. Infrastructure Financing in
California
Kim Rueben and Shelley de Alth1
As a first step toward understanding California’s infrastructure needs
over the next two decades, this chapter examines how California’s state
and local governments pay for projects and services.  It also presents
current spending levels and priorities and shows how they compare to
those in earlier periods and in the rest of the country.  Finally, it
summarizes recent changes in infrastructure financing generally and in
four specific sectors—K–12 education, higher education, water supply
and quality, and transportation—and how California’s decisions have
been affected by the ongoing state budget crisis.
There are three basic ways to pay for infrastructure:  pay-as-you-go,
leasing and private provision, and borrowing.  Under pay-as-you-go
financing, the government pays for a project out of current revenues.  No
borrowing occurs, and no interest is paid.  This approach limits spending
to cash on hand and therefore renders many large projects infeasible.
Currently, California uses pay-as-you-go funding principally from federal
transfers, which are distributed on a revenue-sharing basis.
Another way to provide infrastructure is for the government to
contract with the private sector.  Under this approach, private firms may
provide services directly to the general public, such as the provision of
waste disposal services; or the government can lease public property to
private companies, allow them to pay for improvements, and then
receive the improved property at the end of the lease agreement.  Airport
parking lots, for example, are often financed this way.
_____________
1For a more detailed analysis and data appendix, see the occasional paper
Understanding Infrastructure Financing for California (de Alth and Rueben, 2005),
available at www.ca2025.org.
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Much of California’s infrastructure financing is based on borrowing.
By issuing bonds and paying them off over 20 or 30 years, governments
can undertake large projects that could not be paid for out of current
revenues.  Interest payments on these bonds can double the nominal cost
of a project, but the cost in real dollars is lower.  For large capital
projects, borrowing has the added advantage of matching the long-term
costs of such projects to their long-term benefits.  In effect, the various
generations that will benefit from an infrastructure project contribute to
its financing.
Infrastructure borrowing is done with general obligation (GO) or
revenue bonds.  When the state or local government issues GO bonds, it
pledges to use its general revenues to pay back the interest and principal,
and this debt is backed by the full faith and credit of the issuing
government.  Revenue bonds, in contrast, are paid back with a revenue
stream generated from the infrastructure project itself—for example, tolls
generated from a toll road or water fees for a pipeline project—or with
special assessments for specific projects.  The interest rate for GO bonds
depends on the economic and fiscal health of the issuing government; for
revenue bonds, rates reflect the expected profitability of the project.  At
the state level, GO bonds require a simple majority vote; local GO bonds
generally require approval from a supermajority in that jurisdiction, but
some vote requirements vary by the type of bond being issued.
GO bonds can be separated into two types:  self-liquidating and
nonself-liquidating.  Self-liquidating bonds are backed by project-
generated revenue streams (such as mortgages for veterans’ housing) and
are generally not included when calculating debt-service ratios.  Nonself-
liquidating bonds are paid back with general fund revenues (Table 4.1).
We have included the Economic Recovery Bond, which was passed in
March 2004 and allows the government to borrow up to $15 billion, in
the category of nonself-liquidating debt.  Even though it will be repaid
with dedicated sales tax revenues, the services these revenues would have
otherwise provided must now be funded with other revenues.2  In
_____________
2This categorization of the Economic Recovery Bond is open for interpretation.
For instance the State Treasurer’s Office classifies the bond as self-liquidating, since it is
not repaid from the general fund.
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Table 4.1
State Bond Types, Typical Uses, and Outstanding Amounts ($ billions)
Uses
State Pays
Debt
Service?
Voter
Approval
Required?
Amount
Outstanding
12/97
Amount
Outstanding
7/04
General obligation (nonself-
liquidating)
Education facilities, seismic
retrofit, parks, water projects,
Economic Recovery Bond Y Y 14.9 43.9
General obligation (self-
liquidating)
Veterans’ housing, 1959
California water debt N Y 3.8 2.2
Revenue bonds
State Water Project additions,
college dorms, nonpublic projects N N 22.2 10.9
Lease-payback revenue bonds
Prisons, college facilities, state
office buildings Y N 6.4 7.3
SOURCE:  Legislative Analyst’s Office (1998a) and California State Treasurer
(2004a).
addition, the Economic Recovery Bond will be included in estimating
California’s future debt load, and the state is responsible for repayment
from the general fund if the dedicated sales tax revenues are not
adequate.
Revenue bonds are paid for with specific funds and are not backed
by the full faith and credit of the state; thus they do not require voter
approval.  Lease-payback revenue bonds, however, are a subset of revenue
bonds that mirror a lease-financing agreement.  The debt is used to
construct a government-owned facility, and the debt repayment is seen as
equivalent to what the government would have needed to pay in rental
costs for the space if they had leased it from the private sector.  The bond
costs are paid for by general fund revenue.  These bonds do not require
voter approval because the courts have ruled that the lease revenue
mechanism does not create constitutional debt but is equivalent to a
rental obligation.  However, the payments are included by rating
agencies in the calculation of California’s debt ratio.
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State general obligation debt is mainly repaid with general fund
revenues from existing tax sources.  Because this repayment is not
explicitly linked to higher taxes, voters are not always aware that new
projects will lead to either new taxes or spending cuts in other parts of
the budget.  As the state becomes more reliant on debt financing,
maintaining future spending on operations may be threatened because of
the need to pay off the existing debt burden.
Local Infrastructure Financing
Local governments also finance infrastructure through bonds and
dedicated revenue streams.  However, when local governments issue
general obligation bonds they are usually repaid with voter-approved
property tax increases.  Local revenue bonds—used extensively for water
and sewer projects—are repaid with revenues from services, local sales
and parcel taxes, developer and user fees, and benefit assessments.  This
myriad of revenue sources is also used to provide some spending directly
on infrastructure projects, most notably local sales tax revenues for
transportation projects.  Local governments also receive state and federal
money for projects in a variety of sectors.
Over the last generation, statewide ballot initiatives have limited
local governments’ ability to raise tax revenue.3  Passed in 1978,
Proposition 13 capped the property tax rate at 1 percent, limited changes
in property value assessments to when property is sold, and required a
two-thirds majority for the passage of special taxes.  In 1986 voters
approved a statutory measure that required voter approval (a simple
majority) for passing other general taxes.  Some counties have also passed
sales taxes for transportation projects.  Initially, these sales taxes required
approval by a majority of voters and were considered general taxes, but
the courts have decided that such taxes are special taxes and therefore
now require a two-thirds supermajority for passage or renewal.
User fees and special assessments are also used to provide
infrastructure for local governments.  These fees may vary with
consumption (as with fees for electricity or water) or may be assessed as a
_____________
3For more information on these statewide limitations on local revenues see Rueben
and Cerdán (2003).
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flat monthly charge.  User fees do not require voter approval if they do
not exceed the “reasonable cost of providing service.”  User fees that
exceed a reasonable cost require the same level of voter approval as a
special assessment, which local governments can levy for such public-
benefit-related services as flood control and streetlights.  Following the
passage of Proposition 218 in 1996, special assessments require a two-
thirds majority of voters or a simple majority of property owners for
passage.  There are ongoing debates and court battles over the differences
between user fees, special assessments, special taxes, and general taxes, as
well as what is a “reasonable” cost for a service, but it is clear that local
governments increasingly face the need for public approval to carry out
new or ongoing projects.
The one area in which raising new funds has become easier for local
governments in recent years is K–14 education.  In November 2000, voters
approved Proposition 39, which decreased the supermajority requirement
for local school bond measures from two-thirds to 55 percent.4  Although
there is talk of statewide initiatives to lower the passage rate for other types
of local GO bond measures, none has been approved so far.
Finally, local governments have also relied on development fees for
infrastructure financing.  The local government can negotiate these fees
while approving new developments, which are asked to bear the burden
for new services.  However, this approach is more difficult to use if local
governments wish to build new infrastructure in existing areas.
Spending Patterns in California
Infrastructure spending in California has varied over time as the
result of changes in public attitudes, revenue availability, and population
demands.5  The Pat Brown era (1959–1967) is often seen as a boom
_____________
4This lower majority requirement comes with additional restrictions on the bond
funds including an enumeration of projects that will be funded and the presence of a
voter oversight committee.  In addition, the lower requirement is available only if the
bond is proposed during an election where a federal, state, county, or city election is also
occurring.
5To examine infrastructure spending over time, we use U.S. Census Bureau,
Governments Division data available from 1957–2002 in five-year increments.  Because
of changes in state Controller reporting methodology in 2002, there is missing
information in the census numbers on capital expenditures for nontransportation special
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period of infrastructure building and was characterized by increased
federal spending, bipartisan support for infrastructure, and increased tax
revenues.  Since that time, the political support for infrastructure
provision has changed.  Beginning in the late 1960s, per capita state and
local capital outlays declined in California, reaching a low point
following the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978.  Although this decline
was more dramatic in California, it was similar to capital outlay
expenditure patterns found in the United States as a whole (Figure 4.1).6
The drop in infrastructure spending predated Proposition 13 and
reflected temporary declines in both federal capital funds and school
capital spending because of a decline in size of the school-age population.
E
xp
en
di
tu
re
s 
(2
00
3 
pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 $
)
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
1,000
199719921987198219771972
Governor
Pat Brown
era
Proposition 13
19671962 20021957
SOURCES: U.S. Census Bureau (1957–2002a); California State Controller 
(2001–2002).
California total
United States total
California local
United States local
Figure 4.1—Per Capita State and Local Capital Outlay Expenditures,
1957–2002
______________________________________________________________
districts. We have therefore augmented the census numbers with information from the
Controller’s office about changes in net assets for special districts (California State
Controller, 2004).  For more information, see the data appendix in de Alth and Rueben
(2005).
6Unless otherwise noted, all dollar amounts are given in 2003 dollars.
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Per capita capital expenditures began increasing again in 1982, with
dramatic increases in the last few years.  In 2002, California spent  $931
per person on capital, compared to $917 in the country as a whole.  This
is over one-third more than the amount spent in 1997 and one-quarter
more on a real per capita basis than was spent in 1967—the former high
point in California infrastructure spending.  California has also always
spent more of its capital funds locally than the rest of the country.  In
2002, local governments carried out 83 percent of capital expenditures in
California, compared to 65 percent in the country as a whole.  There has
been a shift in where this money is coming from, with California’s state
government funding an increasing share of local projects.
Although California’s overall per capita spending levels now
approximate those in the rest of the country, how the state spends that
money has diverged from the national pattern (Figure 4.2).  In 1997,
California spent significantly more than the United States as a whole on
resources and community development ($95 per capita versus $56) and
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Figure 4.2—California Versus United States State and Local Capital Outlay,
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water ($79 versus $34)7 and less on highways and roads ($92 versus
$176) and educational facilities ($140 versus $175).  By 2002, California
was still spending less on highways and roads ($156 versus $233) and
more on water and resources (including levee, irrigation, and drainage
special districts).  However, California had almost caught up with the
nation as a whole for spending on educational facilities ($239 versus
$250).
The spending priorities reflected in California’s state budget have
also changed over time.  In 1965–1966, transportation infrastructure
took the largest share of the state’s capital expenditures, and spending on
resources (mainly water) was the next largest slice.  K–12 capital
constituted only 9 percent of state spending but now makes up 69
percent of capital outlay (Figure 4.3), a result of the shifts in state and
local responsibilities occurring after Proposition 13.
Total state spending (2003 $):
$5,789 million
Real per capita spending:
$307
Total state spending (2003 $):
$10,607 million
Real per capita spending:
$299
Other
0%
Transportation
22%
Resources
5%
1965–1966 2002–2003
SOURCES:  California Department of Finance (1967–1968, 2004–2005).
Higher
education
4%K–12
education
69%
Other
4%
Transportation
52%
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24%
Higher
education
11%
K–12
education
9%
Figure 4.3—State Capital Outlay Expenditures, 1965–1966 and 2002–2003
_____________
7Although California has historically spent more on water projects than the nation
as a whole, its water project spending is on par with that of other arid Western states.
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Likewise, the state’s capital funding sources have shifted significantly
since the early 1960s.  Most notably, the state has moved away from pay-
as-you-go financing, with a corresponding increase in reliance on bonds
(Table 4.2).  The amount of direct payments from the general fund for
infrastructure payments has plummeted from the level found in the early
1960s, with general fund revenues now mainly being used to pay back
debt.8  Special funds are usually limited to specific programs, with the
State Highway Account being the largest.  Federal funds make up a
significant portion of the state’s pay-as-you-go infrastructure funds ($1.5
billion in 2002–2003, about 45 percent of capital outlay revenue
excluding K–12 local assistance) and provide money to local
governments to pay for highways, mass transit, flood control, and
veterans’ homes.9
Since 1972 California voters have approved $82.6 billion (nominal
$) in GO bonds for various purposes (Figure 4.4).  About 45 percent of
Table 4.2
State Revenue Sources for Infrastructure Financing
1960–61 1965–66 2002–03
General fund 13.5% 1.8% 0.9%
Special funds 44.2% 27.9% 7.5%
Bond funds 15.8% 42.2% 77.5%
Federal funds 26.6% 28.0% 14.1%
Total real amount (2003 $
millions) 4,104 5,789 10,607
Amount per capita ($) 259 307 299
SOURCES:  California Department of Finance (1962–63, 1967–68,
and 2004–05).
NOTES:  Includes K–12 local assistance for facilities.  Percentages
may not sum to 100 because of rounding.
_____________
8It is important to note that the shift in how California funds infrastructure makes
comparisons in how much general fund revenues are spent on infrastructure projects
somewhat misleading.  In the ad campaigns favoring Proposition 53 (on the October
2003 ballot), proponents highlighted this decline in general fund spending without
recognizing the larger role of special funds and shift to bonds to pay for new investment.
9California Budget Project (1999); Legislative Analyst’s Office (2004a); California
Department of Finance (2004–05).
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SOURCE:  California Department of Finance (2004–05) updated by authors.
NOTE:  The figure does not include the Economic Recovery Bond.
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17%
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Seismic 3%
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Higher
education
11%
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45%
Figure 4.4—Distribution of State General Obligation Bonds
for Infrastructure, 1972–2004
this amount has been used to finance K–12 school construction.  The
next largest categories are natural resources ($15 billion) and higher
education ($10 billion).
The increase in reliance on bond funding has implications for the
state’s debt-service ratio—the portion of annual general fund revenues
that are devoted to principal and interest payments on debt.  This ratio
was at 3 percent in 2002–2003, lower than usual because of the recent
refinancing of outstanding debt in response to the state budget shortfalls.
In March 2004, Californians passed an additional $27.3 billion of
general obligation bonds; half of this will finance school infrastructure
and the other half will help solve the state’s current budget crisis.  In
November 2004, voters approved an additional $3 billion initiative to
fund stem cell research and $750 million for children’s hospitals.  The
result will be increasing debt-service ratios, rising above 7 percent in
2007–2008 and remaining at that level until after 2010 (Figure 4.5).  A
reasonable debt service ratio is 6 percent or less (Legislative Analyst’s
Office, 2004a).  This suggests that California’s capacity for new bonds is
limited in the near term, since more money must be earmarked to repay
debt in the next few years.
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K–12 Education
To flesh out our picture of infrastructure spending, we turn now to
specific sectors, beginning with K–12 education.  Per student outlays on
school facilities have been anything but steady over the last 30 years.
Even before the passage of Proposition 13, school capital financing was
falling (Figure 4.6).  Per pupil capital spending began to increase in the
mid-1990s, well before the lower supermajority requirement for local
school bond measures was passed.  Between 1999 and 2002, local
governments increased per pupil capital spending by over $140.  This
additional level of spending reflects the growing support for schools
generally and school facilities specifically.
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By 1986, K–12 capital finance relied more or less equally on state
bond money, local bonds, and developer and other local fees.10  This
pattern continued into the 1990s, with local districts paying for just over
two-thirds of capital outlay costs for K–12 education through a
combination of local general obligation bonds (32%), developer fees
(11%), and other sources (27%), and with state GO bonds covering the
remaining third (Brunner and Rueben, 2001).
During the recent past, voters have been willing to pass large state
GO bonds to fund K–12 education (Table 4.3).11  Before recent
reforms, however, this funding system suffered from some serious
weaknesses, with school districts uncertain when funding would be
_____________
10Following the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978, it was unclear how school
districts would locally finance new facilities.  Several reforms occurring in the mid-1980s
reestablished local funding sources.  For more information see Brunner and Rueben
(2001).
11Some state bond measures combined financing for K–12 and higher education.
In this section, however, we list the funds solely for K–12 districts.  We will discuss
higher education financing in the next section.
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Table 4.3
State K–12 Education General Obligation Bonds, 1974–2004
($ millions)
Years
No.
Proposed
No.
Passed
Amount
Proposed
Amount
Passed
Real Amount
Proposed
(2003 $)
Real Amount
Passed
(2003 $)
1974–80 3 1 700 150 1,601 419
1981–85 2 2 950 950 1,423 1,423
1986–90 5 5 4,000 4,000 5,253 5,253
1991–95 3 2 3,800 2,800 4,524 3,400
1996–00 2 2 8,725 8,725 9,176 9,176
2001–04 2 2 21,400 21,400 21,573 21,573
Total 17 14 39,575 38,025 43,550 41,244
available and how much to expect.  Although the State Allocation
Board’s decisionmaking process has changed frequently, it historically
allocated bond money on a first-come, first-served basis bond by bond.
Moreover, it required matching funds from localities.12  Until 2000,
school districts needed to reapply each time a bond was passed. This
money was usually depleted entirely before new bonds were authorized,
creating a “hill and valley” revenue stream, which impaired districts’
capacity to plan and raise local supplemental funds.
Moreover, the finance system led to considerable inequities, with
many California children schooled in inadequate facilities.  In 2001, one
in three children attended schools that were overcrowded or in need of
modernization, with estimated costs to correct these problems at $30
billion (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2001).  Following litigation
surrounding the distribution of Proposition 1A funds (passed in 1998),
the state revamped its formula for distributing bond funds, specifically
allocating a portion of new bonds for school districts with critically
overcrowded schools and maintaining a list of projects to be funded from
_____________
12Hardship funds were allowed for school districts that could show an inability to
raise local funds.  For more information on the details surrounding specific limits on
school facility finances see Brunner and Rueben (2001).
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one bond pool to the next.  The new formula also limited the state
match to a certain amount per pupil for each type of district.
After these changes were put into place, voters passed Proposition 47
in 2002 and Proposition 55 in 2004, which authorized $21.4 billion in
new state bond funds for K–12 facilities.  These bonds included money
to fund existing approved projects off the Proposition 1A waitlist ($4.8
billion), projects in critically overcrowded schools ($4.1 billion),
modernization projects in existing schools ($3.7 billion), and new
construction to accommodate projected growth in enrollments ($8.8
billion).  Although there is a per pupil cap on state contributions, most
money is still distributed on a matching basis, so school districts with
higher property values are able to raise more local funds, thereby possibly
becoming eligible for more state money.13  However, hardship
provisions assist districts that are unable to raise their local match.
Concerns about the ability to raise local revenues have been lessened
in the last few years.  Since the passage of Proposition 39, which lowered
the vote requirement for the passage of school bonds in local elections
from two-thirds to 55 percent, school districts passed more than 250
bond measures for more than $20 billion.  Slightly less than half of these
measures would not have passed without the lower supermajority
requirement (Table 4.4).
Table 4.4
Local K–12 School Facility Bonds Since Proposition 39
($ billions)
Number Amount
Passed 256 20.3
Not passed 50 1.7
Proposed 306 22.1
Passed with less than 2/3 119 9.9
NOTE:  Includes the November 2004 election.
_____________
13There is a limit on the level to which school districts can raise property tax rates,
so districts with lower property values may be constrained in how much state funding
they will be able to receive.
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In the aftermath of Proposition 39, the state may wish to examine its
role in financing school facilities.  The Legislative Analyst’s Office has
suggested allocating education capital funds on an ongoing per pupil
basis and moving away from a reliance on bond revenues, which would
address equity concerns and provide a predictable facility revenue stream
(Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2001).  Alternatively, state revenues could
be allocated based on a local match that takes into account the fact that
the same tax rate raises different amounts of revenues across different
districts (because of differences in assessed property values across
districts).  The state could equalize this system by using state money to
top off the revenues raised by a given local property tax increase to
equalize levels across the state.  This would give lower-wealth districts a
higher state match rate for new construction programs.
Although the increased level of state and local bond funding seems
promising for schools, we are allocating much of the next decade’s school
infrastructure funds today.  In particular, if there are future unexpected
demographic shifts, some growing districts may find that they are unable
to provide adequate facilities once the current funds have been spent.
The increased surge in funds has also had at least one unintended
consequence:  The costs of building schools have increased dramatically,
with the demand for construction exceeding the supply of school
construction firms.  Therefore, higher costs may produce fewer
classrooms than originally anticipated.  This pattern might have been
avoided if money had been allocated on a more regular basis.
Higher Education
A mix of federal, state, and local district sources finances the
University of California (UC), California State University (CSU), and
California Community College (CCC) capital outlays.  In 1999–2000,
capital spending represented only 8 percent of total higher education
spending.  State funds for capital and operating expenditures totaled
about $11 billion in 1999–2000 and came from education bonds,
earmarked special funds, and the state general fund.  Student fees and
private funds now augment state funds, adding $1 billion for capital and
$8 billion in operating expenditures in 1999–2000.  As with overall
capital spending, capital outlays for higher education declined rapidly
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during the 1970s, especially after the passage of Proposition 13, but
increased during the late 1980s and 1990s. Census of Governments data
for higher education capital outlay show a real per student spending peak
of $1,652 in 1967 and a trough of $592 in 1982.  By 2002, California
was spending $767 per full-time student.
Before Proposition 13, local community college districts funded
their own building programs through local bonds and property taxes
with some matching funds from the state.  Roughly 10 to 15 percent of
UC and CSU capital funding came from federal sources through the
1963 Higher Education Facilities Act.  Tideland oil revenues from state-
owned land also financed UC, CSU, and CCC capital outlay.  These
revenues were deposited in the Capital Outlay Fund for Public Higher
Education (COFPHE) and totaled $964 million (in nominal dollars)
between 1965 and 1986—about 19 percent of all higher education
capital outlay spending in that period (California Postsecondary
Education Commission, 2003a).
Following the passage of Proposition 13, community colleges lost
the ability to propose new local bond measures, and federal funds for UC
and CSU dried up in the 1980s.  Also in 1985, oil prices dropped
dramatically, decreasing revenue available from the Tideland Oil Fund.
The state then shifted to using bond measures to fund higher education
infrastructure projects.  In 1986, the legislature proposed and voters
passed Proposition 56, a bond measure for higher education raising $400
million.  This was the first time state bond funds were used to fund
facilities for UC or CSU.  State bond measures are now used regularly to
fund higher education capital outlay (Table 4.5).  Until 1996, measures
for higher education and K–12 capital outlay were proposed separately,
but because of stronger voter support for K–12 bonds, propositions are
now joint K–university bond acts.
Before 2000, higher education bond funds had been split into thirds
for UC, CSU, and CCC.  Proposition 47 (2002) and Proposition 55
(2004), which made nearly $4 billion available for higher education
projects, increased the community college share to 40 percent, with UC
and CSU receiving 30 percent each.
UC has been fairly successful in securing private money for capital
building, raising $4.6 billion through private and other nonstate funds
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Table 4.5
State Higher Education General Obligation Bonds, 1972–2004
($ millions)
Date
Proposition
No.
Amount
Proposed
Real Amount
Proposed
(2003 $)
Proposition
Passed?
November 1972a 1 160 572 Y
June 1976a 4 150 359 N
November 1986 56 400 568 Y
November 1988 78 600 794 Y
June 1990 121 450 562 Y
November 1990 143 450 562 N
June 1992 153 900 1,093 Y
June 1994 1C 900 1,012 N
March 1996b 203 975 1,043 Y
November 1998b 1A 2,500 2,616 Y
November 2002b 47 1,650 1,675 Y
March 2004b 55 2,300 2,300 Y
Total 11,435 13,156 11,223
aThese bond measures are for community colleges only.
bThese bond measures also include K–12 money.
Table 4.6
State Capital Outlay Revenue for Higher Education, 1996–1997
Through 2000–2001 ($ millions)
State General
and COFPHE
Funds GO Bonds
Revenue
Bonds and
Special
Funds
Other
Nonstate
Funds Total
UC 10.0 981.9 195.9 4,621.8 5,809.6
CSU 35.6 945.9 11.7 258.3 1,251.4
CCC 1,004.5 1.5 (a) 1,006.0
Total 45.6 2,932.4 209.0 4,880.1 8,067.0
SOURCE: California Postsecondary Education Commission (2003a).
NOTE:  Community college numbers do not include local district
revenues, which are discussed below.
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from 1996–1997 through 2000–2001 (Table 4.6).  Additionally UC can
finance new research facilities through bonds backed by future research
revenue, a recently recommended step (Legislative Analyst’s Office,
2004c).  The CSU system has been less successful in private fund raising,
raising only $258 million from nonstate funds over this same period.
Although community colleges have not raised substantial amounts of
private money, the passage of Proposition 39 has helped them raise over
$9 billion in local district bonds since 2001 (Table 4.7).  Nearly three-
quarters of these measures would not have passed if the two-thirds
supermajority had been required.
Table 4.7
Local Community College Facility Bonds Since
Proposition 39 ($ billions)
Number Amount
Passed 46 9.1
Not passed 5 1.0
Proposed 51 10.0
Passed with less than 2/3 33 6.6
NOTE:  Includes the November 2004 election.
Water Supply and Quality
California water resources are used for agricultural, residential,
industrial, environmental, recreational, and other purposes.  To
accommodate these various uses, California has a vast infrastructure
system for water supply, conveyance, and quality control.  In
1999–2000, capital spending for water supply and water quality totaled
$4.7 billion, and operating expenses totaled $9.6 billion.  About one-
third of this spending is used for sewer systems and wastewater treatment
centers.
City water agencies and nearly 1,300 local water districts and other
entities spend most of this money either to provide water directly or to
meet water standards for municipal wastewater discharge.  User fees are
the largest source of both city and special district funds.  In 1997–1998,
cities brought in $4.1 billion in water and sewer service charges, or 80
percent of city water and sewer functional revenues (California State
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Controller, 1997–98).  Water special districts brought in $4.3 billion in
fees, nearly 60 percent of water district total revenues in this year
(Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2002a).  As Ellen Hanak and Elisa Barbour
show in Chapter 5, average yearly water fees in 2003 were $363, and
only 3 percent of communities faced fees greater than 1.5 percent of
median household income.
Although local water utilities are primarily responsible for delivering
water to end users, several state and federal projects established
significant conveyance and storage infrastructure during the mid-20th
century to supply these local utilities.  These include the federal Central
Valley Project (CVP), the State Water Project (SWP), and the federal
Colorado River Project.  These projects have authority to levy fees and
charges for capital costs.  The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR)
constructed the CVP beginning in 1937 and still controls the facilities.
The project was financed through federal appropriations and repayments
from water users, including agriculture, municipal and industrial users,
and power customers.  Total construction costs totaled $3.3 billion in
nominal dollars as of 1999 (Dowall and Whittington, 2003).  The
Colorado River Project, also administered by USBR, allocates water from
the Colorado River among the Western states, with California
historically receiving a significant share.
The California Department of Water Resources (DWR) runs the
SWP, which furnishes a substantial portion of the water supplies for
urban Southern California as well as agricultural users in the southern
San Joaquin Valley.  Construction on these conveyance and storage
facilities began in the 1960s, when voters approved a $1.75 billion
general obligation bond ($8.2 billion in 2003 dollars) to finance initial
construction. Water supply contractors became responsible for
repayment of this GO bond and passed on these costs to users in the
form of fees.  Subsequently, revenue bonds have been used to finance
additional SWP facilities in Southern California and along the Central
Coast and are also paid off with user fees.
California voters have been asked to approve 15 statewide water-
related GO bonds over the last 30 years, and have done so for all but one
of these, for a total of $9.9 billion (Table 4.8).  The vast majority of
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Table 4.8
State Water General Obligation Bonds, 1972–2004
($ millions)
Date
Proposition
No. Purpose
Amount
Proposed
Real
Amount
Proposed
(2003 $)
Proposition
Passed?
June 1974 2 Clean water 250 698 Y
June 1976 3 Drinking water 175 419 Y
June 1978 2 Clean water and
conservation
375 753 Y
November 1984 25 Clean water 325 473 Y
November 1984 28 Drinking water 75 109 Y
June 1986 44 Water quality and
conservation
150 213 Y
November 1986 55 Drinking water 100 142 Y
November 1988 81 Drinking water 75 99 Y
November 1988 82 Conservation 60 79 Y
November 1988 83 Clean water and
reclamation
65 86 Y
November 1990 148 Water supply 380 475 N
November 1996 204 Water supply 995 1,064 Y
March 2000 13 Drinking water, clean
water, watershed,
and flood control
1,970 2,008 Y
March 2002 40 Clean water 300 305 Y
November 2002 50 Water supply, clean
water, drinking
water, and wetlands
3,440 3,492 Y
Total 8,735 10,415 9,941
these bonds have focused on water-quality-related issues, for both urban
supply (“drinking water”) and wastewater (usually called “clean water”)
programs.  The most recent bonds have also focused on ecosystem
restoration and grants to local water districts to increase water use
efficiency and augment local supplies.
A large portion of the most recent bonds—$1.5 billion—has been
allocated to the CALFED program, a multiagency state and federal effort
to restore the Bay-Delta fisheries, ensure water and environmental
quality, and secure the water supply.  Representatives include urban,
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environmental, agricultural, and other interests.  CALFED does not
directly control or manage water supply but attempts to coordinate
activities of various water actors in the state, including the CVP, SWP,
and local agencies.  CALFED’s long-term financial plan follows a
“beneficiary pays” principle, with project benefits and costs as closely
correlated as possible to avoid or minimize subsidies.  However, to date,
the state bond funds have been the primary revenue source, with
relatively little money forthcoming from either federal sources or local
users.  CALFED partners have recently completed a 10-year finance plan
that allocates costs among federal, state, and local authorities.  In
October 2004, federal legislation authorized $395 million from 2005 to
2010 to support the federal share of CALFED expenditures.
The recent state bonds also provide substantial resources to help
local agencies improve water quality, a shift from the policy in the 1990s,
during which relatively limited state funding was available.  In the first
decade following the passage of the federal Clean Water Act of 1972,
federal grants provided about 75 percent of the capital costs for
upgrading wastewater systems to meet the new water quality standards.
This program was then substantially downsized and converted into a
Clean Water State Revolving Fund, with 20 percent state matching
funds, to provide low-interest loans to wastewater utilities.  In 1996, the
Safe Drinking Water State Revolving Fund was established to assist water
utilities.  California spent $134.6 million in federal funds for water
quality in 1999–2000.  Currently Congress is considering bills that
would provide additional federal money for local water treatment plant
infrastructure, motivated by September 11 security issues and concerns
raised by local governments and environmental groups regarding the
growing costs of clean water programs.
The State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) administers
clean water programs, covering wastewater and storm water runoff.  The
recent passage of Propositions 13, 40, and 50 have greatly increased the
state’s ability to provide local assistance for clean water projects.  In
2003–2004, estimated expenditures from these bond funds total $559
million, or three-quarters of the estimated $750 million in local
assistance from the SWRCB.
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The Department of Health Service’s (DHS) Office of Drinking
Water administers the state’s safe drinking water programs.  Here, too,
bond funds are dramatically increasing spending.  In 1999–2000—
before the bonds—it lent $21.3 million to local entities for drinking
water projects (half of which was from federal sources) and made a small
number of capital grants.  The DHS drinking water budget
appropriation in 2003–2004 includes $115 million in local assistance
from the recently passed Proposition 50, representing one-third of that
year’s DHS local assistance budget.
Whereas user fees are a straightforward local funding source for
water and wastewater systems, there are questions about the funding of a
relatively new area of water quality regulation—storm water. It is
uncertain whether increases in local charges to pay for storm water
management require two-thirds voter or property-owner approval for the
increase or implementation of property-related fees or assessments.  If so,
without federal or state subsidies, local governments will be responsible
for meeting standards but may face difficulties raising revenue.
Another question involves funding for the restoration of fish and
wildlife habitats.  Recent state bonds and efforts such as the CALFED
Environmental Water Account, which buys and stores water to mitigate
competing environmental and water user needs, show the public’s and
state’s willingness to fund water for the environment.  To meet the
continued funding requirements of the CALFED program and new
ecological challenges, however, funding mechanisms will have to keep
pace.
Transportation
How people and goods travel through California will help determine
the state’s quality of life and continued prosperity.  Transportation
infrastructure financing has undergone dramatic shifts since the large-
scale freeway projects of the 1950s and 1960s.  Although the overall level
of spending on highways and roads is now comparable to that of the
earlier period, less of this money is now spent on construction and more
is spent on operations.  In 1967 and 2002, the combined capital and
operating expenses for highways and roads totaled $315 and $332 per
capita, respectively.  In 1967, $231 went to capital, versus only $156
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more recently.  Mass transit has, meanwhile, emerged as a key sector.  In
1972, California spent $20 per capita on transit construction; in 2002, it
spent twice that.
In 1999–2000, capital outlay spending on highways and roads was
evenly divided between state and local projects, with each spending
slightly less than $1.9 billion.  Much of the local spending is allocated by
cities and counties but is coordinated through regional transportation
planning agencies, which receive revenue from the federal and state
governments.
For transit, state and local capital outlay spending in 1999–2000 was
$2.6 billion—about 65 percent of the amount devoted to operating
expenditures.  Virtually all of the transit capital money is spent locally,
although much of it comes from federal and state sources.  Capital
spending on mass transit was unusually high that year largely because of
federal grants and local funds for the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART)
and the Los Angeles County Metro Transportation Authority to
complete extension projects.  In 2001–2002, total transit capital
expenditures fell to $1.5 billion, a more representative level of recent
transit infrastructure financing.
Traditional sources of revenue for transportation have been user fees
such as federal and state fuel taxes, sales taxes on fuel, vehicle registration
fees, motor vehicle weight fees, drivers’ license fees, and tolls.  These
revenues are deposited into special funds administered by the state and
earmarked for transportation, including the Federal Highway Trust
Fund, State Highway Account, and the Public Transportation Account.
About one-third of the state gas and diesel tax is distributed to local
governments for streets and roads; the remainder is deposited into the
State Highway Account.  California’s federal gas and diesel tax
contributions are deposited into the Federal Highway Trust Fund and
redistributed.  Additionally, 4.75 percentage points of the 6 percent state
sales tax on diesel fuel has historically been allocated to the Public
Transportation Account for transit operating expenses and
improvements (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2002b).  Table 4.9 shows the
most recent revenue sources for state capital outlay transportation
spending.  Note that this does not include state or federal money passed
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Table 4.9
State Transportation Revenue for Capital Outlay, 2002–2003
($ millions)
Revenue %
Highway
Bond funds 32.3 1.4
Seismic Retrofit Bond Act of 1996 32.3
Special funds 725.8 32.0
State Highway Account 486.3
Toll Bridge Seismic Retrofit Account 190.9
Traffic Congestion Relief Fund 48.6
Federal Trust Fund 1,480.7 65.2
Transit
Special funds 31.7 1.4
State Highway Account 23.7
Public Transportation Account 0.3
Traffic Congestion Relief Fund 7.7
Total 2,270.5 100.0
SOURCE:  California Department of Finance (2004–05).
through to local governments for capital, including most transit capital
funding.
State and federal gasoline and diesel taxes are still important—
funding about half of transportation spending and raising more than $3
billion each in California annually.  However, fuel tax increases have
been sporadic and politically difficult to pass, making it hard to maintain
revenues in real terms (Table 4.10).  Additionally, this revenue source
has become less reliable over time.  Even with dramatic increases in
vehicle travel, fuel consumption (and therefore real tax revenue) has
declined because of increasing vehicle fuel efficiency.
The federal highway program used to be the largest source of federal
aid to the states, and the federal share of state and local capital spending
on highways reached 46 percent in 1960.  But since the mid-1960s,
federal money has shifted away from highway development and toward
transit, local roads, and operations and maintenance.  Federal authority
has also devolved to regional transportation agencies and local control.
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Table 4.10
State and Federal Gas Tax Rates (cents per gallon)
Year California Federal Total
Total Real
Rate
(2003 $)
1950 4.5 1.5 6 45.8
1951 2 6.5 46.0
1953 6 8 55.1
1956 3 9 60.9
1959 4 10 63.2
1963 7 11 66.1
1983 9 9 18 33.3
1987 9.1 18.1 29.3
1990 14 14.1 28.1 39.6
1991 15 29.1 39.3
1992 16 30.1 39.5
1993 17 18.4 35.4 45.1
1994 18 36.4 45.2
2003 18 18.4 36.4 36.4
SOURCE:  California Department of Transportation (n.d.).
The current mix of transportation financing still represents a
primarily pay-as-you-go system.  But as gasoline tax revenue and federal
funds have eroded, the state has turned to ballot initiatives to fund
transportation capital projects (Table 4.11).  In 1990 and 1996, voters
approved GO bonds for rail transit ($3 billion) and seismic upgrades of
bridges and highways ($2 billion).  Californians also approved
Proposition 42 in 2002, which earmarked 80 percent of the 6 percent
state sales tax on gas to be spent on transportation projects, including
highway improvement and repairs, mass transit, and local road and street
repairs.  (That revenue had previously been allocated to the general
fund.)  Proposition 42 is estimated to raise about $1.2 billion per year in
revenues for transportation.  However, the funds can be allocated back to
the general fund by a two-thirds majority vote of the legislature, and this
occurred at least partially in each of the subsequent budget years to help
address the state’s budget crisis.
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Table 4.11
State Ballot Measures for Transportation Capital Outlay Funds,
1990–2004 ($ millions)
Date
Proposition
No.
Amount
Proposed
Real Amount
Proposed
(2003 $)
Proposition
Passed? Purpose
June 1990 108 1,000 1,250 Y Rail transit
June 1990 116a 1,990 2,487 Y Rail transit
June 1990 122 300 375 Y Seismic
November 1992 156 1,000 1,214 N Rail transit
June 1994 1A 2,000 2,249 N Seismic
November 1994 181 1,000 1,124 N Rail transit
March 1996 192 2,000 2,139 Y Seismic
November 2002 42b 6% sales tax Y Infrastructure
a$29.9 million of Proposition 116 was allocated to the Alameda Corridor project,
which facilitated shipping container rail transportation.
bProposition 42 allocated most of the existing 6 percent sales tax on gasoline for
transportation projects.
Although voters have passed bond measures and initiatives to
earmark funds for transportation, it is unclear in practice how this will
translate into transportation capital funding in the near term.  Future
Proposition 42 funds are not guaranteed, repayment of loans from the
general fund are uncertain, seismic retrofit costs have turned out to be
higher than expected, federal fund levels are unknown, and a conversion
to ethanol fuel will lower federal apportionments unless legislative action
is taken.
The decline in state gas tax revenues and federal funds has prompted
some local governments to seek new funding sources through the
primary option at their disposal—a state-sanctioned optional sales tax.14
Historically, local governments funded street and road construction
predominantly through local general fund revenues (largely from
property taxes) and their share of the gasoline tax pass-through from the
state.  In 1971, state voters also passed a quarter-cent general sales tax on
_____________
14Counties that have passed additional sales taxes for transportation usually pass a
half-cent rate for roads, and in the counties served by BART and in Los Angeles, another
half-cent tax has been passed for mass transit projects.
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all sales to fund local transit, which is deposited into each county’s Local
Transportation Fund; this tax raised about $1 billion for transit
operating and capital funds in 1999–2000 (Table 4.12).  Since 1978, 20
counties approved local supplemental sales taxes of between 1/4 and 1
percent dedicated for highway, street, road, and transit projects.
The optional county sales taxes are now the largest local revenue
source for transportation, constituting one-third of local revenues; in
2003, they nearly equaled state gasoline excise tax revenues.  Because
much of state revenue is distributed with a match requirement, the
ability to raise local sales taxes affects the distribution of state
transportation funds as well.
Getting voter approval for introducing or renewing this funding
source has become more difficult since 1995, when the voter threshold
shifted from a simple majority to a two-thirds supermajority.  Bay Area
and Southern California coastal counties have been most successful in
passing these supplemental sales taxes (Figure 4.7).  Nineteen counties
currently have county sales taxes for transportation, an additional 15
counties have tried and failed to pass a tax at least once, and San Benito
County passed a sales tax in 1988 that expired in 1998.  Marin and
Sonoma Counties recently passed transportation sales taxes in November
Table 4.12
Local Transportation Revenue, 1999–2000
($ billions)
Source Revenue %
Optional local sales tax (1/4 to 1 cent sales tax) 2.6 34.7
Local Transportation Fund (1/4 cent sales tax) 1.0 13.3
Transit fares, property taxes, and local operating assistance 1.4 18.7
Other local funds 2.5 33.3
Total 7.5
SOURCE:  Legislative Analyst’s Office (2000a).
NOTE: Other local funds include local general funds, bond proceeds, fines
and forfeitures, and road taxes.
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SOURCE:  Surface Transportation Policy Project (2002) updated by authors.
Figure 4.7—California Counties That Ever Passed a Local Transportation
Sales Tax
2004 after failing to pass taxes in multiple earlier elections, and it has
taken other counties several attempts to pass or renew these taxes.
Recent state budget shortfalls also affect local transportation funding.
Some local government transit districts are facing a loss of funds as part
of the governor’s negotiated deal with local governments.  Under this
deal, local governments forgo $1.3 billion in local property taxes in each
of the next two years in exchange for support of a ballot measure to
safeguard local funds in future years.
It is clear that local governments are playing a larger role in
transportation funding through the local sales taxes.  The primary
concern raised by this is the new supermajority requirement and the
ability of counties to maintain these taxes.  There are also geographical
equity issues because these local taxes are largely concentrated in coastal
communities.  Additionally, increasing reliance on sales tax revenue
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further divorces transport use from transportation financing.  Allocating
the costs of transport to users of the system encourages more efficient
behavior and can reduce such negative effects as congestion.  Forward-
thinking strategies on transportation financing that consider the
incentives on system use will be crucial to consider as California prepares
for its transportation future.
Conclusion
California currently spends about as much as the rest of the country
on infrastructure projects but less on transportation infrastructure and
more on water and resources than other states.  Our current level of
spending surpasses that of the 1960s, but the priorities have shifted.
Over the last decade, support for K–12 facilities has increased
dramatically.  Going forward, there are still important questions to be
addressed.  Should school districts be more responsible for facilities
financing in the aftermath of Proposition 39?  Should the state become
less reliant on bond financing for school facilities and shift to an annual
per pupil allocation of funding?  Should revenues be distributed to reflect
differences in district wealth?  Should state distributions be based more
on future predicted growth or current enrollments?  In higher education,
where facilities represent a relatively small percentage of total higher
education spending, questions of overall access are likely to be more
pressing than infrastructure needs.
California continues to spend more than the national average of its
infrastructure dollars on water supply and quality, although spending
levels are in line with other Western states.  Water users bear most of
these costs, but rates are relatively low as a percentage of household
income, and most water districts and municipalities have been able to
meet their revenue needs.  Going forward, the main water financing
issues center around water quality and ecosystem restoration.  Local
governments are largely responsible for ensuring water quality, but
because the costs of controlling storm-water runoff are not linked
directly to benefits received by specific households, local governments
could face a two-thirds vote requirement to pass new fees.  Thus, local
authorities may be faced with clean-up costs without a clear way of
paying for them.  For ecosystem improvements, the question is whether
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voters will continue to support state bonds, since contributions by the
federal government and water users have been relatively limited.
Transportation infrastructure seems to be the main area where
California has fallen behind in investment.  Today, many more of our
highway dollars are used for maintenance rather than new construction.
Transportation revenues are also increasingly allocated to mass transit
programs that may or may not be cost-effective.  Furthermore,
traditional sources of revenue are declining in real terms.  Federal and
state fuel taxes, which currently raise 36.4 cents per gallon of gasoline,
have not increased since 1994, and although Californians are driving
more, increased fuel efficiency and higher project costs have further
eroded the real value of the fuel tax revenue.
Increasingly, highway, road, and transit infrastructure is financed
with other taxes, most notably dedicated county sales taxes.  Renewal of
these sales taxes might now face opposition as vote requirements have
changed to require a two-thirds majority for passage or renewal.  General
sales taxes do not tie road use to the cost of providing roads, nor do they
promote the efficient use of transportation infrastructure as much as a
user-based gas tax or toll does.
Transportation questions go beyond the arithmetic of funding
sources.  How much of transportation costs should the actual users of
transportation pay?  How does building new highways affect growth and
congestion?  Should transportation revenues go for roads or mass transit?
These questions must be answered as California considers its
infrastructure future.
Finally, California’s increasing reliance on debt financing in recent
years to help solve the state’s budget crisis also limits the state’s options
in undertaking new projects.  Our current debt load is projected to be
about 7 percent for the next five years, higher than the level deemed
prudent by credit rating agencies, which can limit our future ability to
undertake new projects at the state level.  Local governments also are
faced with an increasingly restrictive environment for raising new
revenues as voter approval is required for a growing list of sources.  As
new infrastructure projects are examined, these constraints might mean
that new options for funding infrastructure will be necessary.
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5. Sizing Up the Challenge:
California’s Infrastructure
Needs and Tradeoffs
Ellen Hanak and Elisa Barbour1
Since the late 1990s, reports by government agencies and
independent groups have sounded a common alarm:  Decades of rapid
population growth, unmatched by corresponding increases in public
investments, are straining the capacity of California’s public facilities.2
In this view, the telltale signs of this problem—overcrowding in schools,
record rates of traffic congestion, growing vulnerability to drought, and
threatened ecosystems—are likely to reach crisis proportions without
actions to fix the way we fund and deliver new infrastructure projects as
well as maintain older ones.
These calls for reform have met with some success.  In 1999, the
state legislature passed AB 1473, which requires that the governor
prepare an annual five-year infrastructure plan.  The passage of
Proposition 39 the following year lowered the voter requirement for local
school bonds from two-thirds to 55 percent, paving the way for
significant increases in local funds for school facilities and for community
colleges.  In March 2002, voters also approved Proposition 42, which
dedicates revenues from the state sales tax on gasoline to transportation
projects.  Education bonds passed in November 2002 and March 2004
made a total of $25.35 billion available for K–12 and higher education
facilities.  Three environmental bonds were passed between 2000 and
_____________
1For a more detailed analysis, see the occasional paper Sizing Up the Challenge:
California’s Infrastructure Needs and Tradeoffs (Hanak and Barbour, 2005), available at
www.ca2025.org.
2See California Business Roundtable (1998); Legislative Analyst’s Office (1998b);
California State Treasurer (1999); Center for the Continuing Study of the California
Economy (1999); Dowall (2001); Neuman and Whittington (2000); Dowall and
Whittington (2003).
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2002, making available $5.7 billion for water quality and supply projects
and $2.3 billion for the acquisition and improvement of open space and
public parks.
Despite these successes, some core funding questions remain.  The
passage of new local taxes and bond finance for other key sectors, such as
transportation, still require a two-thirds supermajority, and the statewide
ballot initiatives do not tap new revenue sources to fund infrastructure.
(Proposition 42 earmarked the use of existing revenues for
transportation, and state bonds are repaid through the general fund.)
The gasoline tax, a major source of roadway funding, has not been
adjusted for inflation since 1994.  In May 2004, water agency opposition
scotched a proposal for water user fees to help restore threatened
ecosystems.  Among major sectors, only higher education has seen fee
increases; since the onset of the budget crisis, student fees are up by over
50 percent and rising.  Thus, California faces the future without a clear
mandate to raise funds at the state level for infrastructure projects.
Moreover, local spending (except in education) still faces high voter
thresholds.  It is therefore appropriate to revisit a central question posed
by the numerous reports on infrastructure:  Are we spending too little on
our public investments to secure a sound economic future and quality of
life?
The conventional method for addressing this question, sometimes
referred to as “gap analysis,” begins by assessing infrastructure “needs,”
pricing them, and then comparing the total price tag to actual spending.
The discrepancy between the price tag and actual spending is then
dubbed the  “funding gap.”  Gap analysis usually assumes that unfunded
needs should be met with public subsidies and tends to ignore or
discount the policy tradeoffs that those subsidies entail.  Perhaps the
major problem with gap analysis, however, arises from the way it defines
and estimates infrastructure needs.  It typically follows an engineering
approach, gauging needs by matching a targeted per capita level of
services to population projections.  As a result, it tends to overstate the
level of needs in sectors where market mechanisms (especially prices)
might shape the demand for those services.  For example, estimates of
water supply needs will be high if the analysis does not acknowledge that
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different pricing approaches might lead to conservation.  Likewise, the
perceived need for new highway lanes will be greater if the analysis
declines to consider alternative transportation modes and incentives to
encourage carpooling.
Such overestimations of need are often compounded by the nature
of infrastructure finance.  When agencies compete for public funds, they
have various institutional incentives to inflate their requirements.  The
result is often a wish list that does not distinguish agency desires from a
definition informed by the notion of consumer demand.  Various
techniques for distinguishing needs from desires—often grouped under
the heading “demand management”—have grown in importance over
the last 10 to 15 years.  The appropriateness of these techniques, which
rely on price mechanisms and other incentives to ration scarce resources,
varies across sectors, depending on their social consequences.  Political
opposition can also block greater reliance on fees even when they would
be appropriate.  In this chapter, we will refer to these approaches, along
with those that emphasize new technologies and the efficient use of
existing assets, as “modern” approaches to infrastructure needs analysis.
In our evaluation of needs and tradeoffs, we will also highlight the extent
to which infrastructure planning has incorporated these approaches.
Instead of asking only whether we are spending enough to secure a sound
economic future and quality of life, we will also ask whether we are
making the most of our available public resources.
We focus our analysis on the three main areas in which California
spends its public investment dollars:  education, water supply and
quality, and transportation.  Together, these sectors represent over 85
percent of proposed state-level spending in the most recent five-year
infrastructure plan, and over 60 percent of all state and local capital
spending in recent years.  After a general description of each sector, we
turn to needs assessments and funding mechanisms and, where
appropriate, alternative approaches to meeting infrastructure needs.  We
then look at the potential for “smart growth” approaches to help
California reconcile the pressures of growth and environmental
protection as it channels its investment dollars.
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K–12 Education
California’s massive public school system encompasses more than six
million students, 9,000 schools, and 1,000 school districts.  Its sheer size
makes the system a key infrastructure concern, but it is also unique in at
least one other respect:  The state constitution guarantees residents
equitable access to primary and secondary schools.  For this reason,
demand-management techniques are inappropriate for this sector, and a
modern approach to needs assessment must focus on mobilizing
resources, using them efficiently, and ensuring their equitable
distribution.
The primary driver of school facilities needs is growth of the school-
age population.  Rapid enrollment growth during the late 1980s and
1990s, during a time of limited investment, created a facilities backlog.
As the baby boom echo ages its way through the K–12 system, this
pressure should subside.  Growth rates for the K–8 cohort are projected
to be negative in the short term and to begin climbing again around
2010 (Figure 5.1).  Growth rates for high school students are expected to
rise until 2005–06, subside and even become negative by the end of the
decade, and then begin rising again around 2015.  Much of the new
growth will occur in inland areas—the Inland Empire, the San Joaquin
Valley, and the Sacramento metropolitan region—where existing
capacity is likely to be more limited.
Taking into account the facilities backlog and new enrollment
growth, planners predict that 35,000 more classrooms will be needed to
accommodate nearly one million additional students by 2008 (Table
5.1).  Modernization needs will also become more prevalent as aging
buildings deteriorate. The Department of Education estimates that 73
percent of classrooms are more than 25 years old.
School Facilities Funding Needs and Gaps
Under the current system for funding K–12 facilities, the state
provides 50 percent of new construction costs and 60 percent of
modernization costs for school districts requesting assistance.  State
grants are standardized based on average cost factors for per pupil new
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Figure 5.1—Projected Population Growth in California by Age Group,
2000–2025
Table 5.1
Statewide Classroom Needs for New Construction and
Modernization of K–12 Public School Facilities,
 2003–2008
New Construction Modernization
Grade Level
Projected
Unhoused
Students
Classrooms
Needed
Students in
Classrooms
Over 25
Years Old
Classrooms to Be
Modernized
K–6 373,446 14,938 500,827 20,033
7–8 160,184 5,933 223,133 8,264
9–12 388,335 14,383 352,394 13,052
Total 921,965 35,254 1,076,354 41,349
SOURCE: California Department of Education (2004).
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 construction and for modernization of classrooms over 25 years old (or
portable classrooms over 20 years old).  The local match can be waived
or reduced for districts facing hardship.
School facilities funding has benefited enormously from recent
statewide and local ballot initiatives.  The recent state education bonds
made $21.4 billion available for K–12 schools.  Following the passage of
Proposition 39, local voters have approved $20.3 billion in local school
bonds.  As Kim Rueben and Shelley de Alth show in Chapter 4, nearly
half of these local measures would not have passed without a relaxation
of the two-thirds majority vote requirement.
Although the recent surge in bond funding has addressed school
facilities needs, a funding gap remains.  The Department of Education
recently estimated a need for $16.9 billion in school facilities funding
over the next five years (Table 5.2).  However, the most recent five-year
infrastructure plan from DOF—which includes remaining state bond
funds—proposed only $10.4 billion, leaving a gap of about $6 billion.
Judging by the overall ratio of local to state bond funds over the past four
years ($20.3 billion versus $21.4 billion, respectively), it is likely that a
comparable effort will be needed at the local level as well.
Table 5.2
State Share of Funding Needs and Proposed Spending for New
Construction and Modernization of K–12 Public School
Facilities, 2003–04 to 2007–08 ($ billions)
Department of
Education Projected
Department of
Finance Proposed
New construction 13.0 4.6
Modernization 3.9 3.4
Hardshipa 2.4
Total 16.9 10.4
SOURCES:  California Department of Education (2004);
California Department of Finance (2003b).
aThe California Department of Education figures include
hardship allocations.
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Alternative Approaches to Meeting Needs
This funding gap suggests the need to reduce costs, provide a more
stable source of funding, or both.  As pressure on school facilities
increased during the 1990s, proposals were advanced to reduce costs and
make fuller use of existing facilities.  These include
• The use of lower-cost technology, especially portable classrooms;
• A shift to multitrack schooling; and
• Management or organizational reforms.
The use of portable classrooms increased considerably with the
introduction of class size reduction policies in 1996.  In 2000–2001,
portable classrooms made up almost one-third of the state’s stock of
K–12 classrooms.   Their advantages include low initial cost, fast
installation, and portability from school to school.  However, concerns
have also been raised about their environmental effects (health,
aesthetics, loss of playground space), and their durability and quality
have led to concerns about their long-term cost effectiveness (California
Air Resources Board and California Department of Health Services,
2003; EdSource, 1998).
Multitrack schooling—which staggers three or more tracks of
students with different schedules throughout the calendar year—can also
increase a school facility’s student capacity.  Since the 1980s, the state
has offered incentives to promote multitrack programs in schools with
space constraints, and by 2002–2003, 22 percent of K–12 students in
California were enrolled in these programs (California Department of
Education, 2003).  The approach has met with a number of criticisms,
however.  For one, it may complicate or even prevent other educational
reforms, such as extension of summer schooling.  Additionally, some
administrators argue that the multitrack schedules, which include more
frequent disruptions than a regular school year, are detrimental for
learning and for efforts to improve educational quality in low-performing
districts (Little Hoover Commission, 2000a).
The remaining cost-savings proposals are still on the drawing board.
One proposal would imply an overhaul of the current incentive structure
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for local districts. To discourage cost overruns, the state’s current 50–50
state-local partnership system allows districts to keep any of the state
funds not spent on construction.  Some observers argue that a better
policy would reward projects that produce long-run savings over the life
cycle of buildings in terms of maintenance, operation, and renewal costs,
in addition to construction costs.  Another proposal argues that
economies of scale could be achieved by regionalizing school facilities
management.  School administrators focus only sporadically on
construction projects and are rarely in a position to innovate successfully
or develop cost-saving expertise (Little Hoover Commission, 2000a).
Similarly, some advocate consideration of joint-use facilities as a way of
achieving economies of scope:  Such facilities would enable a range of
local agencies to provide a diverse set of services to the community
(Metropolitan Forum Project, 1999).
Some analysts have called for a more complete overhaul of the
finance system for school facilities.  The Legislative Analyst, for example,
recommends that the state provide facilities funding on an annual per
pupil basis—similar to the way it funds school operating budgets—after
a transition period in which districts are brought to a comparable starting
point (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2001).  The proposal also includes an
ability-to-pay adjustment to address disparities in local school districts’
capacity to raise matching funds.  Capital expenditures are not currently
subject to the equity requirements established for school finance
equalization.  However, as Manuel Pastor and Deborah Reed discuss in
Chapter 7, the state has agreed to channel additional resource and
attention to facilities in low-performing schools as part of a recent legal
settlement.
Higher Education
California’s system of public higher education is the largest in the
nation, with enrollments of over 2.3 million students (California
Department of Finance, 2003c).  It includes the 10 UC campuses, the
23 CSU campuses, and the 109 CCC campuses.  The Master Plan for
Higher Education, first adopted in 1960, laid out distinct roles for each
segment.  It also set ambitious goals for the overall system, promising an
accessible, low-cost, high-quality postsecondary education to all who
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could benefit from one.  The Master Plan guided the development of all
three segments and produced what many observers regard as the most
successful system of public higher education in the world.
Under the Master Plan’s generous low-fee premise, facilities
planning for higher education uses population growth as the primary
driver of enrollment potential.  The college-age population is expected to
grow more rapidly than the population as a whole until 2012 (Figure
5.2).  Growth in the 18 to 24 year old age group is then expected to
decline and remain negative until 2021.  Indeed, if facilities are expanded
over the next decade to fully accommodate the “Tidal Wave II”
generation (the name college planners have given to the baby boom
echo”), some of California’s postsecondary institutions may experience
excess capacity between 2015 and 2025.
The expected pressure on facilities over the coming decade is
nevertheless substantial.  DOF projects a 26 percent increase in
enrollment from 2003 to 2012, to a total of 2,859,206 students (Figure
5.3).  Some of this growth reflects increased participation rates among 18
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to 24 year olds.  In 2000, the California Postsecondary Education
Commission (CPEC) estimated that improved participation rates would
account for over one-quarter of enrollment growth between 1998 and
2010 (California Postsecondary Education Commission, 2000).  Further
progress in the late 1990s led CPEC to revise this share upward in its
most recent projections (California Postsecondary Education
Commission, 2004).  Increased participation rates imply more college
attendance by economically disadvantaged groups, particularly Latinos,
who are growing as a share of this age cohort.
In 2000, CPEC estimated that the UC system had reached its
capacity limits and that the CCC and CSU systems would reach theirs
within a few years.  It also estimated that the state’s independent colleges
and universities could add an additional 35,000 students between 1998
and 2010.  In 2004, it predicted a capacity shortfall of more than
686,000 students by 2013:  in effect, one-third of the total full-time-
equivalent (FTE) enrollment for all three public segments.  The CCC
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system would experience three-quarters of the capacity shortfall and the
CSU system 19 percent.
Higher Education Funding Needs and Gaps
CPEC’s 2004 update explicitly assumed that state funding, student
fees, and course offerings would return to levels observed during the
economic boom years of 1996 to 2001.  In the new millennium,
California’s higher education system has been one of the casualties of the
state government’s massive budget deficit.  Between 2001 and 2004,
undergraduate fees for a full academic year in the UC system jumped
from $3,859 to $6,230 (61%).  CSU fees climbed from $1,876 to
$2,860 (52%), and CCC fees rose from $330 to $676 (105%).3
Student fee hikes and course cancellations led to an enrollment decline in
the CCC system of about 90,000 students (about 5%) from fall 2002 to
fall 2003.  Given a projected growth rate for the same year of 5 percent,
the CCC system argued that roughly 10 percent of potential students
were “denied access,” although the decline was considerably smaller
(1.7%) in FTE terms (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2004d).
In 2004, proposed state budget cuts to UC and CSU would have
reduced freshman enrollment by 10 percent.  More than 7,000 eligible
students were to be diverted to community colleges and guaranteed
transfers by their junior year.  Although funding for most of these
diverted students was subsequently restored, this was the first such
violation for UC of the access tenets of the state’s Master Plan since its
passage in 1960.  Continued uncertainties over the state’s long-term
budget situation leave open the possibility of further cuts or fee increases.
The CCC mission may be especially vulnerable to cuts in funding
and student fee hikes.  The proportion of students completing two-year
terminal degrees has risen over time, and many members of the next
wave in enrollments will come from families of limited means.  Funding
cuts have been hardest on the least-prepared students at CCCs, who tend
to be first-generation, low-income, and minority (Hayward et al., 2004).
In addition, students in more-expensive vocational programs may have
_____________
3California Postsecondary Education Commission (2003b); University of California
(2004); California State University (2004).
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suffered from cuts along with older working adults who attend evening
and weekend classes.
These cutbacks were the product of reduced operating budgets, not a
lack of facilities.  Although the UC system faces immediate capacity
constraints on some campuses, space is available elsewhere to
accommodate students.  Even as operating budgets were cut, the outlook
for higher education capital budgets actually improved substantially
during the early 2000s, thanks to the passage of state and local bond
measures.  The two most recent state education bonds provided nearly
$4 billion for higher education facilities.  Like primary and secondary
schools, community colleges have benefited from the lower majority
required on local bonds following the passage of Proposition 39.  Since
then, local bonds totaling $9.1 billion have been passed for community
college facilities.  Over two-thirds of the total were passed at the lower
voter threshold.
How far these new funds will go in addressing the projected
shortfalls in space depends on a number of factors, including
assumptions about requirements for research facilities and institutions’
ability to mobilize outside funds.  It also depends on how one assesses
costs for new instructional facilities for higher education.  Although the
legislature has imposed space and utilization standards, each segment
uses its own method of cost estimation.
Table 5.3 presents an overview of four recent capital needs estimates
for all facilities:  two self-reported estimates by the segments for inclusion
in California’s Five Year Infrastructure Plan for 2003 and two estimates
using CPEC’s 2000 and 2004 10-year enrollment projections.  The first
CPEC column reports the results of a detailed cost assessment done in
conjunction with the 2000 study of projected enrollment and facilities
needs to 2010.  The second CPEC column reports our rough estimates
of the cost implications of the June 2004 enrollment projections to
2013, which point to greater facilities shortfalls in the CCC and the
CSU systems and slightly lower future needs in the UC system.  The
update raises total annual costs from $1.5 billion to $2.1 billion, still 17
percent lower than the segments’ own requests for funding, which were
based on lower enrollment projections.  The discrepancies between
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Table 5.3
Needs Estimates (Annualized) and Bond Revenue for California Higher
Education ($ millions)
Self-Reported
Needs, 2003–07a
CPEC Needs
Estimates Funding Proposed/Available
Segment
Request to
DOF
Request
Plus
Deferred
Needs
1998–
2010b
2003–
2013c
DOF
Proposeda
State
Bonds
Since
2001
(Total)d
Local
Bonds
Since
2001
(Total)e
UC 670 770 618 583 335 1,098
CSU 556 556 359 550 312 1,186
CCC 1,329 2,769 526 988 427 1,666 9,100
Total 2,555 4,095 1,503 2,121 1,074 3,950 9,100
SOURCES: aCalifornia Department of Finance (2003b); bCalifornia Postsecondary
Education Commission (2000); cauthors’ calculations based on California Postsecondary
Education Commission (2004); dProposition 47 passed in November 2002, and
Proposition 55, passed in March 2004; ede Alth and Rueben (2005).
CPEC estimates and the self-reported figures are greatest for the CCC
system.
The right-hand columns of the table present two estimates of
available funding:  the administration’s proposed expenditures in the
Infrastructure Plan, and the cumulative amount of state and local bonds
made available since 2001.  The Department of Finance proposed to
fund only two-fifths of the segments’ request and only two-thirds of the
CPEC estimates then available.  The discrepancies were greatest for UC,
possibly reflecting the fact that a large share of UC capital funds is raised
from nonstate sources (California Postsecondary Education Commission,
2003a).
Given the continued state budget woes, these funding proposals—
which include contributions from the general fund—may be unreliable
guides to future funding.  It is therefore useful to assess how far the one
sure source of public funding—the bond revenues—will go toward
alleviating facilities needs.  Table 5.4 summarizes the number of years of
capital needs that could be met under the different needs scenarios,
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Table 5.4
Years of Capital Costs Covered by Public Bonds and Nonpublic Sources in
California
Projected % Share Self-Reported Needs CPEC Needs Estimates
of Nonpublic
Funds
Request to
DOF
Request Plus
Deferred Needs 2000–2010 2003–2013
UC (1) 80 8.2 7.1 8.9 9.4
UC (2) 50 3.3 2.9 3.6 3.8
CSU 21 2.6 2.6 4.1 1.5
CCC 0 8.1 3.9 20.5 10.9
NOTE:  For the UC, scenario 1 includes nonpublic funding at late 1990s levels.
Scenario 2 assumes a drop in nonpublic funding to 50 percent.
assuming that the same share of capital outlay is contributed from
nonstate sources for UC and CSU as during the period from 1996–97
through 2000–01.4  It also includes a scenario with lower nonstate
funding for UC.
The figures highlight the importance of nonstate sources to meet
facilities expansion needs in the current era.  Overall, CCC’s situation
has improved dramatically with the passage of local bonds, which
outnumber state bonds for this segment by five to one.  Depending on
future enrollment patterns, which respond to fees and course offerings,
funds are available to cover from 11 to 20 years under CPEC cost
estimates.  Even with the high-enrollment scenario, this would
potentially cover statewide facilities expansion throughout 2012, the
period of projected enrollment growth.  However, some districts may
still face challenges because local bonds are not evenly distributed.  By
CCC’s own needs estimates, bond funding will be adequate for four to
eight years of capital investment.
With limited expectations of outside funding, the CSU system is in
the worst position, with enough funds for just two to four years.  Thanks
to outside funding, the UC system appears to be in relatively good shape,
_____________
4The share of capital outlay funds contributed from nonstate sources was calculated
from data for the period from 1996–97 through 2000–01, from California Postsecondary
Education Commission (2003a).
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with adequate facilities funds for seven to nine years.  This figure is more
than halved, however, if outside funding falls from 80 to 50 percent of
the total.  Moreover, the ability of different campuses and programs to
raise external funds varies widely.  Older, more established campuses and
programs are better able to raise funds from alumni and donors, yet
newer programs may face more pressing expansion needs.  These
mismatches could significantly alter the projection of adequate facilities
funding.
Alternative Approaches to Meeting Needs
These innovations in facilities finance notwithstanding, public
higher education in California is at a crossroads.  As CPEC warned in
2000, “If a second great surge of students is coming—and Commission
analysis . . . shows clearly that Tidal Wave II is a reality—then business
as usual will clearly be insufficient” (p. 11).  In response to that warning,
numerous reform proposals have been put forward to reestablish or
reinterpret the social contract in the Master Plan.5  Many proponents
argue for the need to restore higher and more predictable levels of state
funding from the general fund, which has been susceptible to cuts during
periods of budget difficulties and has declined as a share of rising real per
student costs.  However, modern approaches recognizing the limits and
tradeoffs involved in public funding are also increasingly common.  As
with K–12 education, these include supply-side proposals to improve the
system’s productivity and cost-effectiveness.  In contrast to the K–12
sector, there is also explicit consideration of demand-management
techniques.  Many of these proposals have found fertile ground in today’s
revenue-constrained environment.
Well before the recent fee increases, a number of observers had
begun to call for greater reliance on user fees.  Instituting a long-term
policy of higher fees (or tuition) would influence demand for schooling
and put a formal end to the Master Plan’s commitment to low-cost
access.  The justification for higher fees is that many students could pay a
_____________
5For summaries of major reports during the late 1990s, see Breneman (1998) and
California Postsecondary Education Commission (1999).  Also see Joint Legislative
Committee to Develop a Master Plan for Education (2002).
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greater share of the costs without undue hardship, thus providing a stable
source of funding to the system.  Higher fees may also relieve some
pressure on enrollment demand in the public sector by shifting some
students to private institutions and encouraging students to finish their
degree programs more quickly.  Some observers also advocate varying
fees (or prioritizing access) according to the level of education, training,
and profession.  In spite of the hefty increases in recent years, fees for
California schools remain low compared with fees in counterpart schools
in other states (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2004d).  To avoid limiting
access, a program to raise fees must be accompanied by increased
financial aid for needy students.
Fee increases alone may not be enough to solve the system’s
problems.  Park and Lempert (1998) found that to maintain historic
levels of access into the next decade, California would need to increase
fees well beyond levels envisioned in current debates unless the system
becomes far more productive in its use of resources.  Proposals for greater
cost-effectiveness include
• Increasing performance and accountability standards;
• Providing incentives or mandates for more efficient use of space;
• Mobilizing outside funds for research facilities;
• Reallocating students from high-cost to lower-cost institutions;
• Realizing economies of scope through regional linkages; and
• Introducing new technologies.
Performance and accountability standards can serve as incentives for
both learners and institutions.  For example, state aid might be geared
toward demonstrated achievement of performance goals such as rapid
time-to-degree.  Such incentives could encourage institutions to facilitate
more streamlined course loads for students.
In the area of space utilization, one much-discussed option is to
extend summer sessions or even institute full year-round operations.
According to the Legislative Analyst’s Office (1999), year-round
operation could increase the number of students accommodated with
existing facilities by up to one-third and save several billion dollars.
Year-round operation has been phased in slowly at some UC and CSU
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campuses, and most financial aid programs have not been restructured to
accommodate summer programs.  The call for summer programs is part
of a more general push for improved space and utilization standards (the
Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2002e).  Many administrators also believe
that the decades-old space standards should be overhauled, and the CSU
Chancellor’s Office has introduced incentives for space conservation and
sharing (California Postsecondary Education Commission, 2000; Dowall
and Whittington, 2003).
Specific issues arise for research facilities.  For the same square
footage, these facilities are about twice as expensive to construct as
classrooms, and they have expanded in the UC system at almost twice
the rate of instructional space (including laboratories) over the past
decade.  Research space in the UC system accounts for about 80 percent
of academic space; the comparable figure at peer universities nationally is
roughly 50 percent (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2004c).  The policy
debates, however, center less on these proportions than on the role of the
state in funding them.  Arguments in favor of state sponsorship stress the
role that research facilities play in the quality of graduate instruction and
in the contribution to the regional economy.  The Legislative Analyst
maintains that the UC system can fund these facilities through sponsored
research.
Another way to reduce the public outlay for higher education is to
emphasize CCC’s role as a feeder institution to the UC and CSU
systems, given the CCC system’s far lower costs per student.  However,
most UC- and CSU-eligible students are unlikely to shift to the
community colleges voluntarily, and efforts to divert such students to the
CCC system for 2004–05 were unsuccessful.  Other proposals that
would help achieve economies of scope include greater intraregional
coordination among educational institutions and more joint use of space.
Improved linkages to the K–12 system offer the potential for better
student preparation for postsecondary education and more streamlined
movement of students through the system.  Finally, technological
solutions such as distance-learning have been advanced.
To be successful, many of the reforms proposed in the name of cost
savings may require additional financial contributions from the state or
other sources.  Year-round enrollment, for example, may be feasible only
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if the state provides full financial support. Technological upgrading
would require expensive up-front investments even as it promises long-
run savings.  Furthermore, efforts to reduce the state’s financial
contribution to higher education, by increasing fees or compressing
costs, necessarily involve tradeoffs.  The economic rationale for public
support to higher education is that the benefits to society of an educated
workforce are likely to outweigh the benefits for individual students.
Attempts to reduce public costs may provoke concerns about loss of
quality as well as equity.  For instance, diverting some students to CCCs
may permit cost savings, but those institutions may also provide a lower-
quality education.  Raising fees without adequate financial aid will
reduce access for those groups least able to afford a higher education.
These choices have consequences not only for individuals but also
for the economic health of the state as a whole.  In today’s more global,
competitive, and high-tech-oriented economy, higher education is
increasingly the ticket needed to obtain the best jobs.  Indeed, as David
Neumark points out in Chapter 3, economic projections for California
predict the greatest job growth in sectors that are relatively skill-
intensive, such as business and professional services, education, and
health care.  Thus, Californians will need to consider the potential costs
of not pursuing policies to ensure greater access, quality, and
affordability—the major elements enshrined in the Master Plan.
Water Supply and Quality
California’s water resources are expected to meet multiple,
potentially competing, objectives:  safe, reliable, and affordable drinking
water supplies for the growing residential population; reliable, low-cost
supplies for water-dependent agricultural and industrial businesses; and
clean and adequate supplies to ensure the health of the state’s waterways,
lakes, and beaches as well as the wildlife and recreational activities that
depend on them.
Although state and federal agencies play a role in all aspects of water
management, the frontline institutions are local utilities and
governments.  Retail water utilities—a mix of special districts, municipal
departments, and private companies—are responsible for meeting
drinking water standards.  Roughly 400 large retailers serve most
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California homes and businesses; over 8,000 additional systems deliver
water to smaller communities and public facilities such as parks.  Nearly
600 local wastewater utilities—many of which double as water
retailers—are responsible for meeting the clean water standards for
municipal wastewater discharge, the primary fixed or “point” source of
water pollution in California.
Over the past decade, municipal and county governments have
progressively become responsible for managing a key form of diffused or
“nonpoint” source pollution—storm-water runoff.  Finally, hundreds of
agricultural water districts manage the water resources for California’s
farmers.  Because they deliver “raw” (untreated) water, they are not
subject to drinking water standards, but they are increasingly being
targeted to manage agricultural runoff, the other main nonpoint
pollution source.  Because agriculture uses about four times more water
than all municipal and industrial uses combined, these districts are also
key players in the discussions about statewide supply policies.  Since the
mid-1990s, a multiagency, federal-state partnership known as CALFED
has brokered agreements among water users and environmentalists for
ecosystem restoration and water supply reliability improvements in the
hub of the state’s water system, the San Francisco–San Joaquin Bay
Delta.
California’s water sector is in the midst of a paradigm shift in the
way public investments are planned and paid for.  Municipal water
services have a strong tradition of direct user-fee finance.  Many
agricultural users have benefited from federally subsidized projects to
develop water supplies.  Since the 1980s, there is a growing recognition,
backed by court rulings and legislation, that both sectors were taking too
much water out of the system.  To support fish and wildlife habitat,
some water has been reallocated to instream uses.  The modern approach
to water planning emphasizes the importance of demand management as
a guiding principle for future water investments.  In theory, water users
have adopted this approach, by agreeing to a “beneficiary pays” principle,
whereby users pay for those investments that benefit them directly, and
tax dollars pay for public benefits, such as ecosystem restoration.  In
practice, implementing this policy is proving contentious, because public
funds are in short supply.
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Supply-Related Needs
California’s water supply concerns arise because urban demand is
growing, traditional supply sources are shrinking, and the environment is
perceived to have unmet needs.  In a conventional approach to water
supply planning, this pattern could imply the need for vast new
quantities of water.  At current levels of per capita use, and with a
projected population increase of 14 million inhabitants, municipal use
would expand by 3.6 million acre-feet between 2000 and 2030.  Between
now and 2015, California will also have to reduce its use of Colorado
River supplies by about 0.8 million acre-feet.  Finally, the most recent
California Water Plan Update, still in draft at the time of this writing,
has set two environmental goals that would also require new water:
increasing instream flows to support aquatic wildlife and eliminating the
overdrafting of groundwater basins.  To meet all these demands, while
leaving agricultural uses at their current levels, California would need an
additional 5.9 to 7.4 million acre-feet by 2030, an increase of 7 to 9
percent over 2000 levels (Table 5.5).
However, this extreme scenario overstates new supply needs by a
considerable amount.  California’s residential water users can still make
Table 5.5
Current and Projected Water Use in California
(millions of acre-feet)
Net Change to 2030
2000
Extreme
Scenario
Moderate
Scenario
Municipal 8.9 3.6  3.1
Agriculture 34.3 0.0 –3.2
Environment 39.4 0.5–1.0 0.5–1.0
Total use 82.6
Colorado River surplus 0.8 0.8  0.8
Groundwater overdraft 1.0–2.0 1.0–2.0 1.0–2.0
Total “new” water needed 5.9–7.4 2.2–3.7
SOURCE:  California Department of Water Resources (2004);
extreme and moderate scenarios calculated by authors using information
from this source (Hanak and Barbour, 2005).
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large savings through conservation.   By one recent estimate, average per
capita use will fall by nearly 5 percent if utilities simply continue to
implement conservation programs to which they have already agreed.
Economic factors are also likely to reduce agricultural water use.  Every
year, some farmers sell land for new housing developments, and others
use water more efficiently as they shift to higher-value crops.  Taken
together, these patterns could cut in half the amount of new supplies
needed—a figure reflected in the moderate scenario of Table 5.5.  Water
no longer used by agriculture provides the opportunity for transfers to
urban and environmental users, reinforcing a trend in water marketing
that got underway in the early 1990s (Hanak, 2003).  Unused
agricultural water can also contribute to reducing groundwater overdraft.
Numerous supply options are available to fill the remaining gap,
including traditional sources, such as surface storage, along with
conservation measures and nontraditional sources, such as storage in
underground aquifers, desalination, and recycling.  Figure 5.4 shows the
most recent estimates of supplies available from these sources from the
California Water Plan Update.
Simply summing these strategies overstates the potential, because
some—for instance surface and groundwater storage—could compete for
the same supplies.  Globally, however, they indicate scope for expansion
well above the range of expected growth in urban and environmental
demand.  The optimal mix of supply solutions depends on costs and
reliability and will vary by locality and region.  Some sources, such as
conservation, groundwater banking, and water transfers, can make water
available at a very low cost—$100 to $200 per acre-foot or less per year.
Others, such as desalination, recycling, and surface storage, require
considerable up-front investments as well as high operating costs, bringing
annual costs above $600 per acre-foot and in some cases over $1,000.
There are no comprehensive estimates of how much California’s
water sector would need to invest each year to expand supplies to meet
urban and environmental demands.  To provide a very rough gauge, we
can cost out the increases in net water demand implied under the
moderate scenario presented above, which range from 75,000 to 135,000
acre-feet per year.  Assuming average development costs in the range of
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SOURCE:  California Department of Water Resources (2004).
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$3,000 to $5,000 per acre-foot, this implies annual investment needs for
new water on the order of $220 to $615 million statewide.6
Quality-Related Needs
Many observers stress that managing water quality is at least as great
a challenge as securing new supplies.  New public health evidence on
drinking water contaminants is raising the bar for water utilities, and
new environmental regulations on polluted runoff are reshaping the way
we will need to manage a wide range of activities.  Some public works
and environmental advocates have also argued that insufficient
_____________
6Average investment costs are based on data presented in California Department of
Water Resources (2004).
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investment by drinking water and wastewater utilities is leading to an
impending water quality crisis.7
Estimates of the investment costs to maintain and expand
California’s local water delivery systems and treatment facilities are
presented in Table 5.6.  On balance, they suggest that capital
expenditure requirements for water quality far exceed the costs of
developing new supplies.  For drinking water, the range is from $1
billion to $2.8 billion per year, and for wastewater from $1 billion to
$1.8 billion.  The relatively modest figure for managing storm-water and
other nonpoint source pollution, with capital costs of $60 million per
year, could reflect an undersampling of agencies responsible for these
activities, although there are also debates about costs.  These estimates
exclude costs for runoff management by farmers and by the California
Department of Transportation (Caltrans), which are also uncertain
(California Department of Finance, 2003d).  They also exclude the costs
of ecosystem restoration, another water quality concern, which the
Table 5.6
Annual Drinking Water and Clean Watershed Investment Needs in California
(millions of 2000 $)
EPA Needs Surveys EPA Gap Analysis CBO Estimates
California
Total
California
Share (%) Low High Low High
Drinking water 874 12.6   969 2,806 1,459 2,529
Clean water
Sewage 663 8.2 1,355 1,842 1,064 1,711
Storm water 18 6.3
Nonpoint source 40 5.8
SOURCES:  U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2001, 2002, 2003);
Congressional Budget Office (2002).
NOTE:  CBO estimates include financing costs.
_____________
7For national studies, see American Water Works Association Water Industry
Technical Action Fund (2001); Water Environment Research Foundation (2000); Water
Infrastructure Network (2000); and Natural Resources Defense Council (2004).  For
commentary on the California situation, see California Rebuild America Coalition
(2003).
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California Department of Water Resources (2004) has priced at $150 to
$300 million per year statewide.  Some ecosystem funds are destined for
protection of the seismically vulnerable Delta levees, whose failure could
jeopardize drinking water supplies for Southern California and irrigation
supplies in the San Joaquin Valley for months, if not years.  A levee
break in June 2004 has renewed debates on the best strategies for
tackling this problem, with costs potentially much higher than those
envisaged in current funding plans.8
Is There a Funding Gap?
The high costs of these investments, particularly for water quality,
have led to calls for increased public subsidies.  Advocates hearken back
to the 1970s, when the federal government provided massive subsidies to
upgrade wastewater treatment.  However, our analysis suggests that
California’s municipal water and wastewater utilities are largely on track
to meet regulatory demands and accommodate growth with the current
funding system, which again relies mainly on user fees.  In real terms,
water-related capital spending, including both supply augmentation and
drinking water facilities, increased from $2.6 billion to $3.3 billion
between 1997 and 2000.9  This lies at the high end of the range of
projected annual needs for these activities of $1.2 billion to $3.4 billion.
Wastewater spending has been relatively stable at around $1.7 billion per
year, well in line with annual capital needs.
This healthy state of affairs is due in no small part to utilities’
straightforward system for raising revenues.  Generally, they need only
a simple majority vote from their governing board to raise fees.
Moreover, current user fees are low as a share of household income,
suggesting scope for fee increases without causing across-the-board
hardship (Table 5.7).  In a recent statewide survey of utilities, only 3
_____________
8CALFED’s 10-year finance plan targets funding for levees at $446 million
(CALFED, 2004).  Some analysts argue that propping up the levee system is an
unsustainable strategy, and they call for reconsideration of the decades-old plan to
sidestep the Delta with a peripheral canal (Leavenworth, 2004a).
9Data are in 2000 dollars (de Alth and Rueben, 2005).  More recent data for water
and sewer are less reliable because of a change in reporting methods for capital investment
by special districts.
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Table 5.7
Water Charges as a Share of Median Household Income in California, 2003
No. of
Communities
in Sample
Average
Yearly
Water Fees
($)
Water Fees as
% of Median
Household
Income
Fees > 1%
of Median
Income
Fees > 1.5%
of Median
Income
Bay Area 109 444 0.6 5 0
Southern Coast 176 385 0.7 13 1
Central Coast 38 457 0.9 29 11
Inland Empire 60 322 0.7 17 8
San Joaquin Valley 55 207 0.5 5 0
Sacramento Metro Area 34 248 0.5 3 0
Rest of State 64 344 1.0 41 8
California 536 363 0.7 15 3
SOURCES:  Authors’ calculations, using water fees from Black and Veatch (2003).
Median household income is from the 2000 census, adjusted for inflation with the
consumer price index for urban areas (CPI-U).
percent (covering 1% of the sampled population) had charges greater
than 1.5 percent of median income, the cutoff for eligibility under
targeted drinking water programs. Regions where water rates are
high—such as the Central Coast and some North Coast and Mountain
communities included in the “rest of state” category—appear more
vulnerable than the Central Valley, where water rates are generally quite
low.  Moreover, modern water pricing techniques—which increase rates
for higher levels of use to encourage conservation—have built-in
protections for lower-income residents, who tend to consume less water
than wealthier households with larger lots.
Mandatory system upgrades, however, could pose real financial
difficulties in some low-income communities.  The potential is greatest
in smaller communities, where unit costs tend to be higher.  Some
existing programs address these concerns.  For drinking water systems,
the state revolving fund, co-financed by federal and state authorities,
gives priority grants and low-interest loans to low-income communities.
California also has a small communities grant program for wastewater
systems, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture targets financial
assistance to rural (typically low-income) communities for wastewater
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and drinking water.  As regulatory pressures increase—for instance to
meet new standards on arsenic in drinking water—policymakers will
need to keep an eye on the adequacy of these programs, which currently
account for a small share of total state and federal support in this sector.
Two other areas of the water portfolio are more problematic:
providing funds for the environment and managing polluted runoff.
The estimated costs of environmental water and ecosystem restoration
are considerable—on the order of $500 million annually.  Many
agricultural users hold the view that the environmental price tag should
also include some restoration of supplies returned to instream uses
through involuntary cutbacks in the early 1990s.  Since 2001,
environmental programs (including levee maintenance) have been
funded with state bonds, and there is enough money available to cover
another two to three years.  The presumption behind CALFED’s
tentative peace accord between water users and environmentalists was
that public funds would continue to be available for these activities.
With no assured long-term funding, environmentalists are now calling
for increased user fees (in effect, an environmental tax) to finance the
program.  The strongest opposition to such proposals comes from
farmers, who maintain that the water supply promises of CALFED have
yet to be met.
Given the likelihood that federal contributions will remain limited,
Californians probably will be asked to make ballot-box decisions on
whether to devote substantial new bond funds to support ecosystem
restoration and perhaps to help fund the development of new supplies.
Because state bonds are repaid through the general fund, this form of
financing amounts to subsidies from the general taxpaying public.
Under the alternative of eco-taxes on water, a much higher burden
would fall on farmers.
For runoff, regulations are clamping down on the construction
industry, local governments, transportation authorities, and farmers.
With management techniques still in the process of development, cost
estimates vary widely, but it appears likely that a flexible mix of
technologies and policies can keep costs down.  A plan in San Diego
allows cities to work with developers to install systems covering entire
drainage areas rather than individual projects, thereby reducing per acre
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costs from $50,000 to $10,000 (Rogers, 2002).  In San Bernardino
County, local governments and water managers are exploring the
possibility of tying storm-water management programs to aquifer
recharge.  By reducing impervious surfaces (e.g., curbs, pavement) and
directing the flow of runoff, they hope to increase local supplies while
reducing the discharge of pollutants to local rivers and lakes.  Even in
areas where recharge benefits are not available, the introduction of more
drought and pest-tolerant native plants can simultaneously conserve
water and reduce pesticide-laden runoff.  Integrated watershed
management approaches are also seen as a way to combat source
contamination of drinking water, reducing the need for treatment.
Nevertheless, there are clearly challenges to paying for runoff
programs, prompting some to consider this as yet another “unfunded
mandate.”  Private construction activities are the only ones with a direct
mechanism for recouping costs—that is, through higher sales prices.
Under the current legal system, storm-water fees may be considered
taxes, requiring a two-thirds popular vote.  In this sense, the unfunded
mandate critique rings true:  Municipalities and transportation agencies
are given responsibility for implementing regulations but lack the
authority to generate the necessary funds.
Transportation
California’s transportation system, the most extensive in the nation,
is made up of more than 50,000 state highway miles, 8,000 miles of
railroad, 250 general aviation and 28 commercial airports, and over 200
public transit systems.  As the leading global gateway for Pacific Rim
trade, California’s ports handle more than one-third of the value of all
U.S. and foreign trade, totaling $200 billion (California Department of
Finance, 2003b; California Department of Transportation, 2003a;
Haveman and Hummels, 2004).
Transportation planning is a hybrid of federal, state, regional, and
local responsibilities.  During the 1990s, federal and state policies
augmented the regional role.  Today, regional transportation planning
agencies (RTPAs) program 75 percent of funds from state and federal
sources designated for transportation capital improvements in California.
The remaining 25 percent is allocated for projects of interregional
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significance chosen by Caltrans.  Regional agencies in urban areas with a
population of 50,000 or more are required by federal law to produce 20-
year regional transportation investment plans and update them every
three years.  The plans must address air quality standards, mobility,
access, congestion relief, equity, energy efficiency, and safety, among
other objectives.
This planning takes place against a backdrop of rising vehicle use.
Between 1967 and 1997, vehicle miles traveled on state freeways grew
almost three times faster than population, and car use is projected to
continue outpacing population growth in the future (Figure 5.5).
Contributing factors include a rise in the number of two-earner
households and a continuing shift of jobs and residents to less densely
developed suburban and “edge city” locations.  Goods-related traffic has
also contributed to the increase in road use, especially in Southern
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California.  California roads and highways carry more truck traffic than
any other state in the nation—more than a billion tons of freight
annually (California Department of Transportation, 2003a; The Road
Information Program, 2004).  In 2002, trucks accounted for 29 percent
of total vehicle miles traveled in the state (California Department of
Transportation, 2003b).
Despite increasing vehicle use, highway construction has been
curtailed as a result of rising costs and declines in its major source of
dedicated revenue.  In inflation-adjusted terms, capital expenditure for
each new U.S. road mile was more than three times higher during the
1990s than during the early 1960s.10  Rights-of-way, labor and
materials, high design standards, and growing community and
environmental concerns accounted for much of the cost increase (Taylor,
1992).  Meanwhile, the state and federal excise taxes on gasoline did not
rise with inflation, and increases in fuel efficiency put downward pressure
on those revenues.  In real terms, California fuel tax revenue per vehicle
mile traveled today is worth approximately 36 percent of what drivers
paid in 1970.  Capital outlays on highways declined during the high
inflation years (Figure 5.5); and, from 1980 to 2000, California
increased its highway lane miles by only 6 percent.
The steady rise in vehicle miles traveled, coupled with limited
capacity expansion, means that Californians have been using their
roadways more intensively over the past few decades.  Traffic delays,
especially at peak periods, are a natural outcome of this process.  Traffic
congestion has become a feature of life in California’s metropolitan areas,
and judging by public opinion polls, a source of daily consternation.
Census data indicate that between 1990 and 2000, average travel time to
work increased by two to five minutes for residents of California’s major
metropolitan areas, or 7 to 19 percent (Table 5.8).
Another view of trends and relative magnitudes across metropolitan
areas is provided by the Texas Transportation Institute’s (TTI) estimates
of annual hours of congestion-related delay (Figure 5.6).  For coastal
regions, the sharpest increases in congestion occurred during the 1980s.
Congestion continued to rise in San Diego and in fast-growing inland
_____________
10For details, see Hanak and Barbour (2005).
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Table 5.8
Travel Time to Work for California Residents, 1990 and 2000 (minutes)
County of Residence 1990 2000 Increase % Change
Los Angeles 26.5 29.4 2.9 11
Orange 25.5 27.2 1.7 7
San Bernardino 27.4 31.0 3.6 13
Riverside 28.2 31.2 3.0 11
San Diego 22.2 25.3 3.1 14
San Francisco 26.9 30.7 3.8 14
Santa Clara 23.3 26.1 2.8 12
Alameda 25.8 30.8 5.0 19
Contra Costa 29.3 34.4 5.1 17
Sacramento 21.7 25.4 3.7 17
SOURCE:  Authors' calculations, using U.S. Census, 1990 and 2000 STF3
NOTE:  Workers are all workers age 16 or older who did not work at home.
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Figure 5.6—Annual Hours of Delay per Person on Highways and Major
Arterials in California Metropolitan Areas, 1982–2001
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areas during the 1990s.  In 2001, the average annual delay per capita
ranged from 19 hours in Sacramento to 52 hours in Los Angeles.
These time delays and the associated extra fuel costs have been used
to generate very large estimates of the costs of congestion to California’s
economy.  For 2001, TTI set the cost at $20.4 billion for the state’s
seven largest urban areas, or about 40 percent more than all public
spending on transportation in California.  Such figures suggest that
Californians might be willing to pay substantial sums to alleviate
congestion—in the Los Angeles area, for example, just over $1,000 per
year for every man, woman, and child.  However, other studies suggest
that commuters’ valuations of time vary considerably (Calfee and
Winston, 1998; Small, Winston, and Yan, 2002).
Moreover, broad measures of congestion are not necessarily the best
indicators of transportation system needs.  Building enough capacity to
eliminate congestion during peak travel periods would create
considerable excess capacity for the rest of the day.  Given the high costs
of road construction, this would be an inefficient use of scarce public
resources.  Modern approaches to congestion focus on strategic
investments to tackle bottlenecks and demand-management techniques.
These include encouraging drivers to carpool, to spread out their travel
across the day, and to use transit alternatives during peak periods.
Mass transit investments in California increased as the construction
of new highway lanes diminished.  Per capita expenditures on California
transit projects more than doubled between 1972 and 1997 as four
major cities—San Diego, Los Angeles, San Jose, and Sacramento—
opened new rail systems during the 1980s and 1990s.  In recent years,
transit has accounted for 20 to 40 percent of the combined capital outlay
for transit, highways, and roads.  Transit serves multiple goals, including
mobility and access for low-income, disabled, and elderly residents
without cars.  However, an important motivation for shifting investment
toward transit was to provide an alternative to road use to alleviate
congestion during peak periods.
Progress toward attainment of this goal has been less than stellar.
Between 1990 and 2000, transit use for trips to work in five major
metropolitan areas barely increased, moving from 5.5 to 5.6 percent
(Table 5.9).  The recent numbers are somewhat better for densely
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Table 5.9
Means of Transportation to Work in Major California Metropolitan Areas
Mode of Travel to Work
Los
Angeles
San
Francisco
San
Diego Sacramento Average
% drove alone
In 2000 72.4 68.1 73.9 75.3 71.5
% point change
1990–2000 0.1 -0.2 3.0 0.1 0.3
% carpooled
In 2000 15.2 12.9 13.0 13.5 14.2
% point change
1990–2000 –0.3 –0.1 –0.7 –0.1 –0.3
% used bus/streetcar
In 2000 4.3 5.7 3.1 2.4 4.4
% point change
1990–2000 –0.2 –0.5 –0.1 0.3 –0.3
% used subway/rail
In 2000 0.3 3.5 0.2 0.3 1.2
% point change
1990–2000 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.4
% worked at home
In 2000 3.6 4.1 4.4 4.0 3.8
% point change
1990–2000 0.8 0.6 –0.6 0.9 0.6
% used other means
In 2000 4.2 5.7 5.4 4.5 4.8
% point change
1990–2000 –0.7 –0.4 –1.8 –1.2 –0.8
SOURCE:  Authors’ calculations using data from the U.S. Census.
NOTE:  The data are for metropolitan statistical areas, which comprise counties
and include undeveloped areas within them.
traveled corridors—38 percent of trips along the San Francisco Bay
Bridge corridor, 30 percent to downtown Los Angeles, 18 percent to
downtown San Diego.11  But it is difficult to dismiss the critique that
overall, these investments are not living up to expectations, with costs—
including high operating subsidies—that far outweigh the benefits.
Often, we have been making the wrong transit investments, favoring
_____________
11Data are from California Transit Association and California Association for
Coordinated Transportation (1999).  See also Fielding (1995).
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suburban light-rail systems that may never pencil out over more flexible
bus systems and selective rail investments in densely populated areas
(Wachs, 1997, 2003a; Garrett and Taylor, 1999).
Federal and state funding allocations have contributed to this
spending bias by favoring new transit capital investment over operating
subsidies, rail over bus service, and track or vehicle mileage or population
over ridership.  As a consequence, suburban systems tend to receive
much deeper subsidies per transit rider than central city systems (Taylor,
1991; Wachs, 1997; Garrett and Taylor, 1999).  The governance system
for ratifying regional transportation plans also plays a role. The one-
government, one-vote system used by most metropolitan area COGs—
entities that generally coincide with regional transportation planning
authorities—works against identifying priorities that are truly regional.
In addition to coping with capacity issues, officials have stressed the
need for more maintenance and rehabilitation of existing transportation
facilities.  Although maintenance and rehabilitation have consumed
increasing shares of spending, a significant backlog remains; deferred
maintenance for state highways alone is estimated at $587 million
(Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2004e).  California’s roadway system has
been characterized as the second roughest in the nation, about one-fifth
of the pavement on state highways is considered in need of rehabilitation
or major reconstruction, and more than half the state’s bridges require
rehabilitation or replacement (California Department of Transportation,
2003a).  Once again, however, these measures cannot always be taken at
face value.  Road and bridge conditions are often checked visually, and it
is not obvious that the entire roadway system should be maintained to
the same high standard.  Given the competing objectives for public
funds, many believe that planners should use new technology to assess
conditions and prioritize expenditures based on usage.
Looking ahead, the volume of goods moving by all modes within the
state is expected to double by 2020.  Many of the state’s major airports
will soon reach capacity (California Department of Transportation,
2003a).  In the greater Los Angeles area, air passenger travel is expected
to double before 2030, with suburban airports forced to accommodate
much of the increasing demand (Southern California Association of
Governments, 2004).  A study recently completed for Caltrans projected
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future road and transit travel demand to 2025 as a function of various
demographic and land-use variables, assuming that transportation
infrastructure is provided at similar levels as today (Crane et al., 2002).
Car use will continue to be the predominant mode of travel, and traffic
congestion will worsen as a result of population growth in urban centers,
the Central Valley, peripheral edge cities, and the highway corridors
linking these areas.  Time spent traveling is projected to rise by 48
percent.  Transit trips will rise at a substantially faster rate than car trips
but will remain a small share (less than 10%) of overall trips in most
areas.
Transportation Funding Needs and Gaps
The complexity of the transportation system makes it particularly
difficult to assess whether we are spending enough in this sector.  In the
early 1990s, transportation agencies were required to move away from a
conventional wish list approach to assessing needs, toward revenue-
constrained planning.  This new system has the advantage of forcing
planners to consider tradeoffs among different investment options in
meeting such goals as mobility and congestion relief, while meeting air
quality requirements.  However, the fiscal constraint requirement also
hampers their ability to evaluate potential benefits from additional
investments.
One recent study by the California Transportation Commission
(1999) surveyed state, regional, and local transportation agencies for
their unfunded 10-year needs for system rehabilitation, operations, and
high-priority expansion projects.  The combined total was between $107
billion and $117 billion, of which three-quarters was for system
expansion and one-quarter was for rehabilitation or retrofit of existing
assets.  Taking 1999 and 2000 capital expenditures as an estimate of the
funded needs, this suggests total capital spending needs on the order of
$16 billion to $17 billion per year.  To meet this total, capital spending
on transportation would have to be more than double the amount
actually expended in these years, a time of budget surpluses.
Because this exercise did not weigh the costs and benefits, however,
it is not a reliable guide to what we should be spending.  Caltrans and
the regional agencies have been working to develop system performance
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measures to permit cost-benefit comparisons across different modes and
projects, but progress has been slow, as the endeavor is both technically
and politically demanding.  Several regional agencies have begun to
model scenarios with different revenue alternatives.  Such scenarios can
then be presented to the public to see whether it will support the tax or
fee increases to fund the more costly alternatives.
Since the late 1990s, both the public and the state legislature have
lent support to transportation funding but with mixed results.  In 2000,
the legislature passed the Transportation Congestion Relief Program, a
six-year program to direct $7.6 billion in state general funds for specific
congestion relief projects around the state.  In 2002, voters passed
Proposition 42, which permanently dedicated state sales tax revenue on
gasoline toward transportation improvements.12  However, as Kim
Rueben and Shelley de Alth show in Chapter 4, these actions were
rapidly undone by the state’s growing budget crisis.  California is also
likely to experience a contraction of federal funds by more than $600
million per year when it converts to ethanol-blended fuel, which is taxed
at a lower rate than fuel with no ethanol content (Transportation
California, n.d.).
Historically, California has relied heavily on user fees to raise
transportation revenue—specifically, the state and federal gasoline taxes,
which now stand at 18.4 cents and 18 cents per gallon, respectively.
Neither is indexed to inflation, and the state tax has not been raised since
1994.  As the real revenue from this funding source declined, California
allowed counties to propose half-cent sales tax increases for
transportation projects, subject to voter approval.  Such measures have
passed in 20 counties, and by the late 1990s, this source accounted for
one-third of local funding for transportation (Legislative Analyst’s Office,
2000a; Goldman, Corbett, and Wachs, 2001).
County sales taxes are a problematic source of funds from several
standpoints:  They reduce flexibility by committing transportation
authorities to spending on a specified set of projects; they favor showcase
_____________
12The sales tax on gasoline, introduced in 1972, had been principally destined to
the general fund, as is the case for other state sales taxes.  This tax should not be confused
with the per gallon gasoline tax, considered a user fee, which has always been dedicated to
transportation funding.
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(but not necessarily cost-effective) projects that appeal to suburban
voters; they are geared to meet needs defined at the county not the
regional level; and they frequently lock in state and federal matching
funds for the same projects.  The shift to county sales taxes also raises
questions of funding stability.  In many counties, these funds risk
nonrenewal under the two-thirds voter threshold introduced with
Proposition 218.  Finally, unlike the gas tax, sales taxes provide no
incentives to drivers to modulate car use.
To improve funding stability and user incentives, many policy
analysts have recommended a state transportation finance system based
on growth-indexed user fees.  For example, the LAO recommends that
voters be asked to repeal Proposition 42, to increase the gasoline tax to
replace the lost funding, and to index that tax to inflation (Legislative
Analyst’s Office, 2004f; see also Taylor, Weinstein, and Wachs, 2001).
A greater reliance on user fees also clears the way for revenue bonds, a
form of long-term borrowing secured by a project revenue stream.
Revenue bonds, which do not require voter approval, offer the prospect
of greater funding stability.
Alternative Approaches to Meeting Transportation Needs
Many of the pathways for maximizing the effectiveness of
transportation spending center on modern approaches:  demand-
management policies such as user fees to encourage more efficient use of
existing systems and improve cost recovery, and supply-side innovations
to provide services more cost-effectively and enable greater capacity
utilization.  Some of the greatest potential lies in combinations of both
demand- and supply-side approaches.
To date, the primary demand-management technique to mitigate
congestion has been the high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lane, reserved
for carpoolers and mass transit vehicles.  This technique imposes no out-
of-pocket costs on drivers but instead encourages them to group their
travel to save time and (sometimes) tolls.  State and federal mandates
require consideration of HOV expansion in all highway expansion
planning.  As a result, the majority of new capacity added to the state
highway system over the last 15 years has been for HOV lanes.  By 2000,
925 lane miles of California state highways had been designated as HOV
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lanes (2% of state highway lane miles).  About 70 percent were in
Southern California.  In 2000, the state’s HOV lanes carried nearly 60
percent more people per hour during peak congestion periods than
mixed-use lanes.  HOV lanes were especially efficient when
complementary efforts to promote bus service and carpooling had been
implemented (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2000b).  Aided by “casual”
carpooling arrangements at East Bay transit stops, the four HOV lanes at
the San Francisco Bay Bridge toll plaza carried 63 percent of all people
crossing during the morning commute, while 18 mixed-flow lanes
carried the remaining 36 percent.  Statewide, about two-thirds of total
maximum HOV capacity was being used, suggesting that some of these
lanes still have room to accommodate users.
Tolls are another alternative both for raising revenue and helping
manage transportation demand.  With the advent of electronic toll
technology, it is now possible to vary tolls by location and time of day, a
practice known as “congestion pricing.”  Five toll roads opened in
Southern California in recent years, and at least two have been used in
conjunction with HOV access, a hybrid known as a HOT (high-
occupancy toll) lane.  Long considered politically infeasible, HOT lanes
allow drivers to use carpool lanes by paying a toll, which varies according
to the congestion in the cost-free lanes.  In San Diego, where a stretch of
Interstate 15 uses this form of congestion pricing, revenues in 2000
averaged about $5,000 per month and were used to finance transit
service on the corridor (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2000b).
A similar HOT lane was designated on Orange County’s State
Route 91, one of four demonstration projects for toll roads in Southern
California financed by the private sector (Taylor, Weinstein, and Wachs,
2001).  These “public-private partnerships” have met with mixed success
to date.  For example, the Orange County Transportation Authority
bought back the Route 91 toll lanes after it concluded that the 35-year
“no compete” clause prevented the expansion of adjoining public
highway space (Shigley, 2003).  The Route 91 project has been running
successfully since then, with funds earned on tolls going to
improvements in other capacity.
Although tolls have raised equity concerns, some research suggests
that equity effects may be small and that policies could mitigate the
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effects for poor households (Taylor, Weinstein, and Wachs, 2001).  A
Legislative Analayst’s Office study (1998c) suggested that welfare
recipients and other low-income drivers could be provided a monthly
transportation subsidy in the form of toll credits or “lifeline” toll rates,
similar to the reduced lifeline telephone and energy rates.  Equity
implications are also less urgent if toll roads lie close to or alongside
nonpaying lanes.  In such cases, toll roads are perceived as providing
relief even to nonusers by relieving congestion on nearby routes.
Parking charges are another pricing mechanism to discourage solo
driving.  Approximately 95 percent of automobile commuters in
California receive free parking at work (census data cited in Legislative
Analyst’s Office, 2002c).  The availability of free parking is partly a
function of local planning codes.  Local governments impose minimum
off-street parking requirements on new development, generally pegged to
peak levels of demand (Shoup, 1997, 1999a).  Studies have shown that
solo driving and car use generally are reduced substantially when workers
must pay to park (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2002c).
In 1992, California passed a parking cash-out law requiring that
certain employers offer cash in lieu of parking.  Although the program
was found to be quite effective in reducing solo driving and increasing
transit use, its scope was very limited, applying only to employers who
lease, rather than own, parking space (Legislative Analyst’s Office,,
2002c).  Other options being tested by California cities include in-lieu
parking fees for developers (in lieu of the requirement for providing free
off-street parking space), employer-paid transit passes, and curb-parking
fees with revenue targeted for improvements to the specific
neighborhood to help overcome public opposition to higher parking fees
(Shoup, 1993, 1997, 1999b).
New transportation strategies to enhance system capacity include
advances in information technology to improve transportation
management (Wachs, 2002).  Smart technologies such as ramp metering,
electronic toll collection at bridges, and traffic lights that respond to
sensors at key locations are already reducing congestion and providing air
quality benefits as vehicles spend less time idling and in low gear.
Sensors also have potential to improve the precision of road and bridge
quality assessments for maintenance scheduling.  Some analysts argue
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that more could be done to support the adoption of smart technologies
(Deakin, 2002).  One constraint is that regional spending plans are tied
down many years in advance by the programs agreed to in county sales
tax ballot measures, leaving little opportunity to respond to new ideas.
Transit planners are also looking for less costly alternatives to light
rail.  Bus rapid transit (BRT), which involves operating buses on
exclusive bus highways or HOV lanes, is gaining new adherents.  Average
capital costs per mile for BRT projects have been less than half the cost
for light rail, although operating costs have been variable (U.S. General
Accounting Office, 2001).  California urban areas implementing BRT
include San Diego, San Jose, and Los Angeles.  To be effective, however,
BRT requires a level of density that currently exceeds those in many
metropolitan areas.  In less densely populated areas, an expansion of
regular bus capacity and access to HOV lanes would be a better option.
Planners are also seeking innovations to mitigate the effects of goods-
related traffic.  Many of these innovations seek to exploit the fact that the
industry itself has much to gain financially by enhanced mobility.  The
flagship effort to date is the Alameda Corridor, a public-private
partnership that has reduced rail and road congestion between the Long
Beach ports and Los Angeles through grade separation (Haveman and
Hummels, 2004).  The corridor is funded primarily by revenue bonds
that will be repaid with charges to the railroad and port shippers.  Plans
are also under consideration for the construction of dedicated truck toll
lanes in the Los Angeles region.
Integrated Strategies and Smart Growth
California’s rapid growth has exposed a fundamental tension
between environmental protection and economic development.
Transportation systems pollute our air and water.  Expanding water
supplies can harm aquatic wildlife.  Construction of all types contributes
to water and air pollution and can endanger critical natural habitats.
Since the early 1990s, planners and environmental and community
activists have increasingly sought to craft solutions to these problems
through integrated approaches.  Rather than taking land-use decisions as
given, these “smart growth” approaches aim to shape these decisions.  By
influencing how and where we build, proponents see the potential not
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only to improve environmental outcomes but also to generate other
social benefits, including more affordable housing, healthier lifestyles
(more walking and biking), greater community development, and more
cost-effective use of transportation facilities.
California’s four major metropolitan areas—the Bay Area, San
Diego, Los Angeles, and Sacramento regions—have officially embraced
this philosophy in their most recent regional transportation plans, which
target more compact, transit-oriented development.  A primary aim of
these strategies is to increase housing affordability, with more housing
and a greater mix of housing types than would occur with the single-
family tract developments envisioned in the “business as usual” scenarios.
Legislation passed in 2002 (AB 857) also calls for the state to embrace
this smart growth approach by investing strategically to support infill
development, efficient development at the urban fringe, and the
preservation of open space.
The explicit adoption of smart growth goals by regional councils of
government, through processes involving substantial citizen input, is
significant.  It suggests that elected officials are buying into the idea that
concerted planning is the best way to ensure that growth is accompanied
by wider social benefits.  Moving from planning to execution of these
goals will be challenging, however.  Many of the benefits of linking
public investment to private land-use decisions will accrue at the regional
scale through more housing opportunities, more open space, better air
quality, better source water protection, and potentially also
improvements in social equity.  Some of the costs, meanwhile, are
concentrated at the local level with those who have to implement or
accept changes in land use.
To make these strategies truly “win-win,” fiscal and legal reforms
may be needed to increase the incentives for denser development.  To
succeed, however, smart growth strategies also depend on the willingness
of California’s residents to accept more compact living.  As Mark
Baldassare and Jon Cohen report in Chapter 8, when surveyed, most
residents say that growth will make the state a less desirable place to live.
Both housing affordability and air quality are routinely listed as primary
concerns.  However, Californians appear more split on the type of
tradeoff they want to make in terms of housing and location, with about
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half preferring single-family homes, even if it means long commutes, and
the other half preferring denser living and easier access to work
(Baldassare, 2002a).  This suggests that there is already a potential
market for compact, transit-oriented development.  If compact
development programs succeed in making housing more affordable, they
may win over more converts.
Conclusion
This chapter set out to shed light on two central questions for public
investment in California.  First, are we spending enough to secure a
sound economic future and quality of life?  Second, are we making the
most of the public resources available?  Our review of three major
sectors—education, water, and transportation—provides ample evidence
that there is no single answer to the first question, if only because there is
no objective measure of “needs.”  Whenever it is appropriate for those
who use public services to contribute to their cost, the demand for those
services—and hence the level of investment needed—depends in part on
how much users are willing to pay.  Recognizing the scope for cost-
saving innovations and developing suitable user incentives are pathways
to spending public resources judiciously.  This is the essence of what we
have termed a “modern approach” to infrastructure planning.
California’s public investment planners have been moving in this
direction over the past 10 to 15 years, experimenting with different ways
to provide and pay for infrastructure.  The challenges include striking the
right balance between efficiency and equity goals and setting up
appropriate funding mechanisms.
In K–12 education, voter support for state and local bonds since
2000 has gone a long way toward redressing a serious backlog of school
facilities shortfalls.  A key contributing factor was the easing of voter
requirements for local school bonds, which now require only a 55
percent majority (down from two-thirds).  Recent reforms have also
begun to redress inequities across school districts, by focusing more
resources on overcrowded schools in low-income neighborhoods.  These
equity concerns are part of a larger question of how to raise performance
levels in California’s public schools, which is especially poor in low-
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income districts (Rose et al., 2003).  Higher per student spending
levels—now relatively low in California—may be a part of the solution.
In higher education, funding innovations have also helped address
the facilities constraints pressing upon the system as the children of the
baby boomers reach college age.  Thanks to the lower pass rate on local
school bonds, the community colleges have generated enough local funds
to ensure expansion well into the next decade.  If the UC system
continues to attract as much outside funding as in the recent past, it too
will be in a good position.  With limited outside funding, the CSU
system is worst placed.
Facilities are not the biggest question mark for this sector, however:
California’s recent budget woes have the potential to reshape some basic
tenets of the Master Plan for Higher Education, established in 1960.  In
particular, proposals now call for additional increases in student fees
(already up more than 50 percent since 2001) and for increasing the role
of the lower-cost community colleges as feeder schools for the four-year
institutions.  Demand management through higher fees offers many
potential advantages, as long as it is accompanied by means-tested
financial aid.  This is, nevertheless, a break with the social contract of the
Master Plan, which promised low-cost, universal access to California
residents.  Californians will need to consider the role they want the
higher education system to play in the future, in which jobs requiring
college training are expected to be an increasing share of all jobs.
Although many raise the specter of impending water shortages as
California grows, more efficient use of existing resources, through
conservation and reallocation through water marketing, can considerably
diminish this challenge.  Moreover, municipal water and wastewater
utilities, financed through user fees, are making substantial investments
to accommodate growth while meeting regulatory goals for clean and safe
water.  The big questions in this sector therefore concern paying for
environmental programs for which no one wants to take ownership.
Without continued bond funding for ecosystem restoration and water
for aquatic wildlife, urban and agricultural water users will be asked to
pay eco-taxes, a prospect farmers consider particularly onerous.
Managing polluted runoff is another unfunded environmental mandate.
New watershed approaches offer potential to achieve this goal at low
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cost; however, local funding sources will also need to be secured through
user fees or local taxes.  Raising these funds is considerably more difficult
than for utility charges, because it requires a two-thirds voter majority.
Transportation agencies face the challenge of providing mobility and
access, managing congestion, and attaining air quality goals in a far
different environment from the heyday of freeway expansion in the
1950s and 1960s.  Real costs of building highway lanes have more than
tripled since then, and the value of traditional roadway user fees—gas
taxes—has eroded through inflation and higher fuel efficiency.  In
today’s more built-up environment, the greatest potential lies in strategic
investments to relieve bottlenecks and to encourage drivers to carpool,
modulate their travel schedules, and use transit alternatives.
Over the past decade and a half, roadway investments have focused
on these approaches, with the majority of new capacity in HOV lanes.
Promising experiments are also under way with the greater use of tolls.
Better pricing of road use would also improve ridership on transit
systems, many of which go underused.  Transportation finance would
also greatly benefit from shifting back to user fee support and away from
general sales taxes that have progressively replaced the gas tax. Making
this move will depend on the public’s willingness.  The alternative is a
future in which we manage demand by default, through longer and
longer delays.
In recent years, strategies that aim to achieve multiple goals, by
focusing on how and where we build our communities, have increasingly
come into the spotlight.  Councils of Government in California’s four
major metropolitan areas have embraced the smart growth philosophy in
their most recent regional transportation plans, which target more
compact, transit-oriented development.  A primary aim of these
strategies is to increase housing affordability, with more housing and a
greater mix of housing types than would occur with traditional “sprawl”
pattern of development (single-family tract developments on the
suburban edge).  To make these strategies truly “win-win,” fiscal and
regulatory reforms may be needed to reduce the disincentives to denser
development.  To succeed, smart growth strategies also depend on the
willingness of California’s residents to accept more compact living.  The
public currently appears split on this issue; it is more united in expressing
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concerns about the effects of growth on housing affordability and air
quality.
The message that emerges across all sectors is that Californians have
choices about the future we want to build.  One part of the choice is
deciding what level of public services we want to provide.  Another part
is deciding how we want to pay for them.  The more we link payments
to the use of facilities, the better we encourage residents and businesses to
use them efficiently.  As the examples of water and wastewater show, user
fees offer the potential to be robust, stable funding sources.  To be sure,
it is important to be aware of the equity implications of more reliance on
user fees.  But there are many ways to provide safety nets to protect those
unable to afford basic services, and equity should not be used as a pretext
for subsidizing those who can afford to pay for the services they use.
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6. California Comes of Age:
Governing Institutions,
Planning, and Public
Investment
Elisa Barbour and Paul G. Lewis1
When infrastructure is working, most of us do not think about it.
When it becomes crowded or rundown, we think first about fixing or
expanding it rather than the decisionmaking process for providing it.
However, if the institutional framework for making decisions about
long-term public investment no longer reflects or facilitates underlying
social and political agreements, it may need to be revisited.  These
turning points may be experienced as crises, and we are fortunate that
they are rare.  However, they also provide opportunities to adapt to
changing needs.
Has California reached such a turning point?  By the late 1990s, a
series of policy reports indicated that the state faced critical infrastructure
deficiencies.2  Voters and elected officials subsequently increased
spending on new infrastructure and on the rehabilitation and
maintenance of existing facilities, but their efforts were soon undercut by
a series of political crises, including electricity system breakdowns, an
unprecedented budget gap, and the recall of a sitting governor.  More
long-standing political concerns such as widespread voter discontent with
_____________
1For an extended discussion of the themes raised in this chapter and for more
details regarding the three infrastructure sectors, see the occasional paper California
Comes of Age:  Governing Institutions, Planning, and Public Investment (Barbour and
Lewis, 2005), available at www.ca2025.org.
2See Legislative Analyst’s Office (1998b); California Business Roundtable (1998);
California State Treasurer (1999); Center for the Continuing Study of the California
Economy (1999); Neuman and Whittington (2000); California Commission on Building
for the 21st Century (2002); Dowall and Whittington (2003).
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government, partisan gridlock in the state legislature, recurrent budget
crises, and antagonism between the state and local governments only
added to worries about governments’ ability to plan, finance, and deliver
an adequate level of infrastructure.
In considering these problems, many commentators pointed to an
earlier so-called “golden era” in California, when under the leadership of
Governors Earl Warren (1943–53), Goodwin Knight (1953–59), and
particularly Edmund “Pat” Brown (1959–67), the state built higher
education, water supply, and highway systems that became the envy of
the nation and even the world.  Comparing that era to the current one
has led many to conclude that the state’s governance system is failing to
provide for current and future needs for public investment.
This chapter seeks to answer several questions.  How do California’s
infrastructure concerns relate to its system of governance?  What are the
origins of current governance challenges for public investment, and what
are potential solutions?  Can we draw useful parallels to dilemmas faced
by state leaders of the past; and if so, what can we learn from their
responses?  We address these questions by tracing changes in government
decisionmaking for surface transportation, water supply, and higher
education since World War II.  Turning to the future, we conclude the
chapter by evaluating emerging opportunities for governance reform.
California’s Golden Age
California’s largest public projects—including the State Water
Project, the Master Plan for Higher Education, and the state highway
system—were passed during Pat Brown’s tenure about four decades ago.
Although much has changed since that time, the political context of that
era forms a useful parallel to the current period.  Many policy challenges
were similar, including strain on existing infrastructure facilities
following decades of rapid population growth and lagging investment,
pressure to enhance educational opportunities resulting from
demographic change and economic restructuring, and planning and
governance challenges posed by new patterns of urban development.
As today, lawmakers in the postwar period were concerned about the
need to expand infrastructure facilities.  During the Great Depression
and World War II, many projects such as new roadways had been placed
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on hold, but the war launched California as a major economic power and
the state experienced a postwar economic and population boom.  One
hundred new cities, mostly suburbs, were incorporated in the state
during the 1950s and 1960s.  Rapid suburbanization was fueled by
economic prosperity and by public policies, including federal
homeownership assistance, new road building, and financing and service-
delivery innovations—special-purpose districts, in particular—that
enabled smaller suburban jurisdictions to escape dependence on central
cities (Fishman, 1987; Hise, 1997; Pincetl, 1999).
Although the state’s young, fairly homogeneous population was
willing to invest in growth and development, governing arrangements
inherited from the past were not well-suited for a major expansion of
facilities.  In earlier decades, central city governments had built many of
the large-scale infrastructure projects, but new patterns of urban
development rendered this approach inadequate.  As suburbanization
transformed metropolitan areas into aggregates of multiple, diverse
jurisdictions, local governments petitioned the state for help with large
projects.  Yet, even as funding was increased for many programs, certain
broad governance conflicts still forestalled large-scale expansion plans.  For
example, proposals for expanding water supplies opened up divisions
between the northern and southern parts of the state and between
agricultural users and city dwellers.  Similarly, as higher education was
widely advocated to support the state’s burgeoning high-tech
manufacturing industries, competition for college and university campuses
intensified among regions and segments of the educational system.
A concerted state approach finally emerged under the tenure of
Governor Pat Brown, who had support from the state’s first Democratic-
controlled legislature in the 20th century.  As the economy entered a
recession, pressure to sustain spending for social services had led to large
deficits, focusing lawmakers’ attention on the need for more efficient,
coordinated growth policies.  A rise in federal aid for domestic
infrastructure also helped propel Brown’s expansionist approach to state
infrastructure.  Most infrastructure “mega-projects” of the 1950s and
1960s in the United States were largely financed with federal money and
carried out by state agencies and regional authorities, leaving just a minor
role for local governments (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003).  The
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confluence of population growth, legislative support, and federal
financing allowed Governor Brown to broker difficult political deals to
create large infrastructure projects.
None of these projects, however, represented a radical departure
from those undertaken or proposed by his predecessors.  Rather, Brown’s
effectiveness lay in his ability to translate the prevailing sense of urgency
for reform into pressure to force political compromises among warring
interest groups, thereby translating pending proposals into long-term
commitments.  Brown also galvanized support for the new projects by
passing the first significant tax increase since the early 1940s and using
large bonds for capital construction for the first time.
Brown’s legacy suggests that a major priority for leaders at such
turning points is to forge consensus and to prod key interest groups to
negotiate so that public investments can move forward.  The plans
ratified under Brown’s leadership also led to new institutional
arrangements, which have been as influential in shaping development
and nearly as long-lasting as many of the physical systems themselves.
To illustrate this point, we turn to the three infrastructure sectors.
A Statewide Freeway System
California was the first state to make a substantial, sustained
commitment to metropolitan freeway construction after World War II.
Under Governor Brown, the pace of building reached full throttle.  The
state highway system, today worth $300 billion (California Department
of Finance, 2003b), is the largest public works project built in the
United States by a single organization (Taylor, 1992).
The State Highway Plan, adopted in 1959, was the culmination of
policies that consolidated the state government’s role in urban road-
building.  The state had passed a gasoline tax in 1923, but funds were
directed to rural road maintenance.  As property taxes flattened out
during the Great Depression and World War II, local governments
petitioned the state for help.  Los Angeles, for example, developed the
earliest and boldest plan for metropolitan freeways in the nation in 1939,
but the project was shelved for lack of funding.  In 1947, the State
Division of Highways was given major responsibility for designing and
building urban freeways, and motor vehicle fees were increased.  The
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federal Interstate Highway Act of 1956 set the freeway-building era in
full motion, as Congress committed $28 billion to build a 41,000-mile
Interstate Highway System, with funds provided on a nine-to-one
matching basis to states (Jones, 1989).
The federal legislation also charged state highway departments, such
as California’s Division of Highways, with planning and construction of
the new system.  In 1958, the division prepared a dramatic 20-year,
statewide plan to upgrade 12,240 miles of highway to limited access
design in a latticework system based on the Los Angeles model.  The plan
met with near-universal support (Jones, 1989, Taylor, 2000).  From 1956
to 1972, more than 1,300 centerline miles (12,700 total miles) of new
freeway were added, increasing total state system miles by 28 percent.
However, because federal and state agencies were paying for the new
highways, their prerogatives frequently won out over local land-use plans.
For example, Los Angeles’s highway aspirations helped prod the state,
but the freeway system eventually built there differed markedly from the
city’s original vision.  The initial Los Angeles plan, which emphasized
regional parkways integrated with transit lines and park and recreation
facilities, was jettisoned in favor of uniform federal and state highway
design standards (with higher speeds, more grade separation, wider lanes,
and longer ramps) imposed without regard for potential joint
development with transit or local redevelopment (Jones, 1989; Taylor,
1992; Wachs and Dill, 1999).  In their efforts to avoid protracted
intergovernmental planning and interfering with metropolitan land uses,
state planners primarily accommodated a particular pattern of local land
use—auto-dependent suburban development (Taylor, 1992).
A State Water System
Water policy followed the same general pattern as transportation
policy.  In the postwar era, the state government adopted a more active
and dominant role to develop a statewide system.  This required a
monumental engineering feat in a state in which the majority of residents
lived in the south but the majority of water originated in the north.  It
also required an equally impressive political feat, as Governor Brown
secured the support necessary to build the world’s largest and most
complex hydraulic system.
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Local governments were the most ambitious builders of water
systems in the early 20th century.  Los Angeles and San Francisco built
aqueducts to meet existing needs and to propel new growth.  Attempts to
develop a state water plan during the 1920s and 1930s evolved into a
more limited effort—the Central Valley Project, soon transferred to the
federal Bureau of Reclamation—to deliver water from the Sacramento
River to the San Joaquin Valley.  It remains the state’s largest single
water supplier.
During the postwar boom years, the state government moved to
coordinate a system for increasing supplies statewide, responding
especially to needs in Southern California, where agriculture was
threatened by depletion of groundwater.  In 1945, the State Engineer
released an audacious plan for the California Water Project (also called
the State Water Project or SWP).  The Feather River would be dammed
and a conveyance constructed to direct water south along a 750-mile
route first to the San Francisco Bay Delta, then through an aqueduct to
the San Joaquin Valley, and from there to Southern California.  The
plan contemplated building two of the world’s biggest dams, the world’s
longest aqueduct, and the world’s most powerful pumps to convey water
over the Tehachapi Mountains (Reisner, 1993).  In 1956, the
Department of Water Resources was established to implement the plan,
consolidating 52 other agencies (Hundley, 2001).
However, formidable political obstacles stymied this ambitious
vision.  Northerners resisted efforts to send “their” water south.
Although San Joaquin Valley farmers strongly supported the proposal,
Los Angeles did not.  Another obstacle was the project’s cost, which was
projected to be as high as $3 billion, equivalent to about $14 billion
today.  Governor Brown made passage of the plan a personal crusade on
which he staked his political reputation. “I was absolutely determined
that I was going to pass this California Water Project.  I wanted this to
be a monument to me,” Brown later recalled (Reisner, 1993, p. 349).
Crossing the state to meet with stakeholders, he offered a series of key
concessions, offering bond sales for local projects to northerners and
reassuring southerners that water contracts under the plan would not be
abrogated while the bonds remained outstanding (Hundley, 2001).
Costs of the project were downplayed; a bond issue of $1.75 billion was
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proposed that would only partially complete it.  Nevertheless, the bond
was nearly as big as the entire state budget itself and was at the time the
largest ever considered by any state.  Brown secured legislative passage of
the measure in 1959.  Although voters in 48 of 58 counties voted against
the bond measure, support in the southern counties helped carry the
measure (Reisner, 1993).
The scale of the State Water Project and the bond measure to pay for
it attest to the scale of Brown’s political accomplishment.  More even
than the highway and higher education systems, the water system
concretely unified the state through a statewide development strategy.
But the slim margin of victory for the bond measure and its partial
payment for the whole plan indicate that the underlying consensus was
weak and that more conflicts would likely lie ahead.
A Master Plan for Higher Education
Perhaps more than any other product of the Brown era, California’s
system of public higher education became a national, even international,
model.  The state’s Master Plan for Higher Education, a compact reached
under Brown’s leadership, committed California to a social contract as well
as a set of governance arrangements.  More than 40 years later, it still
frames programmatic and facilities requirements for higher education.
In the years after World War II, many states attempted to create
more coherent higher education systems.  Unlike other large states,
California based its system on the relative autonomy and the sharp
delineation of its three segments—the California Community Colleges,
the California State University system, and the University of California
system.  The elements of this tripartite system can be traced to
Progressive Era policies around the turn of the last century when the
University of California was granted an unusual degree of autonomy in
the state constitution and the nation’s first network of junior colleges
also was established (Douglass, 2000).  By the 1920s, UC’s reluctance to
build new campuses prompted a “regional college movement” calling for
state support in transforming existing teaching and technical colleges
into full-fledged liberal arts colleges that would eventually coalesce as the
CSU system.
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Enrollment demand soared in the postwar years as veterans took
advantage of the GI bill and workers sought training for jobs in
manufacturing and technology.  Proposals for rapid expansion, especially
of state college campuses, brought policymaking turmoil (Smelser and
Almond, 1974).  UC officials fought attempts by the state colleges to
expand into graduate training.  Lawmakers introduced bills to establish
campuses, viewed as critical for regional development, in their districts.
Segmental leaders, especially UC officials, attempted to resolve
differences; but negotiations frequently broke down.  By indicating that
he was willing to exert his full authority to achieve a more orderly path of
expansion, Governor Brown helped produce a compromise that formed
the basis for the 1960 Master Plan.  Segmental leaders viewed the
moment as their last chance to control the outcome and retain autonomy
from state government.  Their compact—reached at the eleventh hour
and ratified by the legislature—delineates the segmental missions and
governance arrangements.  UC retained a virtual monopoly over
academic research and the granting of doctoral degrees, and the CSU
system gained governing autonomy.
With 10 campuses today, UC is designated the state’s primary
research and doctorate-granting institution.  Under the Master Plan, it
must offer admission to any California resident in the top one-eighth of
his/her high school graduating class.  The CSU system, with 23
campuses today, is a regional system whose primary mission is to educate
through the master’s degree level, especially to provide technical and
teaching degrees.  CSU must offer admission to the top one-third of the
state’s high school graduates.  The 109 locally oriented campuses of the
CCC system are charged with providing academic, vocational, and
remedial instruction at the lower-division levels and must admit any
student capable of benefiting from instruction.  The Master Plan also
links these institutions through matriculation policies.  This so-called
transfer function makes California’s system greater than the sum of its
parts (Douglass, 2002, p.85).
The structure was promoted as a cost-saving measure, which helped
earn legislative approval.  Clear policies for admission, transfers, and
funding permitted orderly planning, including for facilities.  Yet as
Douglass (2002) notes, “The Master Plan did not represent a major shift
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in the policy development of California’s higher education system.
Rather, it represented a political compromise at a critical historic
moment” (p. 96).  That compromise has proved remarkably durable and
influential.  The stable policy environment enabled California to provide
high rates of access and high quality at low cost to taxpayers and
students, compared to peer state systems.
Retreat and Transition
The highways, water systems, and college campuses built during the
1950s and 1960s are still with us, but the confidence and consensus that
launched them began to wane by the 1970s.  The investments of the
postwar era helped transform the state in ways that provoked public
backlash and led to higher costs for development, ultimately rendering
the postwar policymaking approach obsolete.  Communities protested
against invasive projects such as highways, and government costs
increased for mitigating negative local impacts.  A broad environmental
movement emerged in response to air and water pollution; and federal
and state environmental bureaucracies were created to enforce new
regulations for clean air and water, endangered species protection, and
toxic waste disposal, among others.  Requirements for environmental
review slowed down development planning and increased its cost.
Project costs also rose because of the very prosperity fostered by postwar
investments, as land acquisition costs skyrocketed in increasingly built-
up metropolitan areas and labor and materials also became more
expensive.  Anti-tax sentiment emerged among voters in response to
rapidly rising property taxes, and voters passed a series of statewide ballot
initiatives (starting with the landmark Proposition 13 in 1978) to
constrain governments’ ability to raise revenue.
As the state and federal governments increasingly were forced to
absorb new (or overlooked) social and environmental transactions costs
of investment, infrastructure investment declined both in California and
nationally.  The two California governors during the period—Ronald
Reagan (1966–1975) and Pat Brown’s son Edmund “Jerry” Brown
(1975–1983)—were from different parties but shared the view that
growth in public spending should be limited.  The lower investment
levels of the new “era of limits” are reflected in Figure 6.1, which shows
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Figure 6.1—Per Capita State Capital Outlay Expenditures by Budget Area,
Fiscal Years 1965–66, 1984–85, and 2002–03
declines in real per capita capital outlay expenditures in the three state
budget areas pertaining to the sectors discussed in this chapter, from
fiscal year 1965–66 (late in Pat Brown’s tenure) to 1984–85, a low point
in state infrastructure spending (Dowall and Whittington, 2003).  Even
by fiscal year 2002–03, state capital outlay spending in these areas was
well below postwar levels.3
_____________
3Capital outlay expenditure is not only the responsibility of the state government,
of course.  de Alth and Rueben (2005) compiled data from the Census of Governments
on state and local capital outlay spending in California in five-year intervals since 1957.
Their data indicate that real per capita spending for higher education facilities in
California dropped from a peak in 1967 of $51 (in 2002 dollars) to 55 percent of that
level by 1982 and has not exceeded 79 percent of the peak level since.  Combined state,
federal, and local spending on highways and roads in California also peaked in 1967, at
$227, declined to a low of 28 percent of that level in 1982, and remained below half the
peak level during the 1980s and 1990s before rising sharply to 68 percent of the peak in
2002.  Spending on mass transit facilities—tracked only starting in the 1970s—increased
steadily in relation to highways and roads from about one-tenth as much during the
1970s to half as much by 1997.  However, even when mass transit, highway, and road
spending are combined, total transportation capital outlay spending did not regain even
half the peak 1967 level for highways alone until 1992.  Even the sharp increase in
transportation spending between 1997 and 2002 (44%) raised spending to only 85
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In transportation policy, the era of limits was reflected in a shift in
direction during the 1970s toward promoting mass transit as an
alternative to highways and roads. This reflected concerns about rising
air pollution, congestion, and fuel shortages (Jones, 1989).  However, the
rapid demise of the state’s highway building boom also reflected a “cost-
revenue squeeze,” as costs rose rapidly for construction, urban rights-of-
way, and community and environmental mitigation, whereas gasoline tax
revenues declined in real terms as mandated vehicle fuel efficiency
standards reduced the amount of fuel sold (Jones, 1989; Taylor, 1992).
In 1973, the Division of Highways was replaced by Caltrans, a new
multimodal transportation agency whose mandate emphasized flexibility,
efficient use and maintenance of existing resources, and greater
collaboration with local and regional agencies (Taylor, 2000).
Water policy also faced serious constraints.  The State Water Project
bond passed under Pat Brown could not deliver the full 4.2 million acre-
feet that had been promised to cities and rural irrigation districts, and
Governor Jerry Brown attempted to complete his father’s project.
Finishing that project was far more difficult than launching it, however,
as costs for the completion stage were projected to be two to five times
more than for the initial stage.  Moreover, Brown’s proposal for a
Peripheral Canal, a conveyance channel around the deteriorating San
Francisco Bay Delta, became the focus of intense controversy.  When
environmentalists argued that it would divert too much water from the
degraded Bay Delta, Brown proposed a constitutional amendment that
purported to ensure the Delta’s water quality and keep North Coast
rivers wild and scenic forever.  Even so, the Peripheral Canal proposal
was soundly defeated in a 1982 statewide referendum, opposed by all
sides in the water debate.  The measure’s defeat, the first for a major
______________________________________________________________
percent of the peak 1967 level for highways and roads alone.  The intertemporal
comparison is problematic for the water sector, as data for early years are incomplete.
These comparisons are for capital outlay only; noncapital outlay spending (for such
functions as operations and maintenance) in these categories generally has risen steadily
since the postwar era.  When capital and noncapital outlay spending are combined, total
spending for highways, roads, and mass transit in higher education has increased steadily
since 1957.  Total spending remained below peak postwar levels (for highways and roads
alone) during the 1970s and 1980s but exceeded those levels by the 1990s.
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water project since the 1920s, marked an end to the supply-side
approach that had characterized state water policy (Hundley, 2001).
No such public outcry arose against college-building in the
transitional period, but growing anti-tax sentiment among voters,
combined with relatively flat enrollment rates until the late 1980s,
helped usher in a period of lower investment and scaled-down expansion.
More than eight times as many new campuses were established from
1945 to 1975 as from 1975 to 2000 (Douglass, 2002).
Growth Pressure Builds Again
The 1980s were a parallel to the years after World War II—a time
during which growth pressures built to a critical stage.  By the 1990s,
policymakers faced a daunting set of challenges similar to those faced by
postwar lawmakers:  strain on existing facilities and planning challenges
posed by new patterns of urban development and economic
restructuring.  Just as during the Brown era, these challenges provoked a
shift in governance approaches.
California added more than 10 million new residents during the
1980s and 1990s, a population gain of 43 percent.  Growth spilled to
inland areas, but coastal areas also changed rapidly.  As population
pressure strained public facilities, changing patterns of urban
development, related in particular to employment decentralization,
raised planning challenges that traditional governance arrangements were
not well-suited to address.  The rate of job growth was higher than
population growth during the 1980s and 1990s.  Gains in suburban
employment contributed to a steep rise in car use in spite of efforts to
encourage mass transit as an alternative, and more complex commuting
and travel patterns complicated transportation planning in metropolitan
areas.
In another parallel with postwar developments, education became a
major policy concern by the late 1980s because of climbing enrollments
and underlying issues related to economic restructuring.  The labor
market has changed in recent decades with the rise of a knowledge-based
economy, global competition, and the decline of manufacturing jobs.  As
higher education became an increasingly important determinant for
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securing well-paid employment, income inequality among workers also
widened (Reed, 1999).
The basic character of these challenges is reminiscent of the postwar
era.  However, the state also has changed dramatically since then, and
many of the changes make it harder to aggressively pursue new public
investments.
The state’s population has grown more diverse.  In 1970, non-
Hispanic whites constituted 77 percent of the state’s population, but by
2000, they were 47 percent, and by 2025, they are projected to form
about 32 percent to 35 percent (California Department of Finance,
1999, 2004a).  This trend is even more pronounced among the state’s
college-going age group.  By 2025, non-Hispanic whites are expected to
constitute only one-quarter (27%) of 18 to 24-year-olds, while Hispanics
are expected to constitute half (California Department of Finance,
2004a).
The policymaking environment has grown more complex.
Governance is complicated by multiple state, local, and regional
infrastructure agencies, often organized on a single-function basis.  At the
state level in 1960, there were 22 state departments; now there are 11
agencies, 79 departments, and over 300 boards and commissions
(Neumann and Whittington, 2000; California Performance Review
Commission, 2004).  At the local level, an indication of complexity is the
number of special districts—single-purpose governing units that provide
services such as water, sewers, utilities, and public transit.  Special
districts rose especially rapidly in number during the postwar period; by
2002 there were more than 2,800 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002b).
Many more private and nonprofit interest groups also seek a seat at
the table today when the state makes development decisions—groups
that range from environmentalists to neighborhood organizations to
labor and business representatives.  Policymaking is more contested, as
activists have made increasing use of such tools as local and state voter
initiatives and litigation to press for various causes.
Governments today also face higher costs and tighter fiscal and
environmental constraints than in the past.  Costs have risen
substantially for land, materials and labor, and environmental and
community mitigation.  For example, the average ratio of annual
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inflation-adjusted capital outlay expenditures to each new road mile
added in the United States was more than three times higher during the
1990s than during the early 1960s (Hanak and Barbour, 2005).
Meanwhile, Californians’ commitment to environmental protection
remains strong (Baldassare, 2004a).  As development has extended
outward, environmental and economic goals have come into sharp
conflict in some areas, for example, where new development impinges on
precious remaining natural habitat on the urban fringe, and as regional
planners struggle to meet state and federal air quality mandates in spite
of rapidly rising car use.  As remaining sources of water pollution also
increasingly have been traced to farmers, urban dwellers, and local land-
use practices, the nexus between transportation, land use, and the
environment has grown more problematic.
Fiscal constraint also has increased conflict among local governments
and between the state and local governments.  As revenues were squeezed
after the passage of Proposition 13, local governments pursued policies to
maximize fiscal returns, including skewing land-use policies to favor
certain development such as retail sales (Lewis and Barbour, 1999).  In
an atmosphere of competition and constraint, regional policy
coordination is difficult, although many local policies have effects
beyond local borders.  The relationship between local governments and
the state also grew strained in recent years as the state government
reduced local funding during budget crises.
Attitudes about growth and government also have changed since the
postwar era.  As Mark Baldassare and Jon Cohen discuss in Chapter 8,
Californians are more likely to feel pessimistic about growth and also
about government’s ability to address their needs effectively (see also
Baldassare, 2000, 2002a, 2004a).  To limit governmental spending and
discretion, voters made increasing use of state and local ballot initiatives
during the 1980s and 1990s.  Examples include successful efforts to
mandate certain levels of education spending, to subject local tax
increases to a supermajority vote, and to limit the number of terms state
legislators may serve.  At the local level, voters reacted to growth-related
problems by the late 1980s by passing hundreds of local growth-control
measures across the state; local ballot activity subsided somewhat by the
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1990s, but it continues to influence development activity (Glickfeld,
Graymer, and Morrison, 1987; Fulton et al., 2000).
Moving Beyond Bricks and Mortar
In a tightening vise of higher costs, growing demand for services, and
fiscal and environmental constraints, administrators and planners in
specific policy domains considered new strategies by the 1990s.  Planners
shifted their priority from building new physical capacity as the principal
method for meeting future infrastructure needs.  They sought instead to
encourage more efficient use of existing systems and resources.  The great
state plans of the Brown era, and the governing institutions that
implemented them, were revisited or revised, no longer considered
suitable for contemporary needs.  In particular, the top-down, single-
function, engineering-driven approach to planning that was a hallmark
of the Brown era is now increasingly viewed as ineffective as two needs
have become more urgent:  the need to consider policy tradeoffs and the
need to reintegrate growth management (for land use, infrastructure, and
the environment) at an efficient scale matching natural and social
systems—often the bioregional and metropolitan scales.
Transportation
Transportation governance was fundamentally altered in the early
1990s in response to fiscal constraint and policy confusion.  Traditional
methods for accommodating travel demand were being questioned.  A
doubling of real per capita funding on transit capital outlay in California
from 1972 to 1992 had failed to reverse the tide of increasing car use
during the 1980s, and transit lost share to single-occupancy car use for
commutes in most metropolitan areas (a trend that reversed slightly the
following decade) (de Alth and Rueben, 2005; U.S. Census Bureau,
decennial).  Highway expansion was also viewed skeptically as a means to
reduce congestion:  Research suggested that as long as drivers desire more
mobility than can be accommodated by an existing roadway system,
increases in capacity may be quickly consumed as travelers shift from
alternative modes or routes, and as land development responds to new
road supply (Hansen and Huang, 1997; Cervero, 2003).  Meanwhile,
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many of California’s metropolitan areas were in violation of clean air
standards, with automobile emissions a major factor.
 In this context, funding and programming authority was pushed
downward to regional and local agencies.  California’s Transportation
Blueprint for the 21st Century, endorsed by state voters in 1990,
designated transportation agencies in the state’s 32 urbanized counties to
oversee a program to reduce congestion and improve integrated planning
for land use, transportation, and air quality. The federal government
adopted a similar approach but empowered regional (metropolitan)
rather than county agencies.  Congress passed the Intermodal Surface
Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) in 1991; this legislation required
that regional agencies take the lead in long-range planning and address
potentially conflicting transportation and environmental policy goals (as
did its sequel, passed in 1998).  ISTEA also allowed about half of all
federal funds to be used flexibly across program categories (Lewis and
Sprague, 1997).  California’s Senate Bill 45, passed in 1997, completed
the state’s devolution by giving regional agencies responsibility for
programming all federal and state funds for capital improvements in
metropolitan areas.  Numerous funding categories were combined into
more flexible block grants.  However, with funds allocated based on
county shares (by population and lane miles), the regional planning role
was somewhat undermined in multicounty areas (Innes and Gruber,
2001).  County-level authority also was enhanced by optional “self-help”
county sales tax measures. In recent years this source has accounted for
one-third of local funding for transportation in the state (Legislative
Analyst’s Office, 2000a).
This new governance system promotes greater flexibility, strategic
management, and policy integration at a regional scale.  Regional
agencies have devised innovative techniques blending transit with
highway spending and demand-side with supply-side strategies.  For
example, they have combined HOV highway lane designation with peak-
period toll lane pricing for single-occupant vehicles and have initiated
Bus Rapid Transit service, a cheaper alternative to rail (Legislative
Analyst’s Office, 2000b).  Regional agencies use performance measures to
systematically examine alternatives in relation to cost-benefit, mobility,
environmental, equity, and other objectives (Hanak and Barbour, 2005).
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“Smart growth” strategies reflect greater integration of transportation
with land-use planning.  In all the state’s major metropolitan areas,
performance modeling is used to test not just alternative transportation
program scenarios but also land-use scenarios.  In the San Diego, San
Francisco Bay, and Los Angeles areas, smart growth land-use plans were
adopted as the basis of recent long-range transportation plans, in effect
committing the local governments that ratify the plans to denser
development.  Some transportation funds also were provided to
encourage implementation.4
However, the obstacles to success in the new system are also
formidable.  County and regional transportation agencies are essentially
confederations of local governments, local transit providers, and the state
department of transportation.5  Although federal and state laws may
mandate regional plans, the governmental agencies that compile and
adopt them are not accountable at a regional scale to voters or to many
specific performance mandates.  Facing fiscal constraint, local
governments may find it difficult to set aside parochial self-interest in
favor of the “regional good.”  So-called regional plans sometimes
resemble stapled-together lists of priorities of multiple jurisdictions more
than clearly articulated regional strategies (California Transportation
Commission, 2002).  This parochial tendency is reinforced by the system
of transportation funding, which also emphasizes jurisdictional equity.
For example, with transit funds distributed to counties based on track or
vehicle mileage or population rather than ridership, suburban systems
receive deeper subsidies per transit rider than more heavily patronized
_____________
4In the San Diego area, the recently adopted Regional Comprehensive Plan
commits $25 million in transportation funds over five years for localities that adopt
supportive land-use policies.  The half-cent sales tax for transportation passed in
November 2004 includes $250 million over 40 years for local infrastructure
improvements integrating land-use and transportation objectives and $850 million for
environmental mitigation including acquiring and maintaining regional natural habitat
preserves.  The Sacramento area regional transportation plan commits $500 million over
23 years for smart growth community grants, whereas in the San Francisco Bay Area, $27
million annually is targeted for projects integrating transportation and land use or
encouraging high-density housing near transit.
5In most of the state’s major metropolitan areas, designated agencies are COGs,
voluntary organizations of local governments that tend to operate on a one-government,
one-vote basis.
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central city systems, which are often strapped for funds (Taylor, 1991;
Wachs, 1997; Garrett and Taylor, 1999).  If transit funds were geared
instead to promote regional efficiency, congested commuter corridors
and highly used central city systems might be prioritized.  Smart growth
programs also are somewhat undermined by conflicting state policies.
For example, environmental review requirements focused at the project
level tend to deter infill development, and fiscal constraint and
uncertainty render it difficult to provide infrastructure to support infill.
The state can fortify this system by providing policy focus and
institutional support for regional planning.  For example, it could
implement performance-oriented policy mandates at the regional scale,
restructure governing arrangements of Councils of Government, allocate
regional transportation funds on a competitive basis for performance-
oriented objectives, or allow regions to raise gas taxes to fund
coordinated transportation and land-use investments.  It could also
enhance planning stability and efficient use of resources with a shift to a
transportation revenue system based more on growth-indexed user fees
(such as by increasing the gas tax or introducing a fee on vehicle miles
traveled).  In addition to providing revenue predictability, transportation
economists widely agree that higher user fees would encourage efficiency
by assessing drivers more of the full social costs of their vehicle use
(Taylor, Weinstein, and Wachs, 2001; Wachs, 2003b).  Similarly,
reforms are needed to overcome current fiscal and regulatory land use
incentives that work against regional coordination.  For example, more
incentives could be targeted toward land development that is oriented to
regional transportation needs.
Water
Like transportation planning, water policymaking during the 1990s
underwent a governance transformation.  Federal law had established
new water quality standards and mandated that the needs of a new
constituency—wildlife and plants—be accommodated.  By the 1990s, a
new bioregional approach to regulation emerged, through such measures
as health and environmental standards developed for bodies of water
(Mazmanian and Kraft, 1999; Ruffolo, 1999).  A severe drought from
1987 to 1992 brought matters to a head especially in the San Francisco
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Bay Delta, a 700-square-mile region that, in addition to being the largest
wetland habitat in the western United States, also forms the hub of
California’s two largest water distribution systems (the SWP and CVP).
As localities enforced conservation measures while some fish species
neared extinction, calls for greater coordination and more efficient water
use emerged (Landy, Susman, and Knopman, 1998; Hundley, 2001).
To address Delta water concerns, the state and federal governments
organized CALFED in the early 1990s, a collaborative effort among
federal, state, and local agencies and other stakeholders.  When
development of an implementation plan became protracted, Governor
Gray Davis and U.S. Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt helped fashion a
compromise by 2000.  The first phase of an ambitious 30-year plan
called for a range of measures, including conservation, Delta restoration,
the elimination of barriers to water transfers, groundwater management,
levee maintenance, a state Environmental Water Account to protect
endangered species, and the raising of dams.  Water costs were meant to
reflect, as much as possible, the principle of “beneficiary pays” (Martin,
1999; Vogel, 1999; Lewis and Clemings, 1999; Hundley, 2001;
McClurg, 2004).
Like its predecessor, the SWP, CALFED aims to meet and balance
long-term water needs among competing users across the state.  But its
approach reflects important changes in the planning landscape.  Rather
than an engineering-driven bureaucracy intent on building a “big piece
of plumbing,” CALFED is a consensus-building and planning institution
whose aim is to manage demand through negotiation as well as to
increase supply.  Ultimately, it aims to create an integrated, more
efficient system to address environmental needs along with the needs of
other users.  But in spite of its collaborative approach, controversy
resurfaced when the program quickly ran short of funds.  By 2004, with
federal support lagging and little progress made on implementing the
beneficiary pays principle, conflicts erupted over side deals negotiated by
some participants with state and federal agencies.  Reminiscent of
postwar dilemmas, observers looked to the governor to help resolve the
conflicts (Boxall, 2004; Leavenworth, 2004b).  The governance
challenges parallel those in transportation, suggesting that collaborative
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arrangements are vulnerable without coordinated state programs and
fiscal incentives to support them.
Southern California experienced similar controversies.  During the
drought of the early 1990s, the federal government threatened to enforce
legal limits on use of Colorado River water, limits that California has
traditionally exceeded by up to 20 percent (Brackman and Erie, 2002).
Faced with this looming constraint, Southern California water agencies
entered protracted negotiations, resolved in 1999 only after Governor
Davis and Interior Secretary Babbitt intervened.  California agreed to
reduce its use to the legal limits over 15 years through water transfers to
the urban sector and conservation in the agricultural sector through
methods such as land fallowing, canal seepage recovery, desalination,
groundwater banking, and “conjunctive use”—the purchasing of supplies
for storage underground as reserves against times of need (Totten, 2004).
When talks broke down again in 2003, the U.S. Department of the
Interior forced a resolution by cutting California’s allotment of Colorado
River water (Krist, 2003).
A regional approach to integrated water management also has been
promoted at a smaller scale through state support for regional
groundwater basin and (surface) watershed management initiatives.6
Collaborative initiatives have produced innovative approaches linking
water quality, supply, and land use.  However, observers conclude that
they work best as a supplement to traditional regulatory approaches and
_____________
6A 1992 law (AB 3030) provided a systematic procedure for local agencies to
develop groundwater management plans.  This policy was strengthened in 2002 with
passage of SB 1938, conditioning receipt of state funds for construction of groundwater
projects on clearly defined objectives and monitoring protocols for groundwater levels,
water quality, and subsidence.  The Integrated Watershed Management Program,
established in 2002, facilitates watershed-level planning for quality and supply reliability.
The Integrated Regional Water Management Planning Act of 2002 authorized regional
multipurpose water management planning and directed DWR to target grants and loans
to help promote it.  Bonds passed in 2000 and 2002 (Propositions 13, 40, and 50)
allocated over $2 billion for regional management and watershed protection programs.
Related measures that strengthen the connection between water and land-use planning
include SB 610, passed in 2001, which requires that new residential development projects
of more than 500 units demonstrate availability of adequate water supplies.  SB 221,
passed the same year, imposes a similar requirement at the point of subdivision map
approval.
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that local government land-use practices are critical to success (Kenney et
al., 2000; River Network, 1999).
Just as in the transportation sector, efforts to encourage efficiency
and coordination have not been limited to new governance arrangements
but also rely on innovative demand-management and supply-side
techniques for enhancing capacity.  For example, a series of steps in the
1990s helped establish water markets in California, in which supplies are
traded among willing purchasers and sellers (Hanak, 2003).
Conservation is another technique aggressively being pursued by coastal
water districts through programs such as promoting low-flush toilets and
water recycling.  Innovative supply-side solutions include conjunctive
use; more than 65 water agencies in the state operate groundwater
recharge programs (Totten, 2004).  However, full implementation of
conjunctive use may require more concerted state groundwater
regulation.  Systematic conjunctive use programs are difficult without
adequate information and monitoring of groundwater quality and levels.
Furthermore, groundwater concerns also complicate water marketing, as
many worry that farmers may sell surface water and pump groundwater
in its place.  With many groundwater basins in the state already being
overdrafted, the threat of critical land subsidence problems could worsen
(Hundley, 2001; Totten, 2004).   
Thus, California has been moving incrementally toward a more
coordinated system of water planning that better allocates costs and
benefits and integrates policymaking within and across regions and for
environmental and economic needs.  Such goals are evident in the recent
draft update to the State Water Plan, which aims to integrate large- and
small-scale regional plans and programs (California Department of
Water Resources, 2004).  The plan relies on a stakeholder agreement
process and, as with transportation planning, on performance modeling
of numerous management scenarios with varying assumptions for urban
and rural land use, industrial activity, conservation efforts, and other
factors.
Just as in transportation, however, the obstacles to effective
governance are substantial.  A more coordinated system must overcome
institutional fragmentation, as thousands of local water districts still
operate relatively independently across the state.  And as in
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transportation, agreements reached through voluntary collaboration may
be easier to reach in theory than to implement in practice.  Thorny
questions also persist about how to allocate costs for environmental water
needs.
How can the state government strengthen water policy?  As in
transportation, state reforms should provide a coherent policy,
governance, and fiscal framework of incentives and (when required)
mandates to promote coordination and efficiency.  Groundwater
regulations and outcome-oriented performance standards could be
strengthened to help provide focus for regional plans.  Fiscal
responsibilities must be clarified, for example, by resolving how to apply
the beneficiary pays principle.  Support could be increased for regional
management initiatives that promote state objectives.  The role of state
leaders in brokering major water deals also will remain critical.  Today,
the long-term stability of water planning relies on commitment from
multiple stakeholders to resolve conflicts in an ongoing, coordinated
way.  State leaders should avoid the temptation to broker side deals with
some parties for the sake of political expediency and should focus instead
on ensuring the viability of collaborative processes.
Higher Education
For decades, higher education planning was an orderly process, but
the early 1990s were a turning point.  A severe state budget crunch led to
student fee increases and enrollment caps, and a flurry of reports in the
late 1990s and early 2000s raised concerns about capacity and access.7
In the early 2000s, student fees were increased sharply again, and
expected enrollments dropped because of fee hikes and course
cancellations.  In early 2004, over 7,000 qualified applicants were
initially denied admission to UC and CSU.  Although funding was later
_____________
7See for example, California Postsecondary Education Commission (1995a, 1995b,
1999, 2000); California Higher Education Policy Center (CHEPC) (1996); Benjamin
and Carroll (1998); California Education Roundtable (1998); Breneman (1998);
Legislative Analyst’s Office (1999, 2004g); California Citizens Commission on Higher
Education (CCCHE) (1999); Little Hoover Commission (2000b); Dowall and
Whittington (2003); Murphy (2004); and Shulock (2004).
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restored in the state budget, this was the first such violation for UC of
the access tenets of the state’s Master Plan since 1960.
Critics have charged that the Master Plan’s inflexibility has made
new solutions to these problems difficult to implement.  The tripartite
structure suited the state when it embodied the social consensus on
which the original Master Plan was founded.  Higher subsidies per
student for the “high quality” institutions—in particular the University
of California system—were justified based on its research role (which
supports economic growth) and because of the equity and access
provisions of the Master Plan.  Its promise of equal opportunity was
articulated when a more homogenous population was believed to have
equal access to resources, so that ascension through the tiered levels of
the higher education system would be based on choice and merit.
Various demographic and economic changes may be eroding these
assumptions.  College-going, transfer, and graduation rates vary
considerably across racial and ethnic groups.  They are particularly low
for Latinos, African Americans, and Native Americans.  Along with
rising student fees, these patterns have raised concerns about the promise
of economic opportunity through postsecondary education.  Preserving
quality is also a concern and has raised a host of questions.  Given the
role of research institutions in supporting California’s knowledge-based
industries, should they be given funding priority?  Or should more funds
be targeted to community colleges, which play a growing role in
educating the workforce?  The largest such system in the nation, CCC is
expected to enroll 67 percent of new students from 2002 to 2012
(California Department of Finance, 2003c), but the system also faces
pressure to provide remedial education, improve lagging transfer rates,
and meet the growing demand for two-year terminal vocational and
academic programs.  In balancing these objectives with more limited
funds, the CCCs will face complex tradeoffs between access and quality.
Today, basic elements of the Master Plan are being reconsidered or
reframed. There are some common themes in recent proposals:
• Ensuring budgetary stability (such as through increasing student
fees and offsetting financial aid for needy students to help
preserve equity goals).
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• Enhancing productivity (such as through varying fees or
prioritizing access by education level and profession and through
performance standards for institutions and learners).
• Enhancing efficiency (such as through varying fees to encourage
rapid graduation rates, streamlining the transfer function,
redirecting students from high-cost to lower-cost institutions,
expanding existing campuses rather than building new ones, and
instituting year-round operations).
Proposals for governance reform also are promoted, such as regional
coordination among K–12 and higher education institutions to better
address student and workforce needs, and more centralized management
of the CCC system.
Reflecting many of these concerns, the legislature’s Joint Committee
to Develop a Master Plan for Education released a proposal to revise the
Master Plan in 2002.  It recommends greater linkages with K–12, more
centralized governance of the CCC and K–12 systems, greater
collaboration among segments through means such as expanding joint
doctoral programs and cross-segmental instruction, development of an
accountability system, strengthening of the transfer function, and greater
use of alternative facilities.  Governor Schwarzenegger’s recently released
California Performance Review picked up on many of these proposals,
calling for consolidating education policy from preschool through
postgraduate level, reorienting the educational system to meet the needs
of the labor market, implementing performance-based accountability
standards, streamlining transfer requirements, establishing CCC
enrollment priorities, and permitting CCCs to offer bachelor’s degrees.
Governance for CCC and K–12 would be consolidated, with the powers
of the CCC Board of Governors transferred to the state community
college chancellor, who would report to the governor’s education
secretary.  This arrangement would substantially alter the governance
system of the Master Plan, creating, in essence, a unified K–14 system
while retaining governing autonomy for the UC and CSU systems.
Leadership from the state government is needed to ensure that the
Master Plan does not collapse without a new structure to take its place.
The challenge, as in the other sectors, is to step back from traditional
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assumptions about functional and jurisdictional boundaries to consider
needs that cross those boundaries.  In education particularly, the basic
goals of the system need to be clarified before proper governance
arrangements can be implemented.  Governor Schwarzenegger’s
proposals take a step in this direction, articulating not just a reoriented
governance system but also a new vision for the goals and priorities of the
system itself.
New Calls for Reform
As these discussions indicate, reforms in transportation, water, and
environmental governance have reoriented decisionmaking arrangements
to address new realities.  Planning authority has been devolved to more
collaborative, often regional decision processes.  A major objective is to
reintegrate local land-use planning with other growth policy areas, and a
collaborative approach to governance allows that without usurping local
government prerogatives.  This approach is politically expedient in a
state with a strong tradition of local control.
However, although collaborative approaches may be politically
expedient, they tend to be ineffective if they lack clear policy goals or if
they are undermined by conflicting incentives or mandates.  As it stands,
the new collaborative approach is grafted onto a system whose
fundamental lines of authority and responsibility remain unchanged; and
the extent to which policymaking has been altered should not be
exaggerated.  State departments are still organized largely on a single-
function basis, land use is still a prerogative of local governments, and
very little regulatory or revenue-raising authority is vested in regional
governmental bodies.
California lacks a coordinated policy framework to support growth
management.  This shortcoming is evident, for example, in the absence
of clear objectives and priorities guiding regional transportation
planning, the sometimes conflicting mandates and fiscal incentives that
shape local land-use policy, and the lack of a clear regulatory framework
for groundwater management.  Many funding and governing incentives
still deter a comprehensive focus on problems and solutions defined
regionally or statewide—from the structure of COG governance and
transportation funding allocations, to decentralized governance of much
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water policymaking, to the set-in-stone quality of segmental boundaries
in higher education.  As a result, gains from recent governance reforms
often have been limited or ephemeral.
Perhaps the clearest steps toward establishing a more unified state
and regional growth policy framework involve the development of
system performance measures.  In all the sectors studied in this chapter,
state and regional agencies made some progress during the 1990s in
developing objective, performance-oriented measures of program
outcomes.  These measures allow tradeoffs to be modeled among
complex goals and alternatives and help provide focus for planning and
accountability in more collaborative governance frameworks.  However,
effective implementation of performance standards (as opposed to
measures) can ultimately emerge only as part of a more strategic,
coordinated state approach to growth management.
Many observers have concluded that a more strategic approach to
state investment is needed.8  In response to these concerns, a few
incremental steps have been taken at the state level to promote integrated
investment planning.  In 1999, a new requirement was established for
the governor to submit an annual five-year capital improvement plan,
but the first two editions, released in 2002 and 2003, generally failed to
clarify overarching priorities (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2002d).  In
2002, Assembly Bill 857 was passed, requiring that state agencies develop
consistent planning and spending priorities based on a set of smart
growth principles—promoting infill development, protecting
environmental and agricultural resources, and encouraging efficient
development patterns.  It remains to be seen whether these policy goals
will be translated into effective program mandates.
In 2004, Governor Schwarzenegger’s California Performance Review
was released, containing more than 1,000 specific recommendations for
improving efficiency in state government.  Many align with our
own—from increasing vehicle user fees, to developing better system
performance measures and accountability standards, to promoting
regional water planning and better integration of plans for land use,
infrastructure, and environmental protection.  The report also called for
_____________
8See the citations in footnote 1 of this chapter.
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consolidating state administration, including establishing a new
Infrastructure Department that would consolidate 32 programs in six
sectors (water; energy; housing, building, and construction, including for
schools; transportation; telecommunications; and boating and
waterways).  The inclusion of housing programs expands the traditional
definition of state infrastructure.  To facilitate more strategic, integrated
planning, three oversight divisions would operate across the six sectoral
divisions to integrate planning, programming, research and development,
and financing.  It is too early to know which of these proposals will
receive support from the administration and legislature.  However, the
scope and emphasis of the proposed reforms underscore the central
message of this chapter—that broad governance and fiscal reform is
necessary to guide public investment policy.
Toward 2025:  The Governance Challenges of
Public Investment
California is now potentially at a point of departure in its approach
to infrastructure governance as important as that of the Pat Brown era.
Although the state faces critical long-term infrastructure challenges, the
solutions of the past—in particular, large-scale facilities expansion—are
less feasible now.  The following nine trends make it highly unlikely that
another Pat Brown figure will lead the state in that direction.  The
overall theme that emerges is the increased level of complexity in state and
local policymaking.
1. The decline of confidence in government.  Not unique to
California, residents tend to view government and politicians
with distrust and suspicion.  Residents are mildly more positive
about their city and county governments but even at that level
they believe that officials waste a significant proportion of
revenues (Baldassare, 2004b, p. 24).  Politically, therefore,
today’s elected leaders are on a considerably tighter leash than
were Governors Earl Warren or Pat Brown and are unlikely to
expend sizable amounts of political capital on major (and
potentially controversial) infrastructure projects.  Even the
current popular governor may be constrained in what he can
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accomplish; his appeal during the campaign rested in part on
promises to restrain the power of politicians and entrenched
interests in Sacramento.
2. Increased use of the popular initiative.  The wave of citizen
activism and anti-government criticism of the 1960s and 1970s
found its institutional expression in the increased use of voter
initiatives, many of which sought to bypass public officials in the
policymaking process or to limit their power and discretion
(Silva, 2000).  Compared to the postwar era, deals cut with
college presidents, water users, and elite state commissions are
now more vulnerable to end-runs by aggrieved interests resorting
to the direct democracy process.  At the local level, too, efforts
by local officials to coordinate planning with neighboring
jurisdictions may be undone by voter-led ballot measures.
3. Reduced potential for “entrepreneurial” state policy leadership.  A
corollary of the above two trends is the reduced capacity of state
policymakers to craft visionary solutions to California’s
infrastructure problems.  Term limits and staff reductions
(brought about by a voter initiative) limit the legislature’s
capacity to build substantive expertise in such areas as
transportation or higher education.  Likewise, gerrymandered
districts and political polarization in the legislature impede
“middle way” solutions that could appeal to Californians across
partisan and regional divisions.
4. More interests at the table.  Governance today is complicated by
multiple state, regional, and local agencies—many of them with
single functions and still insulated from public scrutiny.  Interest
groups and so-called stakeholder organizations (a term that did
not exist during the Brown era) also have proliferated in recent
decades, and many have full-time staffs and lobbyists in
Sacramento.  This trend has complicated the deal-making
necessary to change infrastructure policies.
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5. Fiscal constraints.  In a state that is now much more built-up, the
costs of constructing and improving public facilities are far
higher than in the Brown era.  Furthermore, voters have
constrained government’s ability to raise revenue.  In this
environment, governments have often focused on the need to
meet basic funding needs of operational services, turning capital
facilities into a luxury accessible only in years of bounty.
6. Reduced federal funding for bricks-and-mortar investment.  For
most of U.S. history, Congress lavished substantial attention on
“internal improvements” such as dams and highways.  The rise
of federal programs geared toward assistance to individuals
(Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, welfare, and assistance
to the disabled, among others) has shifted the federal budget
increasingly toward transfer payments and away from physical
infrastructure.  Although federal infrastructure spending
recovered in the 1980s and 1990s, federal involvement has
splintered into new areas (such as homeland security equipment,
and more emphasis on mass transit facilities).  Moreover, federal
infrastructure programs have faced the same cost-escalation
pressures as have state programs, leaving little room for major
new building programs.
7. Devolution and concern with regional and local control.  As the
federal and state governments seemed to disengage from grand
approaches to infrastructure provision—in part because of
contentious local disputes that spilled into state and national
policy arenas—local governments, regional agencies, and more
ad-hoc public-private assemblages increasingly stepped into the
policymaking void.  Federal and state policymakers sympathetic
to devolution, or wary of centralized responsibility, have often
funded, enabled, or encouraged such tendencies, notably
through such efforts as Senate Bill 45 and CALFED.  Any
would-be Pat Brown in California would need to work in careful
partnership with these decentralized policy processes and be
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comfortable with the lack of direct state control over many
investment decisions.
8. Disjuncture between the electorate and the population as a whole.
In recent decades, a noticeable difference has emerged between
the state’s relatively young, increasingly foreign-born, and
majority nonwhite population and the state’s registered voters,
who are older, predominantly native-born, and nearly 70
percent non-Hispanic white (Citrin and Highton, 2002).
During the postwar era, in contrast, there was less of a
demographic divide between voters and the general public; and
overall rates of voter participation were higher.  The current
disjuncture highlights the challenges of state and local leaders
building consensus around a collective vision of serving
Californians’ future needs.
9. Confusion about goals for growth-planning and investment.  As
Mark Baldassare and Jon Cohen show, Californians of all
political stripes, ages, and racial/ethnic backgrounds tend to feel
pessimistic about growth and governments’ ability to plan for
the future.  Voters demonstrate a continued willingness to issue
bonds or increase taxes for such purposes as schools,
transportation, open space, housing, and water projects, but they
feel more comfortable if funding is carefully targeted.  This
trend may reflect a desire to regain a lost sense of control over
the shape of future growth, but it also hampers the ability of
elected leaders to craft comprehensive dialogues about the shape
of future growth in the state.  Growth planning is now a
complicated balancing act among multiple, sometimes
conflicting goals and objectives for efficiency, equity, quality of
life, and environmental protection.  Although some
decisionmaking frameworks have emerged in which such
deliberation can occur, they are not widely known, and
Californians still indicate substantial confusion and
disagreement about how the state should prepare for its future.
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Infrastructure Governance in a Mature State
The transition from an approach emphasizing massive statewide
engineering projects to a broader consideration of the costs and effects of
potential investments across metropolitan areas ultimately seems a
healthy one in a mature state.  Complexity can hamper decisionmaking,
but effective collaborative arrangements may balance policy objectives
and state, regional, and local needs and concerns more effectively than
either imposed top-down solutions or fragmented, laissez-faire localism.
The protections now offered to environmental values, community self-
determination, mitigation of the harms of projects, and fiscal restraint
can be carried to excessive lengths in some instances, but they are also
values that most Californians seem likely to embrace, at least in general
terms.  In any case, there is no putting the genie of policy complexity
back into the bottle.  Moreover, we suspect that the reasons for such
complexity have much to do with democratic values of inclusiveness and
full debate.
Given these challenges and constraints, what can state leaders do to
set a more deliberate course toward meeting future needs?  First, consider
those models that help point a way forward.  In the midst of all the
current obstacles outlined in this chapter, new governance frameworks
have emerged that reestablish deliberative, comprehensive
decisionmaking on growth.  Although they may not look like the great
infrastructure engineering plans of the past, processes such as CALFED
are, in their own way, equally impressive in scope and impact.  As the
vice president of the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California
recently noted, “Though they are messy and difficult, participatory
collaborative processes such as CALFED are the only way we are getting
anything done in the state” (Quinn, 2004).
Second, consider the basic elements that make these models work.
Leaders now must often secure political agreements not on how to
allocate more services and facilities but on how beneficiaries of state
services can make do with less.  A basic incentive for participation in
collaborative arrangements today is mutual gains through more efficient
use of facilities or resources.  Stakeholders are drawn to the negotiating
table not just by the promise of new facilities but also often by the
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potential for gaining predictability in service delivery and regulation and
by reducing transaction costs and regulatory requirements through a
more deliberate and coordinated approach to conflict resolution.
Government leadership is critical in helping align incentives and in
mediating the allocation of costs and risks to support effective processes
and outcomes.
Rather than being based on one-time political agreements for single-
purpose blueprints meant to address public works needs for several
decades, the new models are more apt to rely on gaining political support
for stable, pluralistic, ongoing decision processes.  We are not suggesting
that long-range investment plans are less important today than in the
past or that all cooperative planning processes will be ongoing.
However, given the policymaking environment of constraint and
complexity, today’s plans are more likely to require periodic reevaluation.
The goal is to accomplish this in a coordinated way rather than through
defaulting to conflict and short-term crisis management.  In spite of its
weaknesses, California’s transportation planning system provides the
state’s most well-developed model for such a purpose.  By providing clear
rules and incentives to guide a stable process of ongoing
intergovernmental planning coordination, it institutionalizes the
development of long-range yet evolving (regularly updated) investment
plans.  However, although the transportation sector succeeds at keeping
stakeholders at the table, it still lacks sufficient policy focus to produce
plans with clear, regionally oriented objectives.
Effective state reforms for public investment should accomplish three
interrelated goals:  align incentives and costs (responsibility and
authority), provide a policy focus, and foster strategic, coordinated
decisionmaking processes for implementation.  At the level of state
departments and agencies, reforms can be more mandate-driven.  The
state government can clarify growth policy goals and priorities, translate
them into quantifiable outcome-oriented policy objectives, and require
more integrated planning to model alternative program scenarios.  State
investments and program priorities then should be made congruent with
this strategic planning process.
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However, the state also needs to foster more strategic, coordinated
planning across  levels of government and, in particular, within regions.  A
more coherent approach by the state toward its own investment policies
will help greatly in this endeavor.  Even without intergovernmental
planning, the state can promote preferred regional outcomes through
more strategic targeting of its own investments and by aligning fiscal
incentives.  Similarly, ensuring greater funding stability would help
stabilize planning processes and possibly make them less contentious.
Going further, quantifiable growth policy objectives also could be used as
the basis for new mandates or preferential grants or loans to local and
regional agencies that aim to meet the standards.  Even further, state
incentives might be made available on a regional basis contingent on
collaborative development of regional growth plans that further state
priorities.
Models for this sort of strategy exist.  In particular, the new approach
to environmental regulation that emerged by the 1990s emphasizes a
clear policy focus coupled with collaborative implementation at a
bioregional scale.  Programs such as ISTEA (in conjunction with the
Clean Air Act) and watershed initiatives focus regional planning on
attaining clear health and environmental standards, but implementation
is left to collaborative processes among multiple actors.  These programs
helped propel many of the collaborative planning innovations of the past
decade, especially because they relied on building closer links with local
land-use and infrastructure planning.9
Today, the state is less in need of new large-scale physical
infrastructure systems than coordinated governance and fiscal systems to
help guide strategic investment.  Specific reforms to establish a clearer
framework might include the following:
_____________
9Other states have gone further in applying this approach to policy areas other than
environmental protection.  For example, a transportation planning rule passed in Oregon
in 1991 mandated that regional plans work to reduce congestion and per capita vehicle
miles traveled and that local governments orient land-use designations and densities to
support multiple transportation modes, infill development, and a jobs-housing balance.
Along with other growth policies and programs, including urban growth boundaries and
protections for agricultural land, the new transportation rule prompted a dramatic shift in
Portland’s approach to development (Calthorpe and Fulton, 2000).
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• Establishing performance-oriented state growth objectives to
guide state and regional plans and investments;
• Reconsidering the governing arrangements of regional
transportation agencies;
• Establishing incentives for local governments—through tax base
sharing, tax increment financing, targeted grants, loans, or
mandate relief—to promote state and regional growth objectives
and neutralize the adverse fiscal consequences of land-use
policies that promote the objectives;
• Raising gasoline taxes and other user fees to better align costs
and benefits;
• Providing regional revenue-raising authority, contingent upon
and linked to coordinated capital investment and land-use plans;
• Integrating local government planning requirements and the
California Environmental Quality Act to promote more “up-
front” consideration of the large-scale environmental effects of
development choices;
• Strengthening groundwater management regulation;
• Resolving how the beneficiary pays principle is interpreted and
implemented;
• Setting performance goals for institutions of higher education
and students; and
• Promoting cooperation across higher education institutions
within each region, with a focus on emerging needs of the labor
market.
Also key to effective growth planning will be to acknowledge and
address voter skepticism and desire for fiscal constraint.  Strategies might
aim to promote more comprehensive dialogue and debate on integrated
investment plans, while also respecting voters’ expressed preferences for
local control, intergovernmental cooperation, and targeted investment.
In spite of certain drawbacks, ballot and bond measures on new
investment and development often form the most effective forums for
dialogue and deliberation on growth concerns.  One way to incorporate
voters in integrated investment decisions would be to authorize regional
revenue-raising authority, subject to voter approval, to fund coordinated
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environmental and infrastructure improvement plans.  Such plans might
include parks and open space along with transportation improvements
and incentives to local governments to orient land use toward regional
goals and objectives.
Given fiscal and political pressures and constraints, lawmakers face a
substantial incentive to ignore long-term fiscal and governance concerns
in favor of short-term political victories or because they are busy “putting
out fires.”  However, the price of political expediency is rising.  Meeting
infrastructure needs will require concerted governance and fiscal reforms
that may not be as dramatic as grand facilities programs of the past but
could be just as far-reaching.  State leaders must meet this challenge if
future quality of life is to be fostered thoughtfully and not by default.
Postwar policymakers rose to a similar challenge, adapting governance
and fiscal arrangements to meet changing needs.  Should we ask less
from our leaders today?
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7. Understanding Equitable
Infrastructure Investment for
California
Manuel Pastor, Jr., and Deborah Reed1
All Californians rely on public infrastructure.  It brings the water we
drink, the energy that lights our homes, the classrooms where our
children are taught, and the roads that take us to work.  Public
infrastructure provides a building block for education, health, and
economic opportunity.  Perhaps because of the importance of
infrastructure in improving quality of life and opportunity, there has
been a growing policy emphasis on equitable infrastructure investments.
Indeed, state law clarifies the intent of infrastructure planning priorities
to “promote equity, strengthen the economy, protect the environment,
and promote public health and safety” (Assembly Bill 857, Chapter
1016, Statutes of 2002).
Infrastructure, by its nature, is not distributed equally across
communities.  Transit service tends to be better in densely populated
urban areas where it is efficient to provide.  Roads and highways are less
expensive and less congested in rural areas.  Whereas purely equal
investments may not be attainable or even desirable, a notion of “fair
treatment” underlies equitable approaches.  For example, Senate Bill 115
(1999) calls for “the fair treatment of people of all races, cultures, and
incomes with respect to the development, adoption, implementation and
enforcement of environmental laws and policies.”  More generally, the
concept of equity can apply to comparisons across any social groups such
as those defined by region, income, gender, race, ethnicity, or age.
However, in the context of existing inequalities, equitable investment
_____________
1For a fuller discussion of the issues raised in this chapter, see the occasional paper
Understanding Equitable Infrastructure Investment for California (Pastor and Reed, 2005),
available at www.ca2025.org.
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policies often refer particularly to low-income and minority
communities.  For the California Department of Transportation
(Caltrans), for example, the “policy goal of promoting fair treatment . . .
means ensuring that low-income and minority communities receive an
equitable distribution of the benefits of transportation activities without
suffering disproportionate adverse impacts” (California Department of
Transportation, 2003c).
Equitable infrastructure investment is a multidimensional concept
(see PolicyLink, 2005).  It often concerns equitable access to the benefits
of infrastructure, such as in the Caltrans policy or equitable access to
funding resources, such as California’s Critically Overcrowded School
Facilities program, which creates a priority allocation of state bond funds
for facility needs in districts with overcrowded schools.  Equitable
financing considers whether revenue sources place disproportionate
burden on some groups.  The Legislative Analyst’s Office (2001), for
example, has proposed a financing policy for school facilities that takes
into account a community’s ability to pay.  Equity considerations may
involve the broader consequences of infrastructure investments, such as
Caltrans programs to abate adverse environmental impacts or the
Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority’s efforts to create local jobs
as part of a rail project.  Equitable investment also involves participation
in decisionmaking, such as Caltrans planning grants to projects that
“Identify and engage low income and minority communities early in the
transportation planning process” (California Department of
Transportation, 2004b).
Recognizing the complex and multidimensional nature of equitable
investment, this chapter is intended as a conceptual framework rather
than an exhaustive study of infrastructure and equity.  We seek to frame
the infrastructure equity issues facing the state rather than to prescribe
specific policies the state should follow.  Whereas we focus our discussion
on the equity issues in infrastructure investments, we recognize that
policy considerations must take into account a wider range of goals.  We
begin with rationales for equitable infrastructure investment.  We then
consider key infrastructure equity issues and related policy in
transportation, school facilities, higher education, and environmental
justice.  Finally, we outline broad components that shape the future of
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infrastructure equity.  We maintain that equity should be an integral part
of the vision for California as the state plans and invests for the future.
Infrastructure, Opportunity, and Equitable Growth
The first rationale for equitable infrastructure is that it can create
opportunities for communities that have been left behind by California’s
economic growth.  Low-income families have not shared equally in
economic growth in California and in the United States.  Infrastructure
investments play a role in shaping economic growth and, through more
equitable investments, infrastructure can improve opportunities for low-
income families and communities.
This rationale takes on more importance when we consider the
income patterns in California over the last several decades.  In 2002,
incomes of low-income families were lower in real terms than incomes of
similar families in 1969 (Figure 7.1).  Over the same period, incomes of
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middle-income families showed a 22 percent gain, and families at the
high end of the distribution showed a 60 percent increase.  One primary
driver of this income pattern has been the growing value of education in
the California labor market.  California workers with a college education
have seen their earnings rise, whereas those with a high school education
have lower earnings today than did similar workers three decades ago
(Reed, 1999, 2004; Reed and Cheng, 2003).
The provision of school facilities, a key infrastructure investment,
creates educational and thus economic opportunities.  Building and
maintaining quality K–12 facilities support children’s learning.  As we
will describe below, there are critical facilities deficits in some California
communities, particularly in schools that serve low-income, Latino, and
African American children.  Furthermore, poor facilities likely limit the
ability of these schools to attract highly qualified teachers.  A survey of
California teachers found that poor school facilities were an important
factor in teachers’ decisions about where to teach (Harris, 2002).  In the
area of higher education, facilities challenges include deferred
maintenance and growing enrollments.  Improving poor and
overcrowded K–12 school facilities and expanding capacity in higher
education will likely improve educational opportunities for low-income
children and youth.
Highways are another form of infrastructure investment that shapes
the pattern of economic opportunity.  In a recent survey, scholars ranked
the federal highway program as the most important influence on the
American metropolis (Fishman, 1999).  By facilitating movement
between distant areas, highways spur economic and population growth
in areas outside the central cities.  Other federal policies have also fueled
suburbanization.  In the same survey, the second-ranked influence on
suburbia was the Federal Housing Administration’s low-down-payment,
long-term, fixed-rate mortgage.  Between 1945 and 1965, these
mortgages were restricted to newer housing, mostly on the suburban
fringe.  Although federal funds have also targeted inner city
revitalization, their effects have been comparatively minor (Dreier,
Molenkopf, and Swanstrom, 2001; Pastor et al., 2000; Wolch, Pastor,
and Dreier, 2004).
197
State and local policy has also directed economic activity away from
the state’s urban areas.  Faced with limited property tax revenues after
the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978, many California cities have
adopted land-use policies designed to promote retail and raise local sales
tax revenue.  Insofar as this “fiscalization of land use” has pushed
residential development beyond city limits, it has led to sprawl and may
exacerbate spatial mismatches between jobs and housing (Lewis and
Barbour, 1999; Little Hoover Commission, 2002).  In addition,
educational policy has not been able to redress the large differences in
quality between schools that serve central city neighborhoods and those
that serve suburban neighborhoods (Betts, Rueben, and Danenberg,
2000; Sonstelie, Brunner, and Ardon, 2000).  As a result, many young
families with the means to do so have moved to the suburbs, as have
many employers.  Between 1990 and 2003, total nonfarm employment
in Los Angeles County fell by 3.5 percent but grew by 21.6 percent in
Orange County and by 52.6 percent in the Riverside–San Bernardino
area.
In light of this pattern, many analysts have concluded that, on
balance, suburbanization has worsened social equity (Orfield, 1997).
The pattern of residential and economic growth in outlying areas has
coincided with a concentration of low-income families, as well as Latino,
African American, and Asian families, in more densely populated areas
and central cities (Figure 7.2).  Thus, investments in highway
infrastructure and other public policies have contributed to a “spatial
mismatch” between urban areas with high concentrations of low-income
and minority residents and outlying areas with strong job growth (Kain,
1992).  In the California context, Raphael (1997), for example, shows
that African American males in the San Francisco Bay Area tend to live
in areas with weak or negative employment growth and that differential
access to employment explains up to 50 percent of the neighborhood
employment rate differences between white and African American
youths.  Similarly, Pastor and Marcelli (2000) gauge the difference
between a neighborhood’s skill base and the educational requirements of
proximate employment for Los Angeles County and find a downward
effect on wages for full-time male workers, especially African Americans.
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One infrastructure-based approach to bridging the spatial divide is to
expand transit routes from central cities to suburbs.  The federal Job
Access Reverse Commute (JARC) program was established in 1998 to
address the transportation challenges of low-income workers including
reverse commutes from cities to suburbs.  The JARC program has not
been comprehensively evaluated (Multisystems, 2003), but research for
California finds that improving job accessibility for transit users
significantly augments the employment prospects of low-skill workers
without cars in San Francisco and Los Angeles (Kawabata, 2002; see also
Blumenberg, 2002).
Another approach to improving opportunities in central cities is to
promote economic development in low-income communities.
Infrastructure investments could play a role in attracting employers, for
example, by providing better road conditions and transit for the
movement of goods, workers, and consumers (California Department of
Transportation, 2003c).  Improved schools and open space infrastructure
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could help attract and retain higher-income families which, in turn,
might promote further economic development.  One concern with this
approach is that a wave of “gentrification” could displace current
residents (Wyly and Hammell, 2000).  Thus, refocusing investment on
central cities in an equitable fashion might also require policies and tools
to limit or ameliorate the effects of displacement (McCulloch, 2001).
Another concern with development in central cities is that it not further
exacerbate pollution and other adverse environmental conditions.  We
return to this concern below in a section on “environmental justice.”
The expanding trade infrastructure in Los Angeles is an example of
infrastructure projects that, proponents argue, will create jobs that are
well suited to the educational and skill levels of Southern California’s
existing labor force.  Traditionally, that labor force has relied on
manufacturing jobs, but that sector has been shrinking rapidly since
1990 (Los Angeles County Economic Development Corp., 2004).
SCAG is looking to jobs in the logistics industry, in which training is
often provided on-the-job, to provide wage structures in which workers
can move up to mid-wage jobs.  However, furthering trade in Southern
California could have adverse consequences for mid-wage manufacturing
employment because of crowded roads and rails and increased foreign
competition for local firms (Haveman and Hummels, 2004).
The discussion in this section illustrates the complex equity
consequences, intended and unintended, of infrastructure investments.
Our intent is not to argue that any specific investment is good or bad for
equity but rather that infrastructure is a public choice that helps structure
the nature of educational and employment opportunities in a region and
that these critical decisions should be made against a backdrop of
increasing income inequality and with equity in mind.
Infrastructure Equity, Growth, and Fiscal Efficiency
The notion of strengthening infrastructure investments in the
neediest communities and in low-income, central city communities may
raise concerns about whether these investments will come at the expense
of other communities.  Our second rationale for these investments is that
they may actually promote broader economic growth in a cost-effective
manner.  The evidence for this claim comes from a variety of findings
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emerging in the research literature.  Taken together, these lines of
research suggest that, in some circumstances, equitable infrastructure
investments may promote broader growth and fiscal efficiency.
Comparative studies of economic growth across nations have found
that countries with lower income inequality tend to have more economic
growth (see Thorbecke and Charumilind, 2002, for a review of this
research).  Research comparing regions across the United States has
found that reducing gaps in the distribution of income is associated with
improvements in regional growth (Voith, 1998; Pastor et al., 2000).
This regional research also concludes that investments that lead to
reduced poverty in central cities may actually promote regionwide
growth, thus providing broad benefits.  Other work indicates that the
stability of city finances affects the economic well-being of surrounding
areas (Haughwout and Inman, 2002).
The potential for broad economic gains from improving conditions
in central cities has been of recent interest to private business leaders.
Johnson (2002b) maintains that enlightened self-interest has driven
business leaders to tackle inner city problems and that doing so has
become a strategic imperative in the global marketplace.  In Charlotte,
for example, business leaders focused on highway, rail, and airport
infrastructure that would position their city as the anchor of a regional
distribution system and ensure that the urban core would not hollow out
(Pastor et al., 2000).  The Bay Area Council, a leading business group in
the San Francisco area, has identified poverty as one of the top five
challenges to doing business in that region.  The council is taking steps
to encourage business investment in impoverished communities partly to
develop market opportunities but also because of a sense that fuller
inclusion of low-income workers and families in the regional economy
will improve the business climate.
Another line of research studies the advantages of investing in
densely populated areas—sometimes described as a form of “smart
growth.”  Investments in dense areas are likely to be equity-enhancing
because low-income families tend to live in dense communities.  For
example, scenario models for the San Francisco Bay Area find that smart
growth strategies of focusing investments in dense areas yield an increase
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in housing and jobs in impoverished communities (Association of Bay
Area Governments, 2002).
Proponents of the sort of smart growth investments that could
improve equity also suggest that there are positive impacts on fiscal
efficiency.  Muro and Puentes (2004) argue that a more compact style of
development over the period 2000–2025 could reduce road-building
costs at the national level by nearly 12 percent, save 6 percent on water
and sewer spending, and save 4 percent on annual spending for
operations and service.  For these and other reasons, Michigan Governor
Jennifer Granhold has created a statewide leadership council on land use,
arguing that the current approach to infrastructure investment supports
sprawl and impedes the efficient provision of public services.
An emerging literature is considering whether smart growth
investments will foster economic growth.  Conceptually, the hypothesis
is that with dense development, businesses are located closer to
consumers and closer to each other, and this closeness will lead to gains
from greater specialization, division of labor, and lower input prices.
Several studies suggest that such “economies of agglomeration” tend to
support aggregate growth (Boarnett, 1998; Haughwout, 1999; but see
also Garreau, 1991).  Decentralized infrastructure, in contrast, may forgo
these agglomeration opportunities (Ciccone and Hall, 1996; Cervero,
2000; and Anthony, 2004).  Nelson and Peterman (2000) conclude that
regions that employ growth-management techniques saw a gain in their
share of income relative to other regions, controlling for other factors
that affect growth.
But if more compact growth and central city development is more
efficient than urban sprawl, why do more metropolitan regions not
choose it?  One answer lies in the split between private and public costs.
Whereas compact development might be better for the metropolitan
region or state as a whole, building in outlying areas is often easier and
more profitable for developers.  Reversing this incentive structure has
been the logic behind Maryland’s smart growth initiative, which seeks to
reduce or eliminate state infrastructure spending outside designated
“Priority Funding Areas.” A newly adopted proposal in Contra Costa
County also restricts funding for new roads to areas within an existing
urban area.
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Taken together, these lines of research highlight the potential
economic advantages of promoting equity.  The research on smart-
growth-type investments in dense areas has not generally been conceived
in an equity framework.  However, given the demographic profiles of
California’s dense areas, these infrastructure investments could also
promote equity for low-income and minority residents.
Equity and Political Consensus
A third rationale for promoting equity in infrastructure investments
is that equity may help build the political consensus required for large
public projects.  Basic political logic suggests that investments with broad
benefits have more popular appeal.  Beyond the simple logic of broad
benefits, perceived inequities in the costs and benefits of public
investments may erode public support, with literature from the field of
experimental economics suggesting that potential deals, even ones with
mutual gains, can be derailed by perceptions of extreme inequity (Guth,
1988).  Because the empirical work around the potential role for equity
in promoting political consensus is still in its infancy, we illustrate our
point with two case studies from Southern California:  the Nueva Azalea
power plant and the Alameda Corridor.
In 2000, California’s energy crisis created considerable pressure to
expand the power grid quickly.  Sunlaw Energy approached the city of
South Gate with plans to build a natural-gas-powered power plant,
poetically named Nueva Azalea.  To assuage fears about air pollution, the
company promised to use a new pollution-control system that had been
deployed only in mini-generators.  Because this was to be the first test of
this technology at that scale, many environmentalists supported the
project, as did the county’s central labor council.  The combined support
of environmentalists, labor unions, and business interests seemed to
make the project a political as well as an economic winner.
Some community members and city leaders of South Gate, however,
were less enthusiastic.  They argued that a new plant, no matter how
clean, was too large a burden in a community that already hosted
numerous pollution-emitting facilities as well as heavy truck traffic from
both its own industrial sites and a nearby freeway.  Eager to move
forward, Sunlaw Energy proposed a citywide referendum and
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underwrote a campaign that included ads, community picnics, and a
float in the city’s Christmas parade.  In the end, however, roughly two
out of three city voters opposed the project, and the company withdrew
its plans (Martin, 2001a, 2001b).
Why was the plant defeated?  The overriding issue for voters
was equity.  They were persuaded that the solution to a general
problem—namely, a statewide shortage of electricity—would impose
disproportionate costs on their community.  Indeed, they rejected what
might have been a win-win outcome, as the plan’s failure left in place a
truck terminal and its associated diesel emissions.  Still, the perceived
sense of inequity drove both public sentiment and eventually
decisionmaking.
In contrast to the Nueva Azalea case, the development of the
Alameda Corridor shows how incorporating community concerns
facilitated progress on public infrastructure and secured a broader
distribution of its benefits.  Originally conceived in the 1980s, the
Alameda Corridor is a high-speed, below-grade rail line designed to
transport goods from the Los Angeles ports to transfer stations and then
to consumers in the rest of the country.  Proponents argued that the
project would have long-term positive environmental impacts in poorer
areas of the Los Angeles region, primarily because rail traffic was causing
truck delays at nearly 200 grade crossings and thereby increasing air
pollution (Erie, 2004, p. 151).
However, the project raised equity issues that focused mostly on job
creation.  The project was of particular interest because the corridor ran
through the “rust belt” area of Los Angeles, whose shrinking
manufacturing base had worsened employment prospects for low- and
mid-skilled workers.  Moreover, those worsening prospects were
associated, both statistically and in the popular mind, with the
international trade that the corridor was meant to facilitate (Pastor,
2001).  Proponents predicted that the investment would generate 10,000
construction jobs and at least 70,000 new jobs throughout the United
States in trade-related industries, but many officials in the cities
adjoining the corridor were concerned that their constituents would not
fill those jobs.  They filed a 1995 lawsuit (dismissed in 1996) centering
on environmental and other concerns, but the underlying tensions arose
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because the Alameda Corridor project had, in the words of UCLA
planning professor Goetz Wolff, “no explicit linkages between the
construction of the corridor and actual job creation and business
development in the corridor cities” (Ohland, 1995).
The Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority sought to defuse
the tensions by working with developers, municipalities, and community
groups to allocate 30 percent of the total hours on the project to new
hires.  One such community group was the Alameda Corridor Jobs
Coalition, a group that was initially spearheaded by a church-based
community development corporation and eventually included 60
community and labor organizations spanning 11 cities.  Once demands
were heard and negotiated, conflicts gave rise to consent and
collaboration, including a key role for the community organizations in
terms of recruitment of residents for the new training and employment
programs.  In the end, the project was completed on time, under budget,
and with an impressive level of community and municipal support.  As
noted above, SCAG is now arguing for expanded trade infrastructure,
not only because it will facilitate growth but also because it will create
jobs that are well suited to the region’s workforce.  Again, there are
reasonable disputes as to whether the SCAG strategy will worsen
environmental disparities or come at the cost of other manufacturing
jobs, but the fact that SCAG leaders are now explicitly including equity
considerations when proposing new infrastructure suggests that lessons
around the benefits of community inclusion have been incorporated into
their thinking.
Equity Issues in California’s Large Infrastructure
Sectors
With these three rationales in mind, we turn to equity issues in the
state’s largest infrastructure sectors:  transportation, K–12 school
facilities, higher education, and water.  In addition, we discuss
environmental justice issues because of their importance as an
infrastructure equity concern.  We describe equity-related policies within
each infrastructure sector and document major equity concerns, relying
primarily on existing studies.  We do not provide a comprehensive
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analysis of equity measures in each sector.  Such analysis is highly
valuable and might allow for measurement of the degree of progress
toward equity, comparisons between regions and across states, and broad
evaluation of specific policies intended to improve equity.  However, in
light of the paucity of available data and the breadth of equity issues that
we seek to address, our discussion is based on equity measurements and
concerns raised by existing studies.
Transportation
We begin with transportation, a key infrastructure investment that
has shaped economic development and helps determine economic
opportunities.  The policy context for transportation has been formed by
a series of federal policies mandating equitable investments.  Title VI of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act requires that the Federal Highway
Administration and the Federal Transit Administration ensure that any
programs and agencies that receive their financial assistance do not
exclude, deny benefits, or discriminate on the basis of race, color,
national origin, age, sex, disability, or religion.  The Federal-Aid
Highway Act of 1970 requires equitable treatment of communities
affected by transportation projects including effects on residences,
businesses, the tax base, and other resources.  In 1994, President Clinton
signed an executive order for environmental justice mandating that
federal agencies address “disproportionately high and adverse human
health or environmental effects . . . on minority populations and low-
income populations.”  In 1997, the U.S. Department of Transportation
issued an order explicitly extending the environmental justice issues
beyond health and environment to include community economic
vitality, employment effects, and displacement.
All state and metropolitan transportation agencies receive federal
funding and are bound by these federal mandates.  Studies by these
agencies as well as independent researchers generally find that public
transit service tends to be better in low-income and minority
neighborhoods (Metropolitan Transportation Commission or MTC,
2001; Center for Urban Transportation Research, 1998).  One reason
for this is that these groups are more likely to live in densely populated
urban areas, which lend themselves to efficient public transit.  A fuller
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analysis of equity concerns would compare transit service between high-
income and low-income neighborhoods that were similarly situated in
dense, urban areas.  Furthermore, analysis should consider whether
transit service is sufficient to meet the needs of low-income
neighborhoods whose residents have limited access to vehicles.  For
example, a recent study found limited transit access to health facilities
and supermarkets for low-income communities in the San Francisco Bay
Area (Transportation and Land Use Coalition of the Bay Area et al.,
2002).
In the area of public transit, an important equity concern is whether
expensive public investments serve high- and low-income communities
equally.  Two commuter rail projects—the extension of Bay Area Rapid
Transit to the San Francisco Airport and the extension of the Metro
Gold Line in Los Angeles—have absorbed a large portion of federal
transit money coming to California.  For low-wage transit riders who do
not commute to a central business district, bus systems are often more
useful than commuter rail.  For example, the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund filed a high-profile civil rights lawsuit against Los Angeles County’s
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) on behalf of a group
called the Bus Riders’ Union (BRU).  The BRU argued that rail
commuters, representing only 6 percent of the overall public transit
ridership, were receiving 70 percent of the MTA’s spending (Pastor et al.,
2000, p. 61).  Some have argued that investments in commuter rail can
actually increase the time and money costs of existing transit users when
bus lines are eliminated (Garrett and Taylor, 1999; DeLong, 1998).  On
the other hand, commuter rail can also have positive equity impacts; for
example, the Pasadena to Los Angeles commuter rail runs through the
heavily immigrant neighborhood of Highland Park and offers residents
convenient access to employment and retail in the downtowns of both
Pasadena and Los Angeles.
Current policy tends to focus on an equitable distribution of
transportation funds across regions, such that suburban transit operators
have been highly favored on a per capita ridership basis (Taylor, 1991,
1992).  Recent efforts to use “system performance measurement”
techniques that prioritize transit needs may be more likely to lead to
more equitable transit investments.  Additionally, transit-oriented
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development strategies, such as MTC’s Transportation for Livable
Communities program, support mixed-used and affordable housing
developments such as the Fruitvale station in Oakland—an example of
how a transit hub can be turned into a local development opportunity.
The tradeoff between highway and public transit investments also
raises equity concerns (Sanchez, Stolz, and Ma, 2003).  Because higher-
income people are more likely to own and drive cars, the concern is that
highway investments disproportionately serve their needs.  Furthermore,
the general emphasis on driving has disproportionately adverse effects on
low-income and minority communities.  Urban highways are more likely
to be located in low-income residential neighborhoods and vehicle
emissions are a major source of ground-level ozone that can cause
asthma.  Indeed, inner city children have the highest rates for asthma
prevalence, hospitalization, and mortality (Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, 1995).
On the finance side, federal and state fuel taxes collected at the
pump are a major source of transportation funding for highways, roads,
and transit.  Some have argued that fuel taxes are regressive because low-
income drivers pay a higher share of income per mile driven.  However,
low-income people tend to drive few miles, and fuel taxes make up a
lower share of household expenditures for low-income families (Poterba,
1991).  Local sales taxes, a major source of funding for transportation,
are regressive because low-income families spend a higher share of their
income on taxed items.  Other user fees, such as toll roads, also create
equity concerns because they typically do not consider users’ ability to
pay and are thus likely to be regressive and potentially limit access.  The
Legislative Analyst’s Office (1998c) suggests measures for subsidizing
low-income drivers.  Nevertheless, the benefits of toll roads may be
widespread including less congestion on traditional roads as well as
potential for tolls to be used for general road improvements.
School Facilities
Although equitable educational investments are critical for increasing
economic opportunities for disadvantaged populations, California
schools that serve low-income, African American, and Latino students
tend to have lower-quality resources, including more uncertified teachers
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and curricula that offer fewer college preparatory courses per student
(Reed, 2005; Betts, Rueben, and Danenberg, 2000).  The evidence on
school facilities shows a similar pattern.  Overall, 17 percent of California
public school students are in critically overcrowded schools, which the
California Department of Education (CDE) defines as those with more
than 90 students per usable acre for high schools and middle schools or
more than 115 students for elementary schools.  About 5 percent of
white students are enrolled in such schools whereas the comparable
figure for African American, Latino, and low-income students is about
25 percent (Table 7.1).  The problem is particularly acute in the Los
Angeles Unified School District, where almost 80 percent of students are
in critically overcrowded schools.
As a measure of overcrowding, number of students per usable acre is
not ideal because classroom crowding can occur in schools with acres
devoted to fields or large common areas.  However, comprehensive data
Table 7.1
Critically Overcrowded and Multitrack School Facilities in
California, 2003
% in Critically
Overcrowded
Schools
% in Critically
Overcrowded or
Multitrack Schools
All 17 24
White 5 11
Latino 25 34
Filipino 14 20
Other Asian 14 19
African American 24 34
Pacific Islander 12 20
American Indian 6 12
Multirace 6 12
Students on meal program 25 35
Los Angeles Unified 79 80
SOURCE:  Authors’ calculations from data provided by the
California Department of Education.
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on classroom overcrowding are not available for California schools.  As
an alternative, we examined the use of multitrack scheduling, which
allows schools to enroll more students by staggering student vacations
throughout the year.  Statewide, 24 percent of students are in schools
that are either critically overcrowded or have multitrack schedules.
Among white students, the share is 11 percent; the comparable figure for
Latino, African American, and low-income students is close to 35
percent.
Schools also differ in the quality and upkeep of facilities as well as in
the provision of specific facilities, including computers, Internet access,
libraries, laboratories and other specialized classrooms (e.g., woodshop),
and sports and exercise facilities.  Although the CDE has data for some
of these facilities, such as computer availability, there are no systematic
data that would support a comprehensive equity study of school facilities.
The plaintiffs in Williams vs. California, a class-action lawsuit filed in
San Francisco Superior Court in May 2000, argued that schools in low-
income communities and communities of color are more likely to have
extremely hot or cold classrooms, unkempt or inadequate bathroom
facilities, and unrepaired and hazardous facilities such as broken
windows, vermin infestations, leaky roofs, or mold.  In settling the case
in August 2004, the state agreed to funding for emergency repairs and a
facilities assessment for schools with low academic performance as well as
the development of further facilities guidelines, assessments, and funds.
Local bonds remain a major source of school facilities funding, and
under this system, a district with high property values can raise
substantially more revenue than a low-wealth district, even with the same
tax rate.  With a 0.06 percent tax rate (the maximum allowed on any
single ballot), school districts with rich property tax bases can raise an
average of $1,340 per student, whereas the lowest-wealth districts can
raise an average of $106 per student (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2001).
To address this, the LAO has suggested an “ability-to-pay adjustment
program” whereby the state would make up the difference between a
district’s maximum potential revenue (calculated from the property tax
base) and a set standard for local financing of school capital.
Recent state bonds providing $21.4 billion for K–12 schools have
several equitable aspects.  First, they are paid back through California’s
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progressive state taxes.  Second, they spread out the payment over future
populations, which will also benefit from the investment, and thereby
promote intergenerational equity.  Third, school districts can reduce or
eliminate the need for a local contribution, which most state bonds
require, based on hardship conditions.  Fourth, the bonds set aside over
$4 billion to target critically overcrowded schools, allowing for
preliminary apportionment in advance of meeting all state regulations.
Preliminary apportionment, as opposed to “first come, first served”
allocation, improves equity for schools in urban areas because of the
lengthy time required to find suitable land for new construction.
Despite these virtues, there remains concern that the state bond
funds will not be allocated to address the most critical school facilities
needs.  For example, PolicyLink and MALDEF (2005) estimate that
addressing current overcrowding would cost approximately two to four
times more than the current allocation of $4.1 billion.  In addition to
overcrowding, schools need to address repair, renovation, and
modernization issues for which there is no system in place to assess
priorities and target school facilities most in need.  Almost $9 billion in
state bond revenue is allocated to new school construction related to
growth.  Many growing districts face substantial facilities challenges, but
it is important to ensure that this policy does not put the needs of
“projected” neighborhoods yet to materialize above those of students
already in schools with inadequate facilities.  In addition, almost $5
billion is allocated to projects that were already in the pipeline in 2002
but do not necessarily represent the neediest schools.
Perhaps the most fundamental barrier to an equitable distribution of
school bond funds is the lack of a comprehensive school facilities
assessment.  The state simply does not have the information to compare
schools and identify the greatest facility needs.  Several recent reports
have called for a statewide inventory and prioritization of need, including
the Legislative Analyst’s Office (2001), the Little Hoover Commission
(2000a), the Joint Legislative Committee to Develop a Master Plan for
Education (2002), and PolicyLink and MALDEF (2005).  It is too early
to tell the extent to which these issues will be addressed by new
guidelines, assessments, reporting, and complaint procedures put in place
by the Williams settlement.
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Higher Education
As David Neumark shows in Chapter 3, with economic forecasts
suggesting that the demand for skilled workers will continue to rise, a
college education is especially important to economic opportunities in
California’s labor market.  In addition to preparing a more qualified
workforce, increased educational attainment can reduce income gaps,
especially for Latinos, who are substantially less likely than other racial
and ethnic groups in California to advance into higher education.  Over
the next decade, higher education facilities must address a backlog of
deferred maintenance as well as expand to accommodate growing
enrollment.  As the children of baby boomers reach college age and
college participation rates continue to improve, this will produce a “Tidal
Wave II” of new college enrollments.
Recent state bond measures provide almost $4 billion for higher
education facilities.  The situation for CCC has improved dramatically
since the passage of Proposition 39, which decreased the supermajority
requirement for local school bonds from two-thirds to 55 percent.  Since
that time, voters have passed about $9.1 billion in local bonds for CCC.
One equity issue is whether these funds are available to the community
colleges with the greatest facilities needs.  About half of community
college districts have passed local bonds since 2000, but we know of no
analysis that compares bond financing with facility needs at the local
level.  If low-wealth districts are indeed less able to raise adequate funds
through local bonds, the state should consider prioritizing these districts
in the allocation of state bond funds.
Several strategies look beyond simply increasing funding to focus on
using existing capacity more efficiently.   One option is to increase the
use of current facilities during summer (Legislative Analyst’s Office,
1999).  If adopted, such a policy must ensure that low-income students
who work during summers are not penalized.  Furthermore, financial aid
programs would need to consider the greater per year expenses and
diminished work opportunities and perhaps provide incentives for
accelerated studies.  Another strategy is to encourage students to move
through the system faster (Dowall and Whittington, 2003).  To
encourage students to finish within four years, the UC system could
follow the University of North Carolina by increasing fees for extended
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enrollment.  However, these additional fees may be disproportionately
borne by low-income students who work while attending university as
well as by those who require remedial coursework.  A scholarship linked
to degree progress could relieve the need to work as well as promote four-
year graduation.
Distance learning is another strategy that helps relieve facilities
constraints.  The term refers to courses that can be taken without
traveling to traditional classrooms, usually by using the Internet.  The
CSU system in particular has been moving toward distance learning
approaches.  Distance learning increases accessibility by allowing students
to complete their coursework conveniently, but concerns about the
quality of instruction remain.  Although many distance learning courses
offer real-time interaction with instructors and other students, they do
not compare well with traditional courses in this area.  In addition, low-
income and minority students in California may have less access to the
technology (e.g., a home computer) as well as less experience with the
technology (Fairlie, 2003).
Another way to increase the efficiency of the higher education
system is to rely more heavily on the CCCs for lower-division
instruction.  This strategy would reduce per student facility and
operating costs.  One concern with this approach is whether it would
adversely affect the traditional CCC student body, which has a relatively
higher proportion of low-income, Latino, and African American
students.  The CCCs have a broad mission to provide workforce
training, vocational or occupational education, and remedial education.
From an equity perspective, it is important that an increased role for
CCCs in lower-division instruction not put at risk these other functions.
In addition, there are concerns about whether the CCC is adequately
successful in its transfer function (California Postsecondary Education
Commission, 2002; Shulock and Moore, 2004).  If the transfer function
is not successful, it creates a challenge to the Master Plan’s promise of
access and affordability in postsecondary education.
A final equity issue concerns the location of higher education
institutions.  A local college is likely to promote educational attainment
in nearby neighborhoods, lead to job growth, and attract educated
workers who can facilitate further economic growth.  For example, the
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potential for regional economic development inspired the siting of the
next UC campus in Merced (University Committee of Merced, 1997).
To meet the access, quality, and affordability goals of the Master
Plan, the state’s higher education system must expand.  The capital funds
for facilities appear to be in place for the next few years, although they
may not be available to the neediest CCC districts.  In this current
period of fiscal crisis, financing operating costs may constitute the major
challenge to access to public higher education (Hayward et al., 2004).
Water Supply and Quality
The passage of Proposition 50 in November 2002 authorized the
sale of $3.44 billion in bonds for water-related programs and affirmed a
commitment to “provide a safe, clean, affordable, and sufficient water
supply.”  To meet these goals in all communities requires consideration
of several equity issues.
A widespread approach to water conservation and pricing is
“demand management,” whereby consumers face price incentives to
reduce water use.  Because water is a basic human need, access and
affordability are critical.  To ensure both, many California water districts
use block pricing to keep prices low for the first units consumed by a
household and raise prices as consumption increases (Hanak, 2005).
Another approach to ensuring affordability for basic usage is to offer
discounts for low-income or medically needy populations, as found in
other utilities.  Such lifeline discounts could be creatively combined with
block-rate pricing to provide affordability in the context of incentives to
save water.
Another equity issue concerns the development of water markets,
which allocate water to users willing to pay the highest rate.  When
selling water leads to fallowing land, communities may face job loss,
lower sales of services and other goods, and reduced local tax revenue.
Because the source communities tend to be in high-poverty, largely
Latino, rural regions of the state, these so-called “third party” issues have
social equity components.  Although there is no comprehensive state
policy to mitigate the impact on communities, several recent water deals
provide examples of agreements that include earmarked funds to benefit
the source communities.  Examples include the Palo Verde Irrigation
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District (selling to the Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California) and the Imperial Irrigation District (selling to San Diego).
One major issue facing California is drinking water contamination.
The most common contaminant identified as exceeding maximum levels
is arsenic, which is associated with lung and bladder cancer.  Problems
with arsenic are concentrated in communities that use wells.  Data on the
affected communities are not currently available, but many believe that
they are typically small, rural communities, which tend to have greater
shares of low-income and Latino residents.  With new federal standards,
these communities are faced with expensive arsenic clean-up projects.
For low-income communities, especially those faced with arsenic
clean-up or major system upgrades, financing may pose a significant
problem.  Small communities may be most at risk, especially in the area
of wastewater treatment, which is particularly expensive when
implemented at a small scale.  State and federal programs do offer
support for water in low-income communities, however, and the state
Revolving Fund gives higher priority for drinking water systems.  The
U.S. Department of Agriculture provides targeted financial assistance to
rural communities for drinking water and wastewater.  California also
has a small grants program for wastewater systems.
More could be done, however.  The Legislative Analyst’s Office
(2004h) suggests consideration of legislation that would target
Proposition 50 bond funding to water systems in disadvantaged
communities.  In addition to aid for low-income and high-need
communities, the federal and state government could offer subsidies
directly to ratepayers in low-income households (Congressional Budget
Office, 2002).  This approach would support low-income households
living in communities where most ratepayers could afford higher costs
without subsidizing high-income ratepayers in low-income communities.
Community participation and representation in water resource
management appear to be particularly poor.  In some agricultural areas,
landowners alone elect the board members of special water districts
(California Senate Local Government Committee, 2003).  The Latino
Issues Forum (2003) has noted that of 68 regional water quality control
board members, only one is Latino and only 11 are minorities.  In
Rialto, where the poverty rate is 20 percent, the Santa Ana Regional
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Water Control Board held a closed-door hearing and rescinded its own
order to have polluters pay for clean-up of perchlorate, an industrial
contaminant.  A clean-up settlement has been reached with only one of
30 responsible parties (Jahagirdar, 2003).
Looking toward 2025, California’s population growth will continue
to increase demand for drinking water and wastewater services.  At the
same time, the demand for water for environmental purposes is also
expected to grow.  These demand pressures, combined with the need to
address system upgrades and contamination, will force water prices
upward.  As prices rise, it will become increasingly important to address
water affordability for low-income families and small communities.
Environmental Justice
How does California perform on measures of the equitable
distribution of the environmental burdens of a modern society?
National studies have given mixed answers, with some showing patterns
of inequity and others providing little evidence of significant disparity
(Anderton et al., 1994a, 1994b; Been, 1995; Bowen, 2001; and Lester,
Allen, and Hill, 2000).  In contrast, California studies consistently find
evidence of disparities.  For example, one study in Los Angeles County
found that African Americans were about 50 percent more likely than
whites to be living in neighborhoods directly proximate to hazardous
waste treatment storage, transfer, and disposal facilities.  Latinos were
twice as likely as whites to be living near these facilities.  These
differences diminished but did not disappear when other factors, such as
population density and even local land use, were taken into account
(Boer et al., 1997).  The disparities appear to be due to disproportionate
siting of facilities in minority neighborhoods rather than to the move-in
of minorities to neighborhoods that became affordable after facilities
were sited (Pastor, Sadd, and Hipp, 2001).
Another study of Southern California found that relative to whites,
African Americans were a third more likely and Latinos were twice as
likely to be living in a neighborhood with a facility that emits high-
priority pollutants listed in the federal Toxic Release Inventory.  The
racial differences in exposure persisted even when controlling for income,
land use, and manufacturing presence (Sadd et al., 1999).  Statewide
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analysis using recent census and environmental data finds that relative to
whites, African Americans were one-third more likely and Latinos were
two-thirds more likely to be living within one mile of a facility reporting
toxic air emissions.  Disparities diminished but still persisted when
controlling for homeownership, population density, and whether the
community is rural or urban (Pastor, Sadd, and Morello-Frosch, 2004).
Some air toxins result from the location of private industries and
public facilities, but much of this risk is from vehicular sources, and the
implications for freeway construction are significant.  A study of
Southern California ranked neighborhoods by cancer risk from all
airborne toxics.  The authors found that whites made up roughly two-
thirds of the population in the least risky third of census tracts, whereas
in the riskiest third of tracts, two-thirds of the population was African
American, Asian, or Latino (Morello-Frosch, Pastor, and Sadd, 2001).
Even after controlling for income differences, African Americans,
Latinos, and Asians generally faced a 15 to 25 percent higher risk of
cancer from airborne toxins.
Perhaps because of the substantial evidence of environmental
injustice in California, the state has recently become a leader in
environmental justice legislation.  Senate Bill 115, signed into law in
1999, required that the California Environmental Protection Agency
(Cal/EPA) and related agencies administer and enforce programs in a
way that “ensures fair treatment.”  Cal EPA Secretary Terry Tamminen
(who was just appointed to serve as Governor Schwarzenegger’s Cabinet
Secretary) recently announced an action plan to address four priority
areas:  precautionary approaches to limit adverse environmental impacts,
reduction of cumulative health impacts, development of community
capacity and public participation, and ensuring environmental justice
considerations in the Governor’s Environmental Action Plan (California
Environmental Protection Agency, 2004).  At least seven other pieces of
legislation have raised environmental justice concerns, and several
focused on landfills and other solid waste facilities (Bonorris, 2004).
Other legislation has aimed to ensure that schools are not built too close
to freeways and other busy roads, particularly in light of research
suggesting a connection between exposure to heavy traffic and respiratory
problems, including the triggering of asthma attacks.  Caltrans has had
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an environmental justice policy since 2001.  New legislation is in the
works to require that landfill operators analyze the impacts of their
facilities in terms of cumulative risk imposed on nearby communities, at
least when considering expansion of current operations.
Environmental justice considerations can be particularly challenging
because many projects provide broad regional economic benefits but also
cause sharp, localized environmental degradation.  In these cases,
planners may seek to compensate the community with the creation of
new employment opportunities and other economic development.  But
environmental costs have a high degree of uncertainty and potentially
severe personal costs.  For example, diesel fumes increase the risk of
cancer and respiratory disease, but the probabilities are not well
understood and depend on individual biology as well as actual levels of
pollution.  In some cases, the harm done by contaminants is not
discovered until years later (as was the case with asbestos).  The Nueva
Azalea plant in South Gate is an illustrative example of a project that was
rejected largely on the grounds that it might exacerbate cumulative
exposure and worsen the state of environmental inequity, despite a
significant amount of promised employment and economic
compensation.
In the face of these challenging tradeoffs, ensuring environmental
justice may require new strategies.  One possibility is to require
community participation and engagement in infrastructure decisions
when a project is expected to exacerbate existing environmental
inequalities.  Another possibility is to require a publicly available
environmental justice analysis for infrastructure projects.  Alternatively,
environmental quality could be regulated as a binding constraint rather
than traded for economic opportunities.
What Will It Take to Improve Equity by 2025?
In this section, we consider the forces shaping the future of
infrastructure equity and the broad policy directions that would promote
more equitable investment.  In particular, we address five components of
equitable infrastructure investment:  equity-based infrastructure
assessment, equitable funding, community participation, innovative
integrated policies, and public will and leadership.
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Equity-Based Infrastructure Assessment
If infrastructure investments are to target the communities with the
greatest needs, California must develop a strategy for assessing needs.
Since 2002–03, the governor has been required to present a statewide
five-year infrastructure plan, but that plan has not been clear on how
priorities were implemented within or across departments; and some
departments lack the basic data from which to assess needs (Legislative
Analyst’s Office, 2003a; State of California, 2004).  State law clarifies the
intent of planning priorities to “promote equity, strengthen the
economy, protect the environment, and promote public health and
safety in the state” (Assembly Bill 857, Chapter 1016, Statutes of 2002).
These priorities were to be implemented with the 2004 five-year
infrastructure plan, which was put on hold by the current
administration.  It remains to be seen how the state plan will promote
equity, but substantial infrastructure investment also occurs at the local
level, and thus evaluation of priorities would need to go beyond the state
plan (Center for the Continuing Study of the California Economy,
1999).
Equitable Funding
Most infrastructure investment is funded through bonds.  Bonds
have equitable aspects including that payments are spread over future
generations who will be the users of today’s new infrastructure.
Furthermore, general obligation bonds are paid back through
California’s progressive state taxes.  Recent school bonds further promote
equity by prioritizing critically overcrowded schools.  However, as the
case of schools facilities illustrates, bond funding can be unstable and
delayed until problems become acute.  In contrast to bonds, sales tax
add-ons, such as those used to finance local transportation projects, are
regressive because low-income families tend to spend a larger share of
their income on taxed items.
User fees have been gaining momentum in California and elsewhere.
The advantage of user fees is that a higher burden of the cost of provision
is borne by those who use the infrastructure services.  However, user fees
are sometimes regressive and may create barriers to access to important
infrastructure services.  For example, substantial growth in transit fares
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could limit access to jobs, health services, and other amenities for some
poor families (Rice, 2004).  In principle, this concern could be addressed
by combining higher user fees with expanded subsidies for low-income
families.  For example, the Legislative Analyst’s Office (1998c) suggests
toll subsidies for low-income drivers.  Fee increases for higher education
could be combined with increased financial aid, perhaps even reducing
the costs for low-income families to below today’s levels.  However, this
approach could also diminish popular support for the subsidy, especially
among those who must pay more for the same service.  As with user fees,
impact fees for new homes pay for infrastructure including sewage lines,
roads, and schools, but they also increase the cost of new homes.  One
strategy to promote equity is to reduce or remove the impact fee for
affordable housing projects.
In October 2003, California voters rejected Proposition 53 to create
an infrastructure fund from general revenue fund transfers.  This
initiative would have provided a “reliable and significant source of funds
for state infrastructure needs” (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2003a) and it
would have required that half of the fund be allocated to local
government infrastructure.  This type of funding would provide a way to
move forward on the highest-priority projects and to coordinate state
and local priorities.
Community Participation
Developing investments equitably also requires seeking participation
in decisionmaking from affected groups.  Infrastructure investments
inherently involve tough choices about how to allocate resources and
how to weigh opportunities and costs that can be hard to quantify.
Federal statutes, which apply particularly in the case of transportation
because of the high degree of federal funding, require opportunities for
community input (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2002).  Public
involvement is also a part of Caltrans policies and the California
Environmental Quality Act.
Because infrastructure planning tends to be a long and technical
process, full community participation may entail proactive policies on
the part of public agencies, including both innovative research and
investments in improving the technical capacities of community groups
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(Pastor et al., 2004; O’Rourke and Macy, 2003).  For example, the
Metropolitan Transportation Commission provides grants to community
organizations to co-sponsor workshops on its major regional
Transportation 2030 plan.  As the Alameda Corridor example shows,
those who worry that community voices may disrupt a smoothly running
technical process should consider the importance of consensus and other
benefits from effective participation.
Integrated Policies and Approaches
In the previous section, we described policy efforts within specific
infrastructure sectors, but many policies address equity issues across
infrastructure areas.  For example, cooperation at the regional level is an
approach to growth planning that potentially leads to more equitable
infrastructure development and financing (Pastor et al., 2000).  Regional
cooperation can reduce the concentration of poverty by opening up
affordable housing possibilities throughout the region.  Regional
approaches to development can seek to locate employment
opportunities, community colleges, shopping, and other amenities near
underserved populations or near transit hubs.  Regional tax-sharing
schemes can allow for more equitable sharing of the costs of public
investments.
To increase financing for infrastructure and development projects in
disadvantaged communities, State Treasurer Phil Angelides has launched
the “Double Bottom Line” initiative to direct state investment programs
and pension investments into needy communities.  The first bottom line
is fiduciary responsibility to ensure a strong rate of return (with limited
risk) on taxpayer and pensioner investments.  The second bottom line is
to invest in broadening economic opportunities in low-income
communities.  The plan calls for investment of over $8 billion in pension
and state program investment funds toward economic growth and
development in California communities.  Thus far, the plan has led to
investments in affordable housing, home mortgages, community
development, and private businesses in underserved communities
(California State Treasurer, 2004b).
Another integrated approach is to provide incentives or remove
barriers for local development plans when the plans address equity
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concerns.  An example of providing incentives is the Metropolitan
Transportation Commission’s program to provide transit funding to
cities and counties that address housing affordability issues.  An approach
to removing barriers is reduction of the voter threshold for new local
infrastructure resources (special taxes and bonds) from two-thirds to 55
percent when projects provide for a balanced mix of investments in
neighborhoods and transportation, affordable housing, open space, and
general infrastructure.  By lowering the voter requirements and by
requiring that various constituencies work together to form a
comprehensive, balanced plan, these constitutional amendments would
help local communities to address infrastructure equity concerns
(PolicyLink, 2003).
Another approach would be to add a “Social Impact Review” (akin
to an Environment Impact Report) to public infrastructure projects
above a certain size (Pastor et al., 2000; Gross, 2002).  Such reports
would help ensure that equity considerations were integrated into the
decisionmaking process for large public investments in infrastructure.
Public Will and Leadership
Public will is an important component of any successful major
infrastructure effort.  According to the PPIC Statewide Survey,
Californians are attuned to the equity issues that accompany these
efforts.  When asked whether school facilities in low-income and
minority neighborhoods are more likely to be in need of repair and
replacement, 72 percent of adults said “yes” (see Chapter 8).  When
asked whether school districts in low-income and minority
neighborhoods should receive more public funding for school facilities,
even if it means less funding for other school districts, 56 percent of
respondents said “yes” (Table 7.2).  Republicans were the only group
strongly opposed to this approach, with 37 percent responding “yes” and
57 percent responding “no.”  Of adults who said that school facilities in
low-income and minority neighborhood were more in need of repair and
replacement, 67 percent agreed with more public funding for these
districts.
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Table 7.2
Californians’ Willingness to Provide Public Funding, 2004
School Facilities Roads and Transportation
Yes
(%)
No
(%)
Do Not
Know
(%)
Yes
(%)
No
(%)
Do Not
Know
(%)
All adults 56 38 6 49 44 7
Registered voters 53 41 6 46 47 7
Likely voters 52 43 5 45 49 6
Regions
Central Valley 47 48 5 40 55 5
San Francisco Bay Area 60 33 7 50 43 7
Los Angeles County 64 30 6 57 36 7
Orange and San Diego Counties 52 41 7 45 48 7
Inland Empire 51 45 4 49 47 4
Party registration
Democrat 62 31 7 55 37 8
Republican 37 57 6 33 62 5
Independent 58 39 3 52 43 5
Self-identified ideology
Liberal 67 27 6 60 34 6
Moderate 54 38 8 44 49 7
Conservative 48 46 6 43 51 6
Age
18 to 34 62 34 4 55 39 6
35 to 54 54 39 7 47 47 6
55 and older 49 41 10 43 48 9
Race and ethnicity
White 48 46 6 39 54 7
Latino 67 27 6 62 31 7
Asian 59 30 11 50 36 14
African American 67 28 5 66 30 4
Noncitizen 72 21 7 59 33 8
Education
High school or less 58 35 7 53 39 8
Some college 50 42 8 45 48 7
College graduate 58 37 5 47 47 6
Annual income
<$40,000 60 31 9 55 36 9
$40,000 to $79,999 55 40 5 48 47 5
$80,000 or more 51 46 3 41 55 4
Has children 56 39 5 50 45 5
Does not have children 55 37 8 47 44 9
SOURCE:  PPIC Statewide Survey, 2004.  See Baldassare (2004c).
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For roads and transportation infrastructure, 61 percent of adults
responded that low-income and minority neighborhoods had worse
conditions (see Chapter 8; see also Baldassare, 2002a, 2002b).  When
asked whether low-income and minority neighborhoods should receive
more public funding for roads and other transportation infrastructure,
even if it means less funding for projects in other neighborhoods, 49
percent of respondents said “yes” and 44 percent said “no.”  Among
likely voters, only 45 percent said “yes.” Liberals, African Americans, and
Latinos favored more funding, whereas most Central Valley respondents,
Republicans, conservatives, and whites were opposed.  However, of those
who said that transportation infrastructure was worse in these
neighborhoods, 65 percent agreed with more public funding.
These findings suggest that Californians favor equitable funding
more for school facilities than for transportation infrastructure.  This
preference may reflect a willingness to invest more equitably in sectors
that have a clear effect on broad opportunities.  They may also suggest
that the supermajority requirement for local bonds may very well impede
infrastructure investments that address equity concerns aside from K–14
schools.
In his account of California’s recent political and economic history,
Paradise Lost, Peter Schrag (1998) wonders whether older, whiter,
wealthier voters will share a sense a common destiny with younger,
minority, and poorer future residents.  Consistent with this, the
Statewide Survey data suggest that willingness to invest more in low-
income and minority communities is highest among the youngest
cohorts and declines with age (Table 7.2).  Spending trends provide
mixed evidence on this issue.  Until the mid-1990s, public investment
had indeed declined as demographic diversity increased.  However, in
more recent years, public investment as measured by capital outlays is
similar in real, per capita terms to levels of the 1960s, when the state was
far less racially and ethnically diverse.  Furthermore, there has been a
shift in capital outlays away from transportation and toward education.
This shift and the recent passage of over $21 billion in new statewide
bonds for K–12 school facilities demonstrate that Californians are willing
to make large capital investments in children.
224
Promoting equity is not simply a matter of following current public
will—there is a crucial role for leaders to take on the hard task of
elevating equity as a concern for policy.  Throughout the state, public
officials and local leaders are working to reform policy, create an
economic vision for low-income areas, and promote investments in
disadvantaged communities.  The task of connecting people across
generations and regions into a sense of common destiny requires leaders
willing to provide a vision.
Conclusion
Is California on a path that will lead to equitable infrastructure
investments?  Equity and environmental justice have emerged as major
themes in infrastructure policy, but it remains to be seen how these new
policies will be implemented and whether the cumulative effects will be
substantial.  We believe that several structural impediments to addressing
equity issues persist.  First, there is only limited evaluation of
infrastructure needs, and investment decisions are not generally linked to
meeting the most urgent needs.  Second, the projected future budget gap
and the unstable nature of past infrastructure financing create challenges
for addressing equity priorities.  Finally, we must enhance the ability of
low-income and minority communities to participate in decisions about
infrastructure investments that affect them.
Moving on all these fronts will require public will and public
leadership.  In particular, we must weave a political narrative that
connects Californians across generations, regions, and economic and
ethnic divisions.  We believe that addressing equity and interconnection
can be part of that new narrative, and that it is both possible and
imperative to do this as the state plans for its next 20 years.
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8. Public Opinion:  Californians’
Views of the Present, the
Future, Governance, and
Policy Options
Mark Baldassare and Jonathan Cohen1
Californians face unprecedented growth-related challenges that could
seriously erode their quality of life and economic well-being over the next
two decades.  Between now and 2025, California’s population is
expected to grow by 10 million residents.  That growth, in turn, will
alter the state’s economy, racial and ethnic makeup, and regional
balance.  It is by no means clear that the state is prepared to finance and
deliver the basic infrastructure required by this growth or to ensure that
unequal access to such infrastructure will not be magnified.  Any
outcomes, of course, will depend on the public’s willingness to pressure
the state’s leadership to take actions and to support policies that improve
the state’s prospects.
Does the public realize that this growth and change are on the way?
In the late 1990s, a time of giddy optimism about the state’s economic
and fiscal conditions, our public opinion research indicated that the
public was largely unaware of the dimensions of this projected growth
and its implications for roads, school facilities, water, and other
infrastructure projects.  Even so, most residents believed that current
problems would worsen.  Later, the gubernatorial recall reflected a
profound distrust of state government, and the state’s persistent budget
deficits led state policymakers to postpone critical discussions about
California’s future.  The election of Governor Schwarzenegger restored
_____________
1This chapter draws on the PPIC Statewide Survey, which benefited from the
research and writing of Eliana Kaimowitz, Renatta DeFever, and Kimberly Curry (see
Baldassare, 2004b).
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some trust in the state’s chief executive, but confidence in state
government’s ability to solve problems has remained low.  Thus, we
reexamine the public’s views about the future in a different and unique
historical context.
This chapter presents the results of a PPIC Statewide Survey
undertaken for this volume.  Conducted in May 2004 with a sample of
2,506 adults, the survey focused on four issues:
• Public perceptions of present conditions;
• Perceptions of the future;
• Attitudes toward governance; and
• Attitudes toward policy options.
Reaching consensus on current conditions, predictions, and policy
preferences is of considerable importance, and we therefore devote much
of our analysis to these questions.  We also analyze similarities and
differences in responses across the major regions of the state, racial and
ethnic groups, voter status, party affiliation, and other demographic
factors.  When possible, we contrast the 2004 survey with the findings
from the 1999 survey to see whether attitudes about the future have
correlated with changes in political and economic circumstances.
To refine the ideas and questions in this survey, we conducted focus
group research in Fresno, Los Angeles, and the San Francisco Bay Area
throughout 2003 and 2004.  We also expanded the survey sample size
from its typical large base (from 2,000 to 2,500 adults) and expanded the
bilingual survey approach to interviewing in five languages (Chinese,
English, Korean, Spanish, and Vietnamese) to better reflect the opinions
of diverse groups.
Current Conditions
 “It’s the economy,” could well be the motto of Californians in the
early years of the new millennium.  When asked to name the most
important issue facing the state today, 29 percent of adult Californians
placed the economy, jobs, and unemployment at the top of the list.  In
comparison, 11 percent mentioned gasoline prices, 10 percent cited the
state budget and taxes, and 8 percent said education and schools.  Our
survey in June 2003 found that a similar share (31%) named economic
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issues as the most important issue facing California.  In September 1999,
however, only 3 percent named jobs and the economy as their top issue.
In the spring 2004 survey, economic issues ranked higher in the San
Francisco Bay Area (38%) than elsewhere (Table 8.1).
The degree of concern about economic issues varied significantly
across racial and ethnic groups.  Forty-one percent of African Americans
thought that economic issues were paramount, but only 26 percent of
whites thought so.  Asians (35%) and Latinos (32%) fell between whites
and African Americans on this question (Table 8.2).
We also asked whether the state was headed in the right or wrong
direction.  Californians were evenly divided on this question:  44 percent
of residents said that things in California were generally going in the
right direction, 44 percent said the opposite, and 12 percent were
uncertain.  State residents were significantly more optimistic than they
had been a year earlier.  The June 2003 survey found that only 30
percent of adults said that things were moving in the right direction.
However, respondents were even more optimistic in September 1999
when 61 percent held that view.
Table 8.1
Most Important Issue by Region
(responses in percent)
“What do you think is the most important issue facing
people in California today?” (top five mentions)
Region
All
Adults
Central
Valley
San
Francisco
Bay Area
Los
Angeles
Orange/
San
Diego
Inland
Empire
Economy, jobs,
unemployment 29 27 38 30 23 27
Gasoline prices 11 9 7 13 15 13
State budget, deficit,
taxes 10 17 11 6 10 10
Education, schools 8 8 13 6 9 8
Immigration, illegal
immigration 5 4 3 6 8 8
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Table 8.2
Most Important Issue by Race/Ethnicity
(responses in percent)
“What do you think is the most important issue facing
people in California today?” (top five mentions)
Race/Ethnicity
All
Adults Asian
African
American Latino White
Economy, jobs, unemployment 29 35 41 32 26
Gasoline prices 11 14 13 13 10
State budget, deficit, taxes 10 7 8 3 15
Education, schools 8 10 6 6 9
Immigration, illegal immigration 5 2 2 5 6
There were significant differences across regions and population
groups on this question.  Large shares of residents in the Central Valley
(46%), Orange County and San Diego (50%), and the Inland Empire
(50%) thought the state was headed in the right direction, but pluralities
in the San Francisco Bay Area (48%) and Los Angeles (46%) believed
that the state was headed in the wrong direction.  There was a sharp
partisan divide on this question, as well, with Republicans (59%)
expressing more confidence than Democrats (36%).  As Table 8.3
indicates, whites were more optimistic than Asians, Latinos, and African
Americans about the state’s direction.  Homeowners were more
optimistic than renters (47% versus 38%), and men were more
optimistic than women (48% versus 39%).
When asked to rate the seriousness of certain conditions in their own
regions of the state, most Californians said that affordable housing (67%)
and traffic congestion on freeways and major roads (63%) were big
problems.  Many residents also cited the quality of education in K–12
public schools (44%), the lack of well-paying jobs (42%), and air
pollution (39%) as big problems in their regions.  Since the May 2001
survey, there has been a sharp increase in the proportion of state residents
who mention housing affordability (47% to 67%), job opportunities
(29% to 42%), and air pollution (30% to 39%) as big regional
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Table 8.3
Overall Direction by Race/Ethnicity
(responses in percent)
“Do you think things in California are generally going
in the right direction or the wrong direction?”
Race/Ethnicity
All
Adults Asian
African
American Latino White
Right direction 44 40 27 39 49
Wrong direction 44 39 59 51 39
Do not know 12 21 14 10 12
problems.  In contrast, there has been little change in perceptions of
traffic congestion (60% to 63%).
Again, attitudes varied across regions (Table 8.4).  Concerns about
affordable housing were highest in the San Francisco Bay Area (76%),
Orange County and San Diego (75%), and Los Angeles (68%).
Table 8.4
Perceived Regional Problems by Region
(responses in percent)
“How big a problem is___in your part of California?”
Region
All
Adults
Central
Valley
San
Francisco
Bay Area
Los
Angeles
Orange/
San Diego
Inland
Empire
Availability of housing
that you can afford 67 51 76 68 75 60
Traffic congestion on
freeways and major
roads 63 43 63 78 70 64
Quality of education in
K–12 public schools 44 41 53 46 39 38
Lack of opportunities for
well-paying jobs 42 44 41 44 32 38
Air pollution 39 54 23 53 29 47
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Nearly eight in 10 Los Angeles residents said that traffic was a big
problem in their part of California, compared to only 43 percent of
Central Valley residents.  Most residents in the San Francisco Bay Area
(53%) thought that public education had reached that level, whereas
only 38 percent of Inland Empire residents thought so.  Across regions,
significant percentages rated the lack of well-paying job opportunities as
a big problem; a higher proportion of Central Valley and Los Angeles
residents (both 44%) held that view, compared to 32 percent of Orange
County and San Diego residents.  More than half (53%) of Los Angeles
residents cited air pollution as a big problem, but only 23 percent of Bay
Area residents did so.
Attitudes about some of these issues varied significantly across racial
and ethnic groups (Table 8.5).  Most African Americans (61%) thought
that K–12 public education in their regions was a big problem,
compared to 45 percent of whites, 42 percent of Asians, and 36 percent
of Latinos.  Majorities of African Americans (58%) and Latinos (54%)
also cited the lack of opportunities for well-paying jobs, compared to 42
percent of Asians and 33 percent of whites.  Lower-income and less-
educated Californians were much more likely than those with higher
Table 8.5
Perceived Regional Problems by Race/Ethnicity
(responses in percent)
“How big a problem is___ in your part of California?”
Race/Ethnicity
All
Adults Asian
African
American Latino White
Availability of housing that
you can afford 67 62 77 67 67
Traffic congestion on
freeways and major roads 63 57 64 59 65
Quality of education in
K–12 public schools 44 42 61 36 45
Lack of opportunities for
well-paying jobs 42 42 58 54 33
Air pollution 39 31 46 49 33
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incomes or a college education to think that jobs were a big problem.
Nearly half of Latinos (49%) and 46 percent of African Americans cited
air pollution as a big problem, compared to 33 percent of whites and 31
percent of Asians.
Are residential conditions unequal?  Most Californians thought that
low-income and minority neighborhoods in their regions were more
likely than other neighborhoods to have poor public facilities (Table
8.6).  Although majorities across demographic groups and regions agreed
with that view, African Americans (90%) were much more likely than
Asians (77%), Latinos (72%), and whites (69%) to hold it.  Likewise,
Los Angeles residents (80%) were the most likely to say that this type of
inequity exists, followed by residents in San Francisco (75%), Orange
County and San Diego (71%), the Central Valley (67%), and the Inland
Empire (63%).
Although the numbers were slightly lower, similar patterns held for
perceptions of road and other infrastructure equity.  About 61 percent of
residents said that low-income and minority neighborhoods in their
regions were more likely than others to have roads and other
infrastructure in need of repair and replacement.  Again, answers varied
along regional as well as racial and ethnic lines (Table 8.7).  Two-thirds
Table 8.6
Local School Perceptions by Race/Ethnicity
(responses in percent)
“Are low-income and minority neighborhoods more likely than
other neighborhoods in your region to have school facilities that
are in need of repair and replacement?”
Race/Ethnicity
All
Adults Asian
African
American Latino White
Yes 72 77 90 72 69
No 21 12 9 20 24
Do not know 7 11 1 8 7
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Table 8.7
Local Transportation Perceptions by Race/Ethnicity
(responses in percent)
“Do you think that low-income and minority neighborhoods are
more likely than other neighborhoods in your region to have roads
and other transportation infrastructure that are in
need of repair and replacement?”
Race/Ethnicity
All
Adults Asian
African
American Latino White
Yes 61 63 86 64 56
No 32 24 13 31 37
Do not know 7 13 1 5 7
of Los Angeles residents noted these inequities, as did majorities in the
San Francisco Bay Area (64%), Orange County and San Diego (60%),
the Inland Empire (60%), and the Central Valley (59%) regions.
Californians were divided on the issue of state spending on roads and
infrastructure projects.  Just under half (49%) said that they would rather
pay higher taxes and have the state government spend more money for
roads and other infrastructure projects, whereas 43 percent said the
opposite.  A solid majority of Democrats (60%) would rather pay higher
taxes and spend more on infrastructure projects, and 50 percent of
Republicans would rather pay lower taxes and have the government spend
less.  Differences across racial and ethnic lines were modest (Table 8.8).
The Future
Few Californians were aware that the state’s population was about
35 million people; only 16 percent placed it in the 30 million to 39
million range.  According to PPIC projections, the state will have
between 43 million and 48 million residents by 2025, but when asked
what the state’s population might be in that year, only 13 percent of
respondents expected the state’s population to be in the 40 million to 49
million range in 2025 (Table 8.9).  This pattern resembled that of five
years ago.
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Table 8.8
Tax and Spending Preference by Political Group
(responses in percent)
“Which of the following statements do you agree with more:”
All Party Registration Likely
Adults Dem. Rep. Ind. Voters
I’d rather pay higher taxes and have the
state government spend more money
for roads and other infrastructure
projects 49 60 42 52 54
I’d rather pay lower taxes and have the
state government spend less money
for roads and other infrastructure
projects 43 35 50 42 39
Do not  know 8 5 8 6 7
Table 8.9
Perceptions of California’s Population
(responses in percent)
“What do you think the state of California’s population is
today—in millions?” and “Could you please tell me what
you think the state of California’s population will
be about 20 years from now—in  millions?”
California
Population
Today
California
Population in
2025
Under 10 million 16 8
10–19 million 13 9
20–29 million 13 9
30–39 million 16 8
40–49 million 4 13
Over 50 million 11 27
Do not know 27 26
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When told that the state would add another 10 million residents
between now and 2025, six in 10 said it would be a bad thing for them
and their families, and only 14 percent considered it a good thing (Table
8.10).  Whites (66%) were the most likely and Latinos (46%) the least
likely to be pessimistic, but pluralities across all political and
demographic groups were unenthusiastic about population growth.
Earlier surveys—even those conducted when the economy was strong
and the state had a budget surplus—showed similar results.
Today’s most important issue seems to influence residents’
perceptions of what the future holds.  The economy, jobs, and
unemployment top the list of most important issues in both 2004 and
2025.  Across the state, nearly one in four residents said that these
economic issues will be the most important in 2025, whereas 10 percent
or less mentioned others issues, such as housing (10%), environment and
pollution (8%), population growth and development (8%), water quality
and availability (7%), or education (5%).
Economic issues were the top future concern in every region, but
other important issues showed some regional variation.  San Francisco
Bay Area residents were more likely than others to express concern about
the environment and pollution in 2025 (12%).  Residents of the Orange
Table 8.10
Perceptions of Future Growth by Race/Ethicity
(responses in percent)
“Between now and 2025, California’s population is estimated to
increase by 10 million people from 35 to 45 million. On balance,
do you think this population growth is a good thing or a bad thing
or does it make no difference to you and your family?”
Race/Ethnicity
All
Adults Asian
African
American Latino White
Good thing 14 18 11 20 12
Bad thing 59 54 58 46 66
No difference 23 23 26 30 19
Do not know 4 5 5 4 3
235
County and San Diego (12%), the San Francisco Bay Area (11%), and
Los Angeles (11%) were nearly twice as likely as Central Valley (6%) or
Inland Empire (6%) residents to express concern about future housing
costs and availability.  Orange County and San Diego residents were the
most concerned about immigration (8%).  About one in three Asians,
African Americans, and Latinos—but only 18 percent of whites—said
that the economy, jobs, and unemployment would be the biggest issues
facing California in 2025 (Table 8.11).  Whites (11%) were much more
likely than Asians (3%), African Americans (3%), or Latinos (2%) to
name water quality and availability as the most important issue in 2025.
In general, Californians were pessimistic about the future quality of
life in their state.  Nearly half (49%) thought that the state will be a
worse place to live in 2025 than it is now; one-quarter said it will be a
better place, and one-fifth said there will be no change (Table 8.12).
Five years ago, 43 percent thought it would be a worse place and a
similar 25 percent expected it to become a better place by 2025.  Levels
of pessimism were similar across regions but varied across racial and
ethnic groups.  Whites (57%) were more likely than African Americans
Table 8.11
Most Important Issue in 2025 by Race/Ethnicity
(responses in percent)
“What do you think will be the most important issue facing
people in California in the year 2025?”(top 6 mentions)
Race/Ethnicity
All
Adults Asian
African
American Latino White
Economy, jobs, unemployment 24 32 33 33 18
Housing costs, housing
availability 10 12 15 8 10
Environment, pollution 8 6 3 4 11
Population growth and
development 8 8 8 8 8
Water quality and availability 7 3 3 2 11
Education, schools 5 5 7 5 5
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Table 8.12
Overall Conditions in 2025 by Race/Ethnicity
(responses in percent)
“Overall, do you think that in 2025 California will be a
better place to live than it is now or a worse place to
live than it is now or will there be no change?”
Race/Ethnicity
All
Adults Asian
African
American Latino White
Better place 25 31 25 31 21
Worse place 49 34 49 39 57
No change 20 24 18 24 17
Do not know 6 11 8 6 5
(49%), Latinos (39%), and Asians (34%) to say that the state will
become a worse place to live in 20 years.  Residents with and without
children at home were equally pessimistic, but pessimism increased with
education and income.
What should be done to plan for the state’s future?  About one-third
of residents said that the state should focus on improving jobs and the
economy.  Slightly less (30%) cited improved roads, schools, and water
systems, and smaller shares mentioned environmental protection (16%)
and creating a more equal society (9%).  By far the top priority for
Asians, African Americans, and Latinos is improving jobs and the
economy; whites were the least likely to mention those issues as well as
creating a more equal society.  Whites were also the most likely to
mention roads, schools, and water systems (Table 8.13).
Statewide, pluralities said that their regions will be worse places to
live in 2025 than they are now.  Inland Empire residents were the most
optimistic; almost one in four predicted an overall improvement in their
region.  Once again, there were significant racial and ethnic differences
(Table 8.14).  More than half of whites (52%) were pessimistic,
compared to 30 percent of Asians, 45 percent of African Americans, and
41 percent of Latinos.  Asians were the most likely to say that their part
of California will be a better place to live in 2025 than it is now.
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Table 8.13
Most Important Priority by Race/Ethnicity
(responses in percent)
“In planning for the expected population growth between now
and 2025, what do you think should be the state’s
most important priority?”
Race/Ethnicity
All
Adults Asian
African
American Latino White
Improving jobs and the
economy 34 47 41 37 30
Providing roads, schools, water
systems 30 24 19 26 35
Protecting the environment 16 10 9 16 17
Creating a more equal society 9 10 15 12 6
Something else (specify) 9 6 16 7 10
Do not know 2 3 0 2 2
Table 8.14
Regional Conditions in 2025 by Race/Ethnicity
(responses in percent)
“Do you think that in 2025 your part of California will be a better place
to live than it is now or a worse place to live than it is
now or will there be no change?”
Race/Ethnicity
All
Adults Asian
African
American Latino White
Better place 18 25 21 22 14
Worse place 46 30 45 41 52
No change 33 38 33 32 32
Do not know 3 7 1 5 2
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Overall, Californians were split over the future of K–12 education
and good job opportunities in their regions.  Five years ago, they were
more optimistic about both issues, with 63 percent predicting an
improved public school system and 60 percent expecting improved job
opportunities and economic conditions over a 20-year span.  Inland
Empire residents were more optimistic than residents elsewhere, but
regional differences were relatively small (Table 8.15).
There were slightly greater differences across racial and ethnic groups
on the questions of public education and job opportunities.  A majority
of Latinos (55%) believed that the public education system in their part
of California will improve, whereas most African Americans (56%),
whites (51%), and a plurality of Asians (44%) said that K–12 public
education will worsen (Table 8.16).  Most African Americans (59%) and
Latinos (52%) were also pessimistic about future job opportunities and
economic conditions, whereas pluralities of whites (47%) and Asians
(45%) expected these conditions to improve.  In general, residents with
Table 8.15
Perceptions of Jobs and Schools by Region
(responses in percent)
“Please tell me which is more likely to happen in
 your part of California.”
Region
All
Adults
Central
Valley
San
Francisco
Bay Area
Los
Angeles
Orange/
San Diego
Inland
Empire
The public
education system
will
Improve 45 46 39 47 43 52
Get worse 46 46 51 45 48 40
Job opportunities
and economic
conditions will
Improve 44 46 46 40 43 53
Get worse 47 48 44 51 47 41
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Table 8.16
Perceptions of Jobs and Schools by Race/Ethnicity
(responses in percent)
“Please tell me which is more likely to happen in
 your part of California.”
Race/Ethnicity
All
Adults Asian
African
American Latino White
The public education
system will
Improve 45 36 38 55 43
Get worse 46 44 56 34 51
Job opportunities and
economic conditions
will
Improve 44 45 38 41 47
Get worse 47 34 59 52 45
high incomes and high levels of education were pessimistic about schools
but optimistic about the economic conditions.
On other issues that were currently viewed as major regional
problems, most residents expected conditions to go from bad to worse
(Table 8.17).  Large majorities of state residents said that the availability
of affordable housing (78%) and traffic conditions (81%) will worsen in
their part of California between now and 2025, and this pessimism was
shared across regions.  Seven in 10 residents (69%) said that air quality
will grow worse by 2025.
Although majorities in all racial and ethnic groups thought that air
quality will worsen, this view was expressed more often among African
Americans (75%) and Latinos (74%) than among whites (67%) and
Asians (64%).  Racial and ethnic differences were smaller on the issue of
housing affordability and traffic conditions.  Younger residents were
more likely than others to say that air quality will worsen, and pessimism
about traffic and housing increased with income and education (Table
8.18).
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Table 8.17
Perceptions of Traffic, Air Quality, and Housing by Region
(responses in percent)
“Please tell me which is more likely to happen in
your part of California.”
Region
All
Adults
Central
Valley
San
Francisco
Bay Area
Los
Angeles
Orange/
San Diego
Inland
Empire
The air quality
will
Improve 23 16 26 24 27 21
Get worse 69 79 65 71 65 74
The availability
of affordable
housing will
Improve 18 17 14 18 16 23
Get worse 78 80 80 78 79 73
Traffic
conditions on
freeways and
major roads will
Improve 15 11 18 14 14 17
Get worse 81 86 77 83 82 82
Governance
When asked who should make important decisions on growth issues,
most residents (73%) said that local voters should do so at the ballot box.
Preferences for direct democracy were more common in Orange County,
San Diego, the Central Valley, and the Inland Empire than they were in
the San Francisco Bay Area (Table 8.19).  Most African Americans
(81%), Asians and whites (73%), and Latinos (71%) also preferred that
approach.  There were no significant differences between Democrats
(73%), Republicans (77%), and Independents (75%) on this question,
although support for local direct democracy increased somewhat with
income and education.
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Table 8.18
Perceptions of Traffic, Air Quality, and Housing by Race/Ethnicity
(responses in percent)
“Please tell me which is more likely to happen in
your part of California.”
Race/Ethnicity
All
Adults Asian
African
American Latino White
The air quality will
Improve 23 22 20 20 25
Get worse 69 64 75 74 67
The availability of
affordable housing
will
Improve 18 19 20 18 16
Get worse 78 70 79 78 79
Traffic conditions on
freeways and major
roads will
Improve 15 16 20 21 11
Get worse 81 74 79 75 86
Residents lacked confidence in their local government’s ability to
plan for future growth.  Only 15 percent of Californians said that they
have a great deal of confidence in their local governments to plan for the
future; Orange County and San Diego residents (11%) were the least
confident, compared to 17 percent of their Los Angeles counterparts.
Confidence was higher among Latinos (19%) than whites, African
Americans, and Asians (all 13%) and lower among Independents than
Republicans and Democrats (Table 8.20).
The state government also received low ratings on this point.
Twelve percent of residents had a great deal of confidence that it could
effectively plan for the state’s future, 46 percent had only some
confidence, and 40 percent had very little or no confidence.  Across the
state, Inland Empire residents were the most likely (18%) and San
Francisco Bay Area residents the least likely (7%) to express a great deal
of confidence in the state government (Table 8.21).  Those with at least
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Table 8.19
Local Growth Decisions by Region
(responses in percent)
“Who should make important decisions on growth issues?”
Region
All
Adults
Central
Valley
San
Francisco
Bay Area
Los
Angeles
Orange/
San Diego
Inland
Empire
Local voters should
make the important
decisions at the
ballot box 73 76 66 73 77 74
Local elected officials
should provide
leadership and
make the most
important decisions 23 21 30 22 22 22
Do not know 4 3 4 5 1 4
Table 8.20
Confidence in Local Government by Political Group
(responses in percent)
“How much confidence do you have in your local government’s
abilities to plan for growth and the future in your region?”
All Party Registration Likely
Adults Dem. Rep. Ind. Voters
A great deal 15 13 15 10 13
Only some 47 53 49 44 52
Very little 28 25 26 31 27
None at all 8 7 9 14 8
Do not know 2 2 1 1 0
some college education or in higher-income brackets were somewhat
more confident than others.
As further evidence of a lack of confidence in state government
officials, only 35 percent of California residents approved of the
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Table 8.21
Confidence in State Government by Region
(responses in percent)
“How much confidence do you have in the state government’s
ability to plan for the state’s future and growth?”
Region
All
Adults
Central
Valley
San
Francisco
Bay Area
Los
Angeles
Orange/
San Diego
Inland
Empire
A great deal 12 12 7 14 12 18
Only some 46 48 45 46 47 42
Very little 31 30 36 30 31 29
None at all 9 8 11 8 9 8
Do not know 2 2 1 2 1 3
legislature’s handling of the plans for the future, and 54 percent of likely
voters disapproved.  With the exception of Bay Area residents, who were
more dubious than their counterparts elsewhere, there were virtually no
partisan or regional differences on this question.  Among Latinos, 46
percent approved of the legislature’s plans, whereas only 31 percent of
respondents from other racial and ethnic backgrounds expressed positive
ratings.
In comparison, the highly popular governor at the time of this
survey was a major source of optimism.  Most Californians (55%) said
they approved of Arnold Schwarzenegger’s plans and policies for
California’s future, including 82 percent of Republicans, 56 percent of
Independents, and 46 percent of Democrats (Table 8.22).  Majorities in
most regions approved of his approach with the exception of the San
Francisco Bay Area (48%).  As for racial and ethnic differences, whites
(65%) and Asians (58%) were more likely than African Americans (44%)
and Latinos (38%) to approve.  The governor’s ratings increased with
age, education, and income.
244
Table 8.22
Governor’s Approval Ratings by Political Group
(responses in percent)
“Do you approve or disapprove of the way that Governor Schwarzenegger
is handling plans and policies for California’s future?”
All Party Registration Likely
Adults Dem. Rep. Ind. Voters
Approve 55 46 82 56 61
Disapprove 30 39 8 31 26
Do not know 15 15 10 13 13
Californians see themselves as having a limited role in growth
planning today.  One in eight Californians said that they had been
involved a lot in discussions about the issues in planning for the future in
their part of California.  In comparison, 58 percent of Californians had
little or no involvement.  Seventeen percent of African Americans and 14
percent of whites said they had discussed such issues, compared to 9
percent of Latinos and only 3 percent of Asians (Table 8.23).
Participation also tended to increase with education, income, and years
at one’s residence, but there were no significant differences across
regions.
Table 8.23
Civic Involvement in Planning Decisions by Race/Ethnicity
(responses in percent)
“How much have you been involved in discussions about the
issues in planning for the future in your part of California?”
Race/Ethnicity
All
Adults Asian
African
American Latino White
A lot 12 3 17 9 14
Only some 30 31 28 22 34
Very little 32 34 33 33 31
Not at all 26 32 22 36 21
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Many Californians would like to be more involved in such
discussions, however.  Overall, one in four Californians would like to be
involved a lot, and 41 percent said they would like to be involved only to
some degree.  Almost a third said they would like very little or no
involvement.  There were no significant variations across regions or
partisan differences on this question, although interest increased with
education and varied by race and ethnicity (Table 8.24).  Those who
lacked confidence in their local government’s ability to plan or who
thought that the state was going in the wrong direction were more likely
to express interest in these discussions.
Table 8.24
Preferences for Civic Involvement by Race/Ethnicity
(responses in percent)
“How much would you like to be involved in discussions about the
issues in planning for the future in your part of California?”
Race/Ethnicity
All
Adults Asian
African
American Latino White
A lot 25 16 35 27 23
Only some 41 45 40 35 45
Very little 20 27 16 22 20
Not at all 12 11 8 16 11
Do not know 2 1 1 0 1
Policy Options
Although most Californians we surveyed were not engaged in local
planning discussions, they had strong opinions about what the state must
do to plan for the future.  Most (85%) named three types of
infrastructure projects—school facilities (40%), surface transportation
(24%), and water systems (21%)—as their top priorities.  Large
pluralities of African Americans (58%), Latinos (48%), and Asians
(41%) thought that school facilities should be the top priority for state
infrastructure funds, but whites were more evenly divided between
schools (35%), surface transportation (29%), and water systems (24%).
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Democrats (44%) and Independents (43%) were more likely than
Republicans (32%) to favor funding for school facilities.  Republicans
were almost equally split between surface transportation (30%) and
school facilities (32%).  Half of those ages 18 to 34 gave top priority to
school facilities, compared to only a quarter of those ages 55 and older.
About half of Californians with children chose school facilities as the top
priority, whereas those without children showed significantly less support
(34%).
Within the realm of transportation, however, Californians were not
of one mind when it came to funding priorities.  Almost half (49%)
listed road-oriented projects, including freeways and highways (32%),
local streets and roads (10%), and carpool lanes (7%).  A slightly smaller
portion gave priority to transit-oriented solutions, including light rail
systems (31%) and public bus systems (13%).  Pluralities of Orange
County and San Diego (38%) and Inland Empire (37%) residents gave
priority to freeways and highways, but similar shares in the San Francisco
Bay Area (38%) and Central Valley (34%) preferred light rail systems
(Table 8.25).  Los Angeles residents were evenly divided between these
Table 8.25
Transportation Priority by Region
(responses in percent)
“What type of surface transportation project do you think should
have the top priority for public funding as your part of California
gets ready for the growth that is expected by 2025?”
Region
All
Adults
Central
Valley
San
Francisco
Bay Area
Los
Angeles
Orange/
San Diego
Inland
Empire
Freeways and
highways
32 28 26 33 38 37
Light rail system 31 34 38 31 28 23
Public bus system 13 12 16 12 12 13
Local streets and roads 10 12 7 11 6 13
Carpool lanes 7 5 5 9 8 6
Something else (specify) 4 6 6 3 4 4
Do not know 3 3 2 1 4 4
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two modes.  Overall, a narrow plurality of urban residents preferred to
fund light rail in their areas (32%), and a similarly small plurality of
suburbanites preferred spending on highways and roads (34%).
There were also differences in transportation preferences among
racial, ethnic, and political groups.  Whites (39%) were much more
likely than Asians (28%), African Americans (24%), and Latinos (16%)
to prefer funding for light rail, but 21 percent of African Americans, 19
percent of Latinos, and 16 percent of Asians thought that the public bus
system should have the top priority for public funding.  Republicans
were more likely than Democrats to prefer funding for freeways and
highways (41% versus 26%), and Democrats were more likely than
Republicans to prefer funding light rail systems (38% versus 30%).
We also asked a series of tradeoff questions to understand how
Californians were thinking through the state’s planning issues.  In each,
respondents were asked to choose between two proposed strategies to
address the top priorities for public funding of infrastructure projects.
There was considerable consensus that the state should focus on
expanding mass transit and making more efficient use of existing
freeways and highways (67%) rather than building more freeways and
highways (30%).  Majorities in each region held this view (Table 8.26).
Democrats (73%) expressed more support than Republicans (59%), and
whites (79%) were more supportive than Latinos (61%).  Support was
highest in the San Francisco Bay Area, whereas residents of the Inland
Empire preferred new freeways and highways.
When asked to choose between two policy options for preparing the
state’s education system for 2025, a majority of Californians (55%)
preferred strategies to use existing public education facilities more
efficiently (Table 8.27).  Another 42 percent thought that we should
focus on building more schools and universities.  Whites (36%) and
Asians (38%) were less likely than Latinos (52%) and African Americans
(47%) to support new school construction.  The preference for more
building was lowest in the San Francisco Bay Area.  Democrats (40%)
and Republicans (36%) express similar support for more building.
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Table 8.26
Transportation Tradeoffs by Region
(responses in percent)
“Which one comes closest to your views about planning
for 2025 in your part of California?”
Region
All
Adults
Central
Valley
San
Francisco
Bay Area
Los
Angeles
Orange/
San Diego
Inland
Empire
We should focus on
expanding mass transit
and more efficient use of
freeways and highways 67 66 75 64 66 59
We should focus on
building more freeways
and highways 30 31 23 33 32 38
Do not know 3 3 2 3 2 3
Table 8.27
School Facility Tradeoffs by Region
(responses in percent)
“Which one comes closest to your views about planning for
2025 in your part of California?”
Region
All
Adults
Central
Valley
San
Francisco
Bay Area
Los
Angeles
Orange/
San Diego
Inland
Empire
We should focus on repairs
and renovation, year-
round schools, and other
strategies to more
efficiently use the existing
public education facilities 55 52 62 52 52 52
We should focus on
building more public
schools and universities 42 45 34 45 42 46
Do not know 3 3 4 3 6 2
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As in transportation and education, Californians preferred demand-
management strategies for water systems rather than new construction
projects in their region (Table 8.28).  Fifty-five percent preferred more
efficient use of the current water supply, whereas 41 percent would
rather build new water storage systems and increase the water supply.
Again, the San Francisco Bay Area was the region with the highest level
of support for increased efficiency (62%), whereas public support for
new water storage systems was highest in the Inland Empire (47%).  A
majority across all racial and ethnic groups chose water conservation over
building new water systems (Asians, 61%; African Americans, 53%;
Latinos, 58%; whites, 53%).  There were also partisan differences, with
most Democrats (58%) favoring water conservation and a majority of
Republicans (51%) supporting the building of new water systems.
Younger Californians were more likely than older Californians to favor
Table 8.28
Water Facility Tradeoffs by Region
(responses in percent)
“Which one comes closest to your views about planning for
2025 in your part of California?”
Region
All
Adults
Central
Valley
San
Francisco
Bay Area
Los
Angeles
Orange/
San
Diego
Inland
Empire
We should focus on
water conservation,
user allocation,
pricing, and other
strategies to more
efficiently use the
current water
supply 55 53 62 55 51 51
We should focus on
building new water
storage systems and
increasing the water
supply 41 43 33 41 45 47
Do not know 4 4 5 4 4 2
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efficiency:  60 percent of 18 to 34 year olds preferred more efficient use
of existing supplies, compared to 50 percent of those ages 55 and older.
Another important policy consideration is the extent to which state
government should be involved in local planning.  When asked about
the state’s role, about six in 10 Californians believed that the state
government should provide guidelines for local land use and
development as opposed to leaving land-use decision to localities.  Los
Angeles residents and Democrats were somewhat more likely to favor
this position, as were majorities in each region (Table 8.29) and in each
racial and ethnic group (Asians, 64%; African Americans, 63%; Latinos,
62%; whites, 53%).  Public support for state land-use guidelines
decreased somewhat with age and income.  Renters were only somewhat
more likely than homeowners to favor state growth guidelines (62%
versus 53%).
Californians also had strong opinions about whether and how local
governments should work together.  Nearly eight in 10 Californians
(77%) preferred that local governments work together to form a
Table 8.29
State Government Involvement by Region
(responses in percent)
“Please tell me which statement comes closer to your views.”
Region
All
Adults
Central
Valley
San
Francisco
Bay Area
Los
Angeles
Orange/
San Diego
Inland
Empire
The state government
should provide
guidelines for local
land use and
development 57 51 59 63 53 60
The state government
should not be
involved in local land
use and development 37 43 36 31 40 37
Do not know 6 6 5 6 7 3
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common regional plan.  Large majorities favored this view in each party
and region (Table 8.30) as well as each age, educational, and racial and
ethnic group.
The public’s attitudes toward current spending and tax increases will
also shape policy choices on planning for the future.  A majority of
Californians (60%) and likely voters (67%) thought that local
government lacked adequate funding for roads, school facilities, and
other infrastructure projects.  Democrats (70%) were somewhat more
likely than Republicans (62%) to hold this view (Table 8.31).  Pluralities
across regions agreed that their local governments did not have adequate
funding.  San Francisco Bay Area residents (66%) were the most likely
and Los Angelenos (56%) the least likely to say that local government
lacked adequate funding.  California residents who had incomes over
$40,000 (66%), a college education (68%), and who were white (67%)
were more likely than their counterparts to say that their local
governments had inadequate funding for infrastructure projects.
Table 8.30
Local Government Involvement by Region
(responses in percent)
“Please tell me which statement comes closer to your views.”
Region
All
Adults
Central
Valley
San
Francisco
Bay Area
Los
Angeles
Orange/
San Diego
Inland
Empire
Local governments
should work together
and have a common
regional plan 77 78 82 78 74 78
Local governments
should work
independently and each
have its own local plan 20 19 16 20 23 20
Do not know 3 3 2 2 3 2
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Table 8.31
Perceptions of Local Government Funding by Political Group
(responses in percent)
“Do you think local government does or does not have adequate funding
for the roads, school facilities, and other infrastructure projects that are
needed to prepare for future growth in your part of California?”
All Party Registration Likely
Adults Dem. Rep. Ind. Voters
Does have adequate funding 33 25 32 33 28
Does not have adequate funding 60 70 62 61 67
Do not know 7 5 6 6 5
Would Californians support tax increases to prepare for future
growth?  A solid majority of likely voters (66%) said they would vote to
increase the local sales tax for roads and public transit projects by one
half-cent for 20 years.  (In California, such local special taxes require a
two-thirds vote to pass.)  Democrats (73%) and Independents (70%)
were more likely than Republicans (58%) to support that approach.
Latinos (76%) were more likely than residents of any other racial or
ethnic group to support a measure of this type.  Sixty-six percent of
whites and lower percentages of Asian and African Americans (both
59%) said they would vote yes on this measure.  Across regions, 66
percent or more of all adults and at least six in 10 likely voters would
support this local sales tax increase.  There were no significant differences
across gender, age, or educational groups or across regions on this issue.
However, support for this local transportation sales tax measure declined
at higher-income levels.  For building and improving local school
facilities, the overall majority was even stronger:  72 percent said they
would vote yes on a 20-year bond measure to pay for school construction
and renovation projects in their local school district.
Residents were more divided, however, when asked whether they
would support disproportionate funding for these low-income and
minority neighborhoods to alleviate infrastructure deficiencies.  Overall,
56 percent of California adults thought that these neighborhoods should
receive more public funding for school facilities even if it meant less
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funding for other school districts; 38 percent say they should not.  Large
percentages of Latinos and African Americans (both 67%) and Asians
(59%) supported that approach for school facilities, but only 48 percent
of whites did so (Table 8.32).  Party divisions were even more important.
Sixty-two percent of Democrats favored disproportionate funding for
disadvantaged neighborhoods, compared to only 37 percent of
Republicans.  Most residents in Los Angeles (64%) and the San
Francisco Bay Area (60%) favored this approach, whereas other regions
were less supportive.
Of the 56 percent who thought that low-income and minority
neighborhoods were more likely than other neighborhoods in their
region to have school facilities in need of repair, two-thirds believed that
these neighborhoods should receive more public funding even at the
expense of other neighborhoods.  In contrast, two-thirds of Californians
viewed low-income and minority neighborhoods as more likely than
others to have roads and other transportation infrastructure in need of
repair and replacement, yet they were more evenly divided (49% versus
44%) when asked if these neighborhoods should receive more public
funding for roads and other transportation projects.  Los Angeles (57%)
was the only region where more than half of residents thought that low-
income neighborhoods should receive more funding.  Whites (54%)
Table 8.32
Preferences for Local School Funding by Race/Ethnicity
(responses in percent)
“Should school districts in low-income and minority neighborhoods
receive more public funding for school facilities even if it means
 less funding for other school districts?”
Race/Ethnicity
All
Adults Asian
African
American Latino White
Yes 56 59 67 67 48
No 38 30 28 27 46
Do not know 6 11 5 6 6
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were not supportive of weighted funding formulas for this purpose,
whereas African Americans (66%), Latinos (62%), and Asians (50%)
viewed it more favorably (Table 8.33).  There was also a partisan divide:
Fifty-five percent of Democrats thought that low-income and minority
neighborhoods should receive more public funding for this purpose,
whereas 33 percent of Republicans held this view.  Among the 61
percent of residents who believed that low-income and minority
neighborhoods were more likely than others to have road and other
transportation deficiencies, 65 percent agreed that such neighborhoods
should receive higher public funding even at the expense of others.
Table 8.33
Preferences for Local Transportation Funding by Race/Ethnicity
(responses in percent)
“Should low-income and minority neighborhoods receive more
public funding for roads and other transportation infrastructure
even if it means less funding for projects in other neighborhoods?”
Race/Ethnicity
All
Adults Asian
African
American Latino White
Yes 49 50 66 62 39
No 44 36 30 31 54
Do not know 7 14 4 7 7
Conclusion
Much has changed since 1999, the last time we asked Californians to
evaluate the state’s future.  At that time, the state’s economy was
booming, and the doomsayers who had given California up for dead in
the early 1990s were proven wrong.  Although Californians in 1999
overwhelmingly believed that their state was headed in the right direction
and expected the good economic times to continue, they still worried
about the future.  Most expected that current problems—such as traffic
congestion, crime rates, an income gap between the rich and the poor,
and environmental pollution—could only go from bad to worse.  Many
believed that the best days were behind them, and that the state would
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never be able to catch up with the rapid population growth and
immigration facing the state and plan for a better tomorrow.  But they
also hoped that schools and job conditions would continue to improve
because the economy was strong and the state’s coffers were overflowing
with public funds.
What gave the public a dim view of the state’s future?  Many
Californians had the nagging feeling that the state’s leadership was not
up to the challenges that were ahead.  Every survey that we conducted in
the late 1990s found that many voters did not trust their state
government to act efficiently and responsively.  This distrust ran deep
and helped explain their desire to resolve important issues though
initiatives at the ballot box (see Schrag, 1998; Sears and Citrin, 1982;
Clark and Inglehart, 1998; Cain and Gerber, 2001; Broder, 2000;
Bowler and Donovan, 1998).
That was then, and this is now.  No sooner did the new millennium
begin than a host of new problems emerged—some confirming the
doubts that were present about California’s readiness for the future.  The
high-tech boom went into a tailspin in late 2000 and, with it, the
promise of job creation, budget surpluses, and extra funding for public
projects without raising taxes.  The state began to experience power
brownouts in 2001 that many attributed to market manipulation made
possible by a flawed state law to deregulate the electricity industry.  The
terrorist strike in September 2001 officially ended one of the longest
periods of U.S. peace and prosperity and launched the war on terror.  By
2002, the state’s budget deficit had grown and partisan gridlock
prevented the governor and legislature from passing a balanced budget
on time.  That same year, the state’s gubernatorial election set a record
for the most campaign spending and lowest turnout in state history, and
the daily blitz of negative advertising took its toll on an already cynical
California public (Baldassare et al., 2004).  For the winner of that
contest, the new year and 2003 brought more history-making bad news:
a record state budget deficit, more gridlock over spending and taxes,
record low approval ratings for the governor and state legislature, and the
first-ever recall election of a California governor.
When we checked the pulse of Californians in the May 2004 survey,
Governor Schwarzenegger had been in office for six months.  He was
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enjoying high approval ratings, and there was a rebound in confidence in
the overall direction of the state and improvement in ratings of the state’s
economy.  Still, the mood of the state fell far short of the optimism that
was pervasive in the late 1990s. The public had not shed its lingering
doubts about the government’s ability to perform, and voter distrust was
still high.
Today, population pressures and economic uncertainties continue to
cloud the state’s future.  Residents rank jobs and the economy among
their chief concerns, both now and over the next two decades.  For this
reason, they believe that improving the state’s economy and job
opportunities takes precedence over roads, infrastructure, and
environmental protection in planning for growth.  Yet there is little
doubt that residents regard growth-related problems—such as traffic
congestion, air pollution, and housing affordability—as a threat to their
quality of life.
Although the facts about population trends are not widely known,
the public’s reactions to population projections—both statewide and
regionally—are strongly negative.  Indeed, today’s problems are expected
to get worse, and the hopes for improving conditions have diminished in
the past five years.  There is an overwhelming belief that air quality,
traffic congestion, and housing affordability will worsen and only muted
optimism that we will see improving schools and job opportunities.
Most Californians believe that the government lacks the resources to
fund roads, schools, and other infrastructure projects that are needed to
plan for the future.  Moreover, a tiny minority of those sampled is
confident that state and local government can rise to the challenge.
Their one glimmer of hope at the time of the survey was their new
governor.
What type of planning should and could take place as Californians
prepare for 2025?  Residents agree that the emphasis should be on school
facilities, surface transportation, and water systems.  They also seem
resigned to the fact that the era of big projects in California’s history is
long gone.  Rather than looking to massive highway projects, new public
universities, and new water systems, they favor more efficient uses of
existing infrastructure.  The public believes that the state, working in
concert with local governments to develop regional plans, can provide a
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better blueprint for housing and transportation—one that can ensure
jobs, economic vitality, and a decent quality of life for local
communities.  With certain assurances that their money will be put to
appropriate uses, the majority seems willing to invest in the future by
increasing taxes and spending for schools, roads, and what they define as
deserving purposes.
Other complex issues must also be addressed in any future plans.
Immigration and other demographic trends have transformed California
into a majority-minority state, and the gap between the rich and the poor
has been growing (Reed, Haber, and Mameesh, 1996; Reed, 1999;
Reyes, 2001).  Most Californians perceive inequalities in roads, schools,
and other infrastructure.  However, public support for diminishing these
disparities—for example, by investing disproportionately in low-income
and minority neighborhoods—is more tepid.  Yet, without careful
planning, current inequities could be locked in for decades or even
exacerbated.  The challenge of reaching consensus in a state as large and
diverse as California is also a roadblock to future planning.  Regional,
racial and ethnic, and partisan divisions sometimes lead to disparate
solutions to current problems—even when everyone acknowledges these
problems explicitly.
Last but not least is the task of restoring the public’s trust and
confidence in government at all levels in California.  A concerted effort
will be needed to bridge the gap between the people and their
government.  In our system, voters will have the final say in many of the
important policy decisions that shape the future of the state.  It is
therefore essential to engage the public in a way that informs the
decisions they will be asked to make at the ballot box.
Appendix:  Survey Methodology
The findings in this chapter are based on a telephone survey of 2,506
California adult residents interviewed between May 24 and June 8,
2004.  Interviewing took place on weekday nights and weekend days,
using a computer-generated random sample of telephone numbers that
ensured that both listed and unlisted telephone numbers were called.  All
telephone exchanges in California were eligible for calling.  Telephone
numbers in the survey sample were called up to six times to increase the
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likelihood of reaching eligible households.  Once a household was
reached, an adult respondent (age 18 or older) was randomly chosen for
interviewing by using the “last birthday method” to avoid biases in age
and gender.  Each interview took an average of 19 minutes to complete.
Interviewing was conducted in English, Spanish, Chinese, Korean, or
Vietnamese.  This choice of languages is because Spanish is the dominant
non-English language in the state, and the three Asian languages account
for most of the non-English speaking Asian adults in California.  Casa
Hispana translated the survey into Spanish.  Schulman, Ronca &
Bucuvalas, Inc., translated the survey into Chinese, Korean, and
Vietnamese and conducted the telephone interviewing.
We used recent U.S. Census and state figures to compare the
demographic characteristics of the survey sample with characteristics of
California’s adult population.  The survey sample was closely comparable
to the census and state figures on dimensions such as age, gender, and
geographic distribution.  The survey data in this report were statistically
weighted to account for any demographic differences.
The sampling error for the total sample of 2,506 adults is ± 2
percent at the 95 percent confidence level.  This means that 95 times out
of 100, the results will be within 2 percentage points of what they would
be if all adults in California were interviewed.  The sampling error for
subgroups is larger.  The sampling error for the 1,868 registered voters is
± 2.3 percent.  The sampling error for the 1,284 likely voters is ± 3
percent.  Sampling error is only one type of error to which surveys are
subject.  Results may also be affected by such factors as wording,
question order, and survey timing.
Throughout the report, we refer to five geographic regions.  “Central
Valley” includes Butte, Colusa, El Dorado, Fresno, Glenn, Kern, Kings,
Madera, Merced, Placer, Sacramento, San Joaquin, Shasta, Stanislaus,
Sutter, Tehama, Tulare, Yolo, and Yuba Counties.  “San Francisco Bay
Area” includes Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco, San
Mateo, Santa Clara, Solano, and Sonoma Counties.  “Los Angeles” refers
to Los Angeles County, “Inland Empire” includes Riverside and San
Bernardino Counties, and “Orange County and San Diego” refers to
Orange and San Diego Counties.  These five regions were chosen for
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analysis because they are the major population centers of the state,
accounting for approximately 90 percent of the state population.
We present specific results for respondents in the four self-identified
racial/ethnic groups of Asian, African American, Latino, and white. We
did not include the “other” racial/ethnic category because of small
sample size.  We also compare the opinions of registered Democrats,
Republicans, and Independents.  The “Independents” category includes
only those who are registered to vote as “decline to state.” We also
analyze the responses of “likely” voters who are the most likely to
frequently participate in the state’s elections based on their responses to a
series of questions on past voting, level of political interests, and
intentions to vote.
We used earlier PPIC Statewide Surveys to compare trends over time
in California, such as the December 1999 survey that asked residents for
their perceptions of California’s future and population trends, and a May
2001 survey that asked about the impacts of recent population growth
on the state’s social and economic conditions (Baldassare, 1999, 2001).
We also rely on the survey analysis and interpretation in Baldassare
(2000, 2002a).
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